Friday, October 18, 2024

Kexel Chabot on Falsifying the Unitary Executive

Christine Kexel Chabot, Marquette University Law School, has posted Rejecting the Unitary Executive:

George Washington (NYPL)
Critics have dismissed originalism as an empty methodology incapable of resolving our most important constitutional disputes. The debate over the unitary executive has proved particularly difficult to resolve as a matter of original public meaning.  While unitary scholars claim that Article II grants the President an indefeasible power to remove all subordinates at will, their interpretation rests on minimal text and conflicts with significant historical evidence. The Supreme Court circumvented this impasse when it adopted a strong unitary interpretation of Article II in Trump v. United States.

This Article develops a new methodological framework to address the underlying disconnect between ongoing historical disputes over the unitary executive and original public meaning’s claims to a determinate understanding of the Constitution. Leading originalists have staked their claims to determinacy on empirical, fact-based assertions of historical consensus on the Constitution’s meaning. My framework responds to these empirical claims on their own terms. It requires unitary theorists who assert historical consensus to measure their claims against the entire historical record including evidence that would render these claims false. Under my approach, for example, a theory asserting an absolute claim that all that swans are white cannot withstand observations of swans that are black. A theory of historical consensus that Article II empowered the President to remove all subordinates at will likewise cannot withstand reliable historical counterevidence of restrictions on the President’s removal power.

 While the supposedly competing evidence relied on by unitary executive theorists may show an unrestricted removal power over some subordinate officers, this evidence does not rule out tenure protection for other subordinate executive officers. It aligns just as well with the unitary executive’s theoretical alternative: a pluralist understanding in which Congress has discretion whether or not to restrict the President’s removal power. The framework developed by this Article makes clear what originalism’s underdetermined methodological framework has hidden from plain sight. The Founding generation rejected the unitary executive and not today’s pluralistic system of congressional discretion.

--Dan Ernst