Thursday, January 21, 2016

VanderVelde on the Dred Scott Case in Context

Lea S. VanderVelde, University of Iowa College of Law, has posted The Dred Scott Case in Context, which appears in the Journal of Supreme Court History 40 (2015): 263-81:
Credit: LC
This essay concisely summarizes several new discoveries about the Dred Scott case. It argues that only by examining three broader contexts does the case make sense and can its significance be seen. Contextual examination is necessary because the stipulated facts taken at face value make little sense. For example, how could aged slave bring a lawsuit in the first place and sustain it for eleven years against a master who lived in far-away New York? This seeming irrationality has led to speculation about motives which is, in fact, wrong.

The case can only be explained by resort to three contexts in which the case is embedded. They are: 1) the national geography of westward migration, 2) local Missouri law, and 3) the parties’ intimate relationships to persons, who were not named in the case. Theoretically, this essay argues that these contexts are useful, if not essential, to understanding most high-profile, high-significance lawsuits, like Dred Scott v. Sanford.

The first context highlights the larger role that slaves played in the nation’s expansion. There was a steady stream of slave petitioners who satisfied the criteria for freedom by having lived on free soil (freedom-by-residence) before arriving at the St. Louis courts in a slave state. The second context, local law, demonstrates certain aspects of the Missouri statute authorizing freedom suits. In many circumstances, Missouri law provided petitioning slaves with lawyers and a series of successful suits under that law created local expectations that slaves could sue for freedom and win. These two contexts demonstrate that the Scotts should have won the case easily, under Missouri law in the Missouri courts, until the Missouri Supreme Court changed course.

The third context highlights other people who had a stake in the outcome. On the plaintiffs’ side, changing the incentives, were Mrs. Dred Scott (Harriet) and the Scotts’ daughters. Harriet Scott’s status as a mother rendered her more legally relevant to the family’s stability because the daughters’ legal status hinged on the determination of their mother’s status. So recognizing Mrs. Scott and the children’s stake in the case helps explain the litigants’ tenacity. Behind the defendant, John F. A. Sanford was his extended family, the slave-holding Chouteaus, who favored litigating to the end. Recognizing these hidden persons changes the incentives. These persons could exercise influence on whether the case settled.

"Militant Democracy" and the Crisis Politics of the State--Then and Now

[By Anne Kornhauser]

One lesson I learned from writing a book on the intellectual history of the modern American state is that it is possible to appreciate the magnitude as well as the meaning of structural change by studying systematic thought--legal and otherwise. As I discussed in my previous post, the stance of partial detachment that most intellectuals assume makes them--theoretically, though not necessarily--well placed to divine the broad canvass on which transient events occur. This is all the more evident if thinkers from a variety of disciplines are all struggling with the same problem, even as they differ in methodological approaches and personal proclivities. In the 1930s and 1940s, the large structural change many intellectuals struggled with was the profound transformation of states across the world. If World War I was about solidifying the nation state as the only legible political unit, World War II forced a reckoning over the nature and extent of that state and its ideal form of governance.

As I was writing my book, I sensed we might be witnessing another such moment. The debate over the state--its meaning, its possibilities, and its limitations--has returned, with a vengeance. Now, as in the past, looking transdisciplinarily and transnationally brings into sharper relief conceptual problems that have arisen as a result of this debate. Here I will discuss one concept, militant democracy, as an illustration of how the eclecticism of interdisciplinary knowledge can aid in our understanding of the political and what that, in turn, might tell us about the resonance of militant democracy in our own time.

The concept of militant democracy was explicitly discussed by Karl Loewenstein, the German émigré political scientist and legal academic, and implicitly by other German émigré intellectuals in the United States, among others, beginning in the 1930s. Broadly, militant democracy was--and remains--the idea that existential threats to democracy must be extinguished by repressive, if legal, means in order to preserve or establish democracy. For example, Loewenstein sought to apply the concept to the short-lived and astonishingly inept experiment of denazification in occupied Germany. It has also been invoked historically to outlaw political parties.

The unending "war on terror" with its attendant fears about enemies within and without and the questions it has raised about nation-building has revived the concept of militant democracy not only among historians but also among legal academics, literary scholars, and political theorists. One would miss the significance of this concept, therefore, if one focused on a single academic discipline. What it means to think about the political and who does that thinking may not be as obvious as we might think. Looking across the disciplines helps us to appreciate the complexity of the category of political thought itself and to better understand which political problems are echoing most broadly, and why.

Most of the historical work that addresses militant democracy concerns World War II and the Cold War when emergency conditions justified new approaches to achieving order and security even in the name of promoting freedom, rights, and the rule of law. Until recently, most normative scholars  have accepted the concept of militant democracy. Meanwhile, historical scholarship has generally found militant democracy to have been a reasonable response to clear threats to a democratic regime, and given the limited range of alternatives under the extreme conditions produced by World War II, if not the Cold War. Notably, however, one historian has recently explored what he describes as militant democracy in practice revealing its clearly repressive effects during both World War II and the Cold War. In a provocative study of the influence of German émigrés on Cold War politics and policy in the United States, Udi Greenberg argues that Loewenstein in particular helped make militant democracy a reality at home and abroad by participating in a transnational organization founded in 1942 that suppressed throughout the Americas innumerable citizens deemed subversives or infiltrators.

In general, scholars are depicting militant democracy in increasingly authoritarian terms. Leading the way among normative thinkers are the political theorists Carlo Invernizzi Accetti and Ian Zuckerman. In "What's Wrong With Militant Democracy?" (forthcoming in Political Studies) they contend that militant democracy is intrinsically "arbitrary" in its determination of who is a threat to democracy. Who constitutes the democratic community cannot be determined democratically, they conclude. Scholars seem to emphasize the repressiveness of militant democracy more in the context of internal threats to democracy than of nation-building. One can detect this pattern in the mid-twentieth century as well. Loewenstein notwithstanding, many German émigrés became less sanguine about ideas such as militant democracy and constitutional dictatorship when the threat to democracy was on their home turf--in the United States. To be fair, one good reason for this is that they saw the threat as much less acute than that faced by Germany after the war.

I am sympathetic to the reading of militant democracy as authoritarian, especially in already established democracies where, historically, the existential threat has been more often exaggerated than real. On the other hand, as in the German occupation, it does seem apparent that the options are few once one has decided to take up a project of coerced democratization. This may be one reason why the predominant question among many powerful countries in the world today is whether to engage in such projects in the first place, rather than how to do so.

Zhao, "The Confucian-Legalist State: A New Theory of Chinese History"

New from Oxford University Press: The Confucian-Legalist State: A New Theory of Chinese History, by Dingxin Zhao (University of Chicago). A description from the Press:
In The Confucian-Legalist State, Dingxin Zhao offers a radically new analysis of Chinese imperial history from the eleventh century BCE to the fall of the Qing dynasty. This study first uncovers the factors that explain how, and why, China developed into a bureaucratic empire under the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE. It then examines the political system that crystallized during the Western Han dynasty, a system that drew on China's philosophical traditions of Confucianism and Legalism. Despite great changes in China's demography, religion, technology, and socioeconomic structures, this Confucian-Legalist political system survived for over two millennia. Yet, it was precisely because of the system's resilience that China, for better or worse, did not develop industrial capitalism as Western Europe did, notwithstanding China's economic prosperity and technological sophistication beginning with the Northern Song dynasty.

In examining the nature of this political system, Zhao offers a new way of viewing Chinese history, one that emphasizes the importance of structural forces and social mechanisms in shaping historical dynamics. As a work of historical sociology, The Confucian-Legalist State aims to show how the patterns of Chinese history were not shaped by any single force, but instead by meaningful activities of social actors which were greatly constrained by, and at the same time reproduced and modified, the constellations of political, economic, military, and ideological forces. This book thus offers a startling new understanding of long-term patterns of Chinese history, one that should trigger debates for years to come among historians, political scientists, and sociologists.
Reviewers say:
"Empirically rich and conceptually clear, Zhao's work combines vast historical evidence, cutting-edge social theories, and rigorous analytical strategy to present a compelling case of why China's pattern of state formation diverged from Europe's more than two millennia ago, creating a Confucianist-Legalist centralized bureaucratic state that lasted into modern times. It is historical social sciences at its best. This book is going to change our view on Chinese history forever." -- Ho-fung Hung

"This book offers an intriguing and not uncontroversial explication for a two-part problem of compelling interest today: (1) why was China able to achieve a unified, bureaucratic empire by the Qin dynasty? and (2) why did the imperial institutions and ideology forged in the Qin-Han period show such great resilience over two millennia? Zhao, in moving away from the simplistic narratives offered in all too many textbooks, provides us a fresh look at complicated historical processes that deserve our reconsideration." -- Michael Nylan
More information is available here.

Wednesday, January 20, 2016

Journal on European History of Law and Toth on Capital Punishment in Hungary

[Via H-Law, we have the following announcement.]

The association The European Society for History of Law is the publisher of the Journal on European History of Law which is published 2x per year. It is assigned for law-historians and Romanists that want to share with their colleagues the results of their research in this field.  At the same time, reviews of books with historical themes are being published. You can also find there information about the happenings in the field of law-history.

Articles in the journal are published in English or in German, according to the authors wish. The articles must fulfill the criteria written in the guidelines for authors. The executive editor decides on whether to publish the articles and in which order.

All the works must be reviewed. The executive editor decides on whether to publish the materials and in which order. After the review, the decision will be sent to the author by email.
The authors are held responsible for the lingual and formal level of the papers submitted. These levels are checked by the editor’s office and some small necessary changes can be done by the editor.

The European Society for History of Law
Foltynova 2,635 00 Brno; Czech Republic
info@historyoflaw.eu

[And, for a recent TOC, masthead, and contribution, see Statutory Regulation of Capital Punishment in Hungary During the Horthy Era and World War II, by Zoltan J. Toth, Karoli Gaspar University, Budapest, which appeared in 6:2 (2015), and
deals with the history of the normative regulation concerning capital punishment in Hungary between 1919–1944, that is, during the Horthy era. Right after the end of the Soviet Republic of Hungary, in August 1919, the legal system of the Hungarian Kingdom was reinstated. Capital punishment, however, remained general penalty not only in the military criminal procedure, but in the ordinary one as well. Besides these, from time to time, numerous martial law statutes stipulated that the death penalty could be applied in cases of various criminal offences, both in peacetime (mainly in 1921, 1924 and 1931–1932) and, particularly, wartime. The implementation of capital punishment, however, culminated in 1943 and 1944 when (that is, in the end of 1944) the statehood of Hungary collapsed.]

Batlan on Jewish Women, Legal Aid and the Secular Liberal State

Felice Batlan, Illinois Institute of Technology-Chicago-Kent College of Law, has posted Forging Identities: Jewish Women, Legal Aid, and the Secular Liberal State, 1890-1930, which is forthcoming in the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality:
This article discusses an unexamined area of the history of the legal profession — the role that late nineteenth and early twentieth century Jewish women legal practitioners played in the delivery of free legal aid to the poor as social workers, lawyers, and, importantly, as cultural and legal brokers. It presents two such women who represented different types and models of legal aid — Minnie Low of the Chicago Bureau of Personal Service, a Jewish social welfare organization, and Rosalie Loew of the Legal Aid Society of New York. The article interrogate how these women negotiated their identities as Jewish professional women, what role being Jewish and female played in shaping their careers, understandings of law, and the delivery of legal aid, as well as the constrained professional possibilities, but at times, opportunities, both women confronted and embraced. By puzzling through these issues, we also see two contrasting understandings of the rule of law and the secular liberal state. This article, combining gender history, legal history, and Jewish history, thus contributes to and enriches the growing body of scholarship on Jewish male lawyers and their relationship to the larger Jewish community and the state.

Schneider on "Producing Veracity in the Victorian Courtroom"

New from Yale University Press: Engines of Truth: Producing Veracity in the Victorian Courtroom, by Wendie Ellen Schneider (Iowa State University). A description from the Press:
During the Victorian era, new laws allowed more witnesses to testify in court cases. At the same time, an emerging cultural emphasis on truth-telling drove the development of new ways of inhibiting perjury. Strikingly original and drawing on a broad array of archival research, Wendie Schneider’s examination of the Victorian courtroom charts this period of experimentation and how its innovations shaped contemporary trial procedure. Blending legal, social, and colonial history, she shines new light on cross-examination, the most enduring product of this time and the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”
A few blurbs:
“This is one of the most important contributions to the study of the Victorian legal system in a very long time, but its significance goes far wider than that. The author has fashioned a rich cultural history that is authoritative and transnational.”—Rohan McWilliam

“No other work has looked at nineteenth-century perjury in Britain in such a sustained way.”—Ray Cocks
More information is available here.

Tuesday, January 19, 2016

Louk on the Federalism Decisions of the Burger Court

David Scott Louk, law clerk to the Honorable James E. Boasberg, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, has posted Repairing the Irreparable: Revisiting the Federalism Decisions of the Burger Court, which is forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal 125 (2016): 682-728:    
Warren E. Burger (credit)
The text of a Supreme Court opinion rarely tells the full story of the debates, discussions, and disagreements that resulted in a particular decision. Drawing on previously unexamined archival papers of the Justices of the Burger Court, this Note tells the story of the Burger Court’s federalism jurisprudence between 1975 and 1985, famously bookended by a pair of rare and abrupt reversals of Supreme Court precedent. The Note documents the Justices’ deliberations for the first time, sheds new light on the institutional workings of the Court, and enriches our understanding of the foundations of modern federalism. In its federalism cases, the Burger Court grappled with the challenge of balancing the states’ autonomy against the rise of new national problems and an expanding federal government’s solutions to them. The Justices’ papers show that they were more attuned to policy outcomes and the real-world consequences of their decisions than may typically be assumed. Above all, the papers reveal the Burger Court’s deep struggle to articulate a sustainable federalism jurisprudence given the constraints of judicial craft. As the Note concludes, however, the Burger Court’s uneven federalism experiments nonetheless laid the groundwork for the Court’s subsequent attempts to fashion more workable doctrines. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have adjudicated federalism disputes more effectively by avoiding impracticable doctrines and remaining mindful of the institutional limitations of courts as federalism referees.

Westward Expansion and the Constitution in the Early American Republic

[Via H-Law, we have the following call for applicants.]

NEH Summer Institute on Westward Expansion and the Constitution in the Early American Republic

We would like to invite applications to participate in a two-week National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on “Westward Expansion and the Constitution in the Early American Republic” in Norman, Oklahoma, from June 13–24, 2016. The application deadline is Tuesday, March 1.

Jointly sponsored by the Institute for the American Constitutional Heritage and the Department of History at the University of Oklahoma, this Summer Institute will explore the social, cultural, and political dimensions of American westward expansion through the lens of the U.S. Constitution and the struggles over its interpretation between the American Revolution and the conclusion of the Mexican-American War in 1848. The Institute will feature several leading scholars of the early republic—Alan Taylor, Peter Onuf, Fay Yarbrough, Amy Greenberg, Lindsay Robertson, and Peter Kastor—and will include trips to cultural attractions and historical collections unique to Oklahoma, such as the Chickasaw Cultural Center in Sulphur, Oklahoma, and the National Cowboy Hall of Fame and Western Heritage Museum in Oklahoma City. All participants will receive a $2,100 stipend to offset travel, accommodations, and other costs of attendance.

Our website contains a more detailed description of the material to be covered, a daily schedule, and faculty profiles.  A downloadable flyer can be found [here.]  Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any additional questions. We look forward to your applications, postmarked by March 1, 2016.

Paul A. Gilje and Kevin Butterfield, University of Oklahoma (co-directors).  Contact: iach@ou.edu

ISO a Third for a "Loss of Services" Panel at OAH 2017

Kim Reilly, University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, and Evelyn Atkinson, University of Chicago, are in search of a third paper for a panel at the Organization of American History meeting in New Orleans in 2017.  Proposals are due in this Friday, January 23.
Our panel examines the relationship between affective bonds and the growth of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We focus on the law as a site where the human toll of industrial- and transportation-related injuries came to the fore, as judges, litigants, and the broader community negotiated the value of community ties and familial bonds in a market economy. Evelyn Atkinson’s paper looks at damage suits brought on behalf of poor children injured at industrial work sites. Courts debated how to compensate families for the injury and loss of children who were both cherished members of and economic contributors to their families. Kim Reilly’s paper will discuss "loss of services" suits brought by husbands when their wives were injured, as the nature of wives' "services" was redefined from labor to companionship.  Taken as a whole, the panel will explore the conference theme of "Circulation" from two angles: the circulation of capital, human and otherwise, in a market economy; but also circulation as a web of interconnectedness among family and community members that must be negotiated and reformulated in the context of industrial capitalism.
Contact: ematkinson@uchicago.edu

Pitts on Embezzlement and High Treason in Louis XIV's France

Recently out from Johns Hopkins University Press: Embezzlement and High Treason in Louis XIV's France: The Trial of Nicolas Fouquet (October 2015), by Vincent J. Pitts (Quinnipiac University). From the Press:
From 1661 to 1664, France was mesmerized by the arrest and trial of Nicolas Fouquet, the country’s superintendent of finance. Prosecuted on trumped-up charges of embezzlement, mismanagement of funds, and high treason, Fouquet managed to exonerate himself from all of the major charges over the course of three long years, in the process embarrassing and infuriating Louis XIV. The young king overturned the court’s decision and sentenced Fouquet to lifelong imprisonment in a remote fortress in the Alps.
A dramatic critique of absolute monarchy in pre-revolutionary France, Embezzlement and High Treason in Louis XIV's France tells the gripping tale of an overly ambitious man who rose rapidly in the state hierarchy—then overreached. Vincent J. Pitts uses the trial as a lens through which to explore the inner workings of the court of Louis XIV, who rightly feared that Fouquet would expose the tawdry financial dealings of the king's late mentor and prime minister, Cardinal Mazarin.
From an advance reviewer:
"Pitts is a natural storyteller who draws the reader into the world of nobles and financiers. The book gives the reader a good sense of some of the main features of high politics of the time: court intrigue, shifting alliances, rivals scheming for power, shady dealings, patronage, piety, high officials skirting the law. At times the crafty plotting of the historical characters is reminiscent of Hilary Mantel's Bring Up the Bodies." — Gail Bossenga
More information is available here.

Monday, January 18, 2016

The Passing of Judge Marie Garibaldi

We briefly noted the passing of the trailblazing female judge of the New York’s highest court, Judge Judith Kaye.  One of our former students has alerted us to the passing on Friday of New Jersey’s first female supreme court judge, Marie Garibaldi.  The AP story quotes colleagues who called her “fair and calm, and kept her network of 46 former clerks together like a family.”  My former student, a Garibaldi clerk, attests to the last. The Star-Ledger's obituary is here.  Update: The New York Times's obituary.

A Legal History Graduate Student Conference at Brown

[We have the following CFP.  H/t: Joanna Grisinger.]

Legal History Graduate Student Conference.  Hosted by the Law and Humanities Graduate Study Group at Brown University. Saturday April 23, 2016, at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. Deadline for submission: February 29, 2016.  Acceptance notification: March 7, 2016.

The Law and Humanities Graduate Study Group at Brown invites paper submissions on any topic in legal history, or any historically-inclined approach to the study of “law and …,” for its inaugural graduate student conference. We invite papers on any theme, period and location. The day-long conference will consist of moderated panels with faculty commentators, and a lunchtime faculty panel on “Varieties of Legal Sources.” Please submit a 150- to 300-word abstract along with your C.V. by February 29th, 2016 to Sara Ludin at saraludin@berkeley.edu.

If you have questions, please contact Sara Ludin (saraludin@berkeley.edu) or Jonathan Lande (jonathan_lande@brown.edu). This event is made possible through the generous support of: the Brown History Department, the Brown English Department, and the Brown Faculty Legal History Workshop.

Sheldon on Lincoln, the Supreme Court, and the Politics of Slavery

Next month at the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress: The lecture Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Politics of Slavery will take place on Thursday, February 18, 2016, 4:00 p.m., Room LJ-119, First floor, Thomas Jefferson Building:
In his 1858 "House Divided" speech, Abraham Lincoln accused Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney, outgoing President Franklin Pierce, president-elect James Buchanan, and Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas of a conspiracy to perpetuate slavery in the United States. According to Lincoln, this conspiracy took form in the infamous 1857 Supreme Court case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, which excluded African Americans from U.S. citizenship. Kluge Fellow Rachel Shelden re-examines Lincoln’s conspiracy charge in the context of how the federal political system – and particularly the Supreme Court – operated in the mid-nineteenth century.

The Charles W. McCurdy Fellowship in Legal History

[We have the following announcement.]

Applications are now being accepted through February 1, 2016, for the Charles W. McCurdy Fellowship in Legal History offered through a partnership between the University of Virginia’s Miller Center and the School of Law. The fellowship allows scholars to complete dissertations in legal and political history while in residence at the Law School. During the fellowship year, the McCurdy Fellow spends the majority of her or his time on dissertation research. The Law School's nationally renowned Legal History Program — including a workshop, a writing group, a joint J.D.-M.A. in history program, and a robust community of interested scholars — offers the fellow a rich environment in which to grow as a scholar. The fellow helps coordinate the Legal History Workshop and has the opportunity to present their work there. Like all Miller Center Fellows, the McCurdy Fellow is paired with a "dream mentor" — a senior scholar in the fellow's field from anywhere in the world — who will provide critical guidance during the year. The fellow also participates in the Miller Centers’ fall and spring conferences and receives training on how to reach broader audiences. The fellow receives a stipend of $32,000 for the year.

Applicants must have completed the coursework toward a Ph.D. in history. Strong preference is given to applicants who hold a J.D. and who will complete their dissertation by the end of the fellowship year.  For the application and process, please see the Miller Center Fellowship Program website.

Bringing Intellectual History Back In

[By Anne Kornhauser]

Initially, this was to be a post on militant democracy. I decided to defer that topic in order to reflect on a recent post on this site. Blogging, I think, is conducive to swerving, but swerving is not conducive to long, hard thinking, so please read the following in the spirit of an initial impression of an intellectual historian who cannot pass up the chance to comment on a discussion of her subfield.

In his response to Jeremy Kessler's approbatory and thoughtful review of Dan Ernst's terrific book on the emergence and legitimation of the administrative state, Mark Tushnet calls for the integration of the intellectual history of the administrative state with its political-institutional history, how the state governs in practice. In this Harvard Law Review forum, Tushnet acknowledges that Ernst, in seeking to show that the administrative state was neither weak nor unshackled by law and that it was consciously crafted as such, features this integrative approach in his book as does Kessler in his review. But Tushnet wants a more robust, a "thicker" intellectual history, particularly of administrative law. This, Tushnet suggests, will be a more effective parry to the conservative thrust against the "lawless" administrative state.

In addition to their scholarly contributions, these three scholars have a political concern: the continuous outpouring of (mostly) legal scholarship that condemns the administrative state for trampling of the constitution. All agree that this idea of a bureaucratic state run amok has filtered into public discourse, informing the ideology of the Tea Party along with other, less vociferous conservative critiques of centralized administrative governance. But these ideas are misplaced and a more intensive reconstruction of the intellectual underpinnings of the New Deal state--especially assumptions about the law--would help to defuse them.
                                                                                                                               
James Landis (LC)
Tushnet's central premise for employing intellectual history as a political corrective rests on the remove of intellectuals from the institutions of governance they seek to criticize--or defend. Tushnet does not necessarily mean a literal remove--he uses the term "disjuncture" to describe the gap between the conceptualization of the administrative state culled from scholarly sources and the actual functioning of state institutions, a disconnect that can affect even those operating in the thick of state institutions. The common ground between those on the outside and the entrenched lies in the need to make institutions conform to ideas, however interpreted, not the other way around. Tushnet cites the legal thinker James Landis's overwrought boosterism of the administrative state the New Dealers made, not least Landis himself. I concur. In my book I read Landis and others like him against the grain to locate underlying ambivalences and unresolved tensions behind a manifestly unvarnished defense of the state.                                                 

An undistorted intellectual justification of the administrative state would undercut its critics. Meanwhile, Tushnet argues, historians should similarly examine the conceptual apparatuses of contemporaneous scholarly criticisms of the state to uncover intellectual errors based on this disjuncture or on faulty intellectual assumptions. Tushnet contends that "the conservative challenge is vulnerable on jurisprudential grounds as well [as political grounds], at least in the absence of a conservative reaction to legal realism that goes beyond mere disagreement" [127]. The political riposte has not worked on its own; it is time to bring out the heavy artillery--intellectual history.

It is rare to see intellectual history invoked as a way to enhance broad historical understanding, let alone to effect political or intellectual change in the present, and I want to celebrate this invocation. But I also want to probe the explanatory power with which Tushnet endows the mismatch between scholarly ideas and institutional practice, in two ways. First, I think this disjuncture can be an advantage not only a detriment to scholarly understanding.

Scholars are trained to keep some perspective on their object of study. This perspective cannot be from an elusive Archimedean point, but it does require some consciousness of the relationship to one's sources, including ideas. That consciousness, in turn, usually induces a measure of distance between scholar and source. For example, the German émigré legal thinkers in my book drew on ideas from their upbringing under Weimar that allowed them to understand, in ways that most American thinkers could not, the magnitude of the transformation of the American state in the 1930s and 1940s and the isomorphism between that state and other political regimes. But, usually, they adapted those ideas rather than rigidly cling to them. There are cases, such as that of Landis and other New Deal enthusiasts, where the distance between the scholar and their intellectual influences appears to evaporate before more pressing needs. This does not mean it has disappeared entirely. Creditable scholarship--scholarship that cannot be accused of pure propagandizing--must be understood as something more than politics tout court.

Second, the limited intellectual resources available to scholars need not detract from their analysis. In Tushnet's frame, ideas need not trump institutions, though I agree with him that they often do. Yet context and experience shape the interpretation of texts and it is important for intellectual historians to try to figure out when a scholar is trying to resist those forces. This is one lesson I derive from Tushnet. I would add that scholars are not limited to currently fashionable ideas. What constitutes the plausible universe of ideas? That is a question every intellectual historian ought to ask. One reason I wanted to look at liberal and social democratic critiques of the administrative state was to break down the artificially imposed binary between the liberal statists and their conservative critics. The aim of the book was not to show that one side was right and the other wrong. It was to bring greater clarity and richness to the intellectual and political debates about the administrative state for the sake of historical understanding, but also so that we might extricate ourselves from our own arid and misleading political discourse. On this goal, it seems, all the authors agree. The interesting conversation begun by these three incisive scholars concerns how to get there.

Sunday, January 17, 2016

Sunday Book Roundup

Civil Disabilities: Citizenship, Membership, and Belonging (University of Pennsylvania Press), edited by Nancy J. Hirschmann and Beth Linker, is reviewed on H-Net.
"To aid readers unfamiliar with disability studies or theories of citizenship, the introduction includes concise and helpful discussions of the differences between the medical model of disability and various social models of disability, and of the various senses of citizenship which go beyond national identity to multiple levels of group membership and senses of belonging. These summaries are followed by some helpful illustrations of the ways in which disability and citizenship intersect and how understanding disability and citizenship in the broader ways previously developed may be necessary for working toward justice."
Books & Ideas has a review of Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press) by Intisar A. Rabb.

The Washington Independent Review of Books has a review of Fergus Bordewich's The First Congress: How James Madison, George Washington and a Group of Extraordinary Men Invented the Government (Simon & Schuster).
"Has any Congress ever accomplished as much as the very first one, meeting in three sessions between March 1789 through March 1791, in two temporary capital cities (New York and Philadelphia)? Fergus Bordewich thinks not. His central thesis in The First Congress is that this Congress established the high-water mark for U.S. legislative achievement."

There are many interviews this week worth checking out. The Daily Beast has an interview with Sarah Vowell, who has recently published Lafayette in the Somewhat United States (Riverhead Books).

New Books has interviews with several authors this week, including one with Christopher Phelps, who co-authored Radicals in America: The U.S. Left since the Second World War (Cambridge University Press) with Howard Brick.

New Books also interviews Abram De Swaan, who discusses his book, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder (Yale University Press).

The editors of The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt), Luke Nichter and Douglas Brinkley, talk with New Books as well.

Finally, not quite the traditional book review of our Sunday posts, but too interesting not to mention, is the article, "Black America's Underground Guide to Escaping the Jim Crow South," by Malcolm Jones in The Daily Beast. He looks at The Negro Travelers' Green Book, which has recently been digitalized in the NY Library's digitalization project.

Saturday, January 16, 2016

Weekend Roundup

  • On Friday, January 29, 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM, in the Cannon House Office Building, Room 121, Washington, DC, the National History Center of the American Historical Association will host a Congressional briefing on the history of political partisanship in the United States.  The presenters will be Brian Balogh, Professor of History at the Corcoran Department of History at the University of Virginia, and Joanne Freeman, Professor of History and American Studies at Yale University.  Donald A. Ritchie, Historian Emeritus of the Senate, will moderate.  Questions and answers will follow the presentation. Light refreshments will be served.  RSVP to Amanda Moniz at amoniz@historians.org. 
  • On Thursday, January 21 from 3:30-5:00 p.m., the Miller Center [for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia] will host the first event in the 2016 Historical Presidency series, “Thomas Jefferson’s Electoral Revolution of 1800” with Alan Taylor, the Thomas Jefferson Foundation Professor at the University of Virginia.
  • Around the Colloquia: On January 13, John F. Stinneford, University of Florida Levin College of Law, presented in Florida Law’s faculty workshop on “The Original Meaning of ‘Cruel.’” H/t: Legal Scholarship Blog
Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.

Friday, January 15, 2016

Benidickson's Bibliography of Candian Legal History in the 1990s

Jamie Benidickson, University of Ottawa, has posted from his backlist Survey of Canadian Legal History in the ‘90s, which appeared in the Ottawa Law Review 28 (1997).  “This survey of recent writing in Canadian legal history,” he writes, “reviews journal articles, essay collections and monographs under five general headings: Biographical Studies, Ideas and Ideologies, Legal Institutions and the Profession, Criminal Law and Punishment, and the Aboriginal Legal Presence.”

A Historical Source on Maltese Civil Law

The Times of Malta carried a report Sunday of the publication of Notes of Maltese Civil Law, by “the Department of Legal History and Methodology within the Faculty of Laws at the University of Malta.”  Edited by President Emeritus Ugo Mifsud Bonnici, the book publishes the transcribed lecture notes of Giovanni Caruana (1866-1923).  It is part of "Historic Maltese Legal Materials Series."  More.

Barzun on Causation, Legal History and Legal Doctrine

Charles L. Barzun, University of Virginia School of Law, has posted Causation, Legal History, and Legal Doctrine, which is to appear in the Buffalo Law Review 64 (2016):
This short essay is my contribution to a conference on “opportunities for law’s intellectual history,” which took place at SUNY Buffalo Law School in the fall of 2014. The essay offers a friendly criticism of what I perceive to be a trend in legal history. In particular, it criticizes legal historians’ seemingly increasing reluctance to offer causal explanations of past events or current practices. While recognizing the empirical and conceptual difficulties that beset any effort to identify “causes” of historical events, I argue that legal history cannot effectively serve the critical function many historians hope for it without making controversial judgments about historical causation in particular cases. The bulk of the essay is devoted to identifying and analyzing four potentially critical types of history: Impeaching Accounts, Genealogies, Stories, and Restorative Projects. My aim in discussing each type is to show that critical histories that purport to remain agnostic as to the driving causal factors at work in the historical phenomena under examination are either insufficiently critical, insufficiently historical, or both.

Thursday, January 14, 2016

Finkin on Historical Precursors to the "Gig" Economy

Matthew Finkin, University of Illinois College of Law, has posted Beclouded Work in Historical Perspective, which is forthcoming in the Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 37 (2016):
The Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal is publishing a collection of papers on the “gig” economy and labor law, edited by Valerio De Stefano of the International Labor Organization. This paper places what is seen as an innovation in a larger historical context. It compares “gig” work to the putting-out system that was a feature of manufacture from early modern Europe forward to modern times. It explores the economic, social, and technological basis of both and teases out the larger implications of what seems to be genuinely new by virtue of the global reach of information technology.

Dameron on Consumer Welfare and Antitrust in the States, ca. 1890

Charles S. Dameron, Yale Law School, J.D. 2015, has posted Present at Antitrust's Creation: Consumer Welfare in the Sherman Act's State Statutory Forerunners, which is forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal 125 (2016):
For the last four decades, federal courts have construed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare statute. But considerable disagreement persists within the legal academy regarding the true legislative aims of American antitrust law. This Note argues that interpreters of the Sherman Act ought to look more closely at an understudied branch of antitrust — state antitrust statutes enacted contemporaneously with the Sherman Act — to better understand the roots of federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to prohibit the same combinations in restraint of trade that were already prohibited by state statutory and common law. The plain language of the Sherman Act’s state predecessors shows that most were designed to promote what we now call consumer welfare. These statutes prohibited only those business combinations that harmed consumers by artificially constraining the supply of consumer goods. Read in this context, the Sherman Act is properly understood as the federal component of a national program on behalf of consumer welfare.

Kessler on Ernst, Tushnet Replies

The Harvard Law Review has just published two essays on Daniel Ernst's Tocqueville's Nightmare: a long review, by Jeremy K. Kessler (Columbia University), and a response, by Mark Tushnet (Harvard Law School).  Kessler has posted an abstract of his review, titled "The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy":
It is telling that the winners of [Daniel] Ernst’s history are not the hardened legal realists whom we generally think of as building, and justifying, the New Deal state. Rather, Ernst turns the spotlight on reform-minded corporate lawyers, such as Charles Evans Hughes and John Lord O’Brian, who stepped back from the edge of realism. While accepting the necessity of the administrative state for managing a modern economy, they fought to imbue that state with a legalistic conception of “fair play” and a distinctively lawyerly form of expertise. These political and intellectual moderates would have agreed with Sunstein and Vermeule when they write that “[a] dose of legal realism . . . has its place, but . . . respect for the governing rules is not optional.” Just as for Sunstein and Vermeule, the APA evacuated administrative law of “any kind of ideological valence,” for Ernst, the “rule of lawyers” insulated the administrative state from becoming a weapon in the hands of any particular social or economic group.

It apparently goes without saying — neither Ernst nor his protagonists say it — that the impartiality of the “rule of lawyers” admits one important exception. Under a “rule of lawyers,” the administrative state will persistently favor one socioeconomic bloc: lawyers and the interests they serve. From this perspective, Tocqueville’s Nightmare can be read as a narrative of regulatory capture: the capture of the administrative state by lawyers themselves. But while regulatory capture is generally understood as a threat to administrative legitimacy, Ernst suggests that lawyerly capture is its condition precedent. If he is right, important new questions come to the fore: how did lawyers win the struggle to equate administrative legitimacy with their control of the administrative state, and what exactly did they win by defining administrative legitimacy in this way? Ernst’s ingenious history not only forces us to ask these questions, but also helps us answer them.

Dudziak's "Bullet in the Chamber" on C-SPAN3 This Sunday

Mary Dudizak (LC)
A Bullet in the Chamber: The Politics of Catastrophe and the Declaration of World War I, a lecture by LHB Founder Mary L. Dudziak, the Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law at the Emory University School of Law, gave as the holder of the Kluge Chair in American Law and Governance at the Library of Congress, will air on C-SPAN3's American History TV on Sunday, January 17, at 6:45 pm ET.  Sometime later, it will be posted to CSPAN’s website.

Wednesday, January 13, 2016

Barzun on Frank, Fuller and Romantic Pragmatism

Charles L. Barzun, University of Virginia School of Law, has posted Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a Romantic Pragmatism:
Jerome Frank, 1938 (LC)
Jerome Frank and Lon Fuller are not frequently classed together in discussions of twentieth-century legal thought. Although they both wrote extensively about the nature of law and adjudication over roughly the same period of time (1930s-1950s), they are typically characterized as standing on opposite sides of the issues that matter most in legal theory. Frank is these days seen as an “extreme” realist, who thought judges decided cases on the basis of irrational biases, while Fuller is best known for being a critic of realism, a defender of natural law, and an influential member of the Legal Process school of legal thought, which is itself seen as a response to precisely those excesses of realism that Frank is said to epitomize.

In this essay, I argue that when we place these two thinkers on opposite sides of the traditional lines drawn in legal theory – between realism and process theory, natural law and positivism, instrumentalism and formalism – we miss something important, and importantly similar, in their views about law, adjudication, and human knowledge. In particular, both thinkers maintained (1) that the human self was constituted by a mix of impulses, intuitions, emotions, motives and purposes, only some of which are conscious but all of which shape how the mind perceives the external world; (2) that such motives in judges are activated by the facts of particular cases in a way that can, at least sometimes, serve as the basis for just decisionmaking; and, finally, (3) that the first two observations provide a foundation for legal knowledge of the sort judges properly rely on when deciding cases. I conclude by suggesting that we might think of these common themes as reflecting a “romantic” strain of legal and philosophical pragmatism.

Ramsey vs. McManamon on the Original Meaning of "Natural Born"

Michael D. Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, has posted The Original Meaning of “Natural Born.”  (H/t: Legal Theory Blog.)
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that no one but a “natural born Citizen” is eligible to be President of the United States. Modern conventional wisdom generally holds that the phrase “natural born Citizen” includes anyone made a U.S. citizen at birth by U.S. statutes or the Constitution. But that conventional wisdom is, on its face, open to doubt. If anyone born a U.S. citizen is eligible, the word “natural” in the eligibility clause is superfluous. Further, in general in eighteenth-century legal language, natural meant the opposite of “provided by statute” (hence “natural law” and “natural rights”). And plausible arguments can be made for a narrow meaning of “natural born” on the basis of either traditional English common law or eighteenth-century continental public law. To this point, modern scholarship has provided no comprehensive response to these objections.

Nonetheless, as matter of the Constitution's original meaning, the conventional wisdom is correct. This article defends a broad view of the original meaning of the eligibility clause on the basis of eighteenth-century English parliamentary practice. The key to understanding the eligibility clause is Congress’ power over naturalization, which in turn is best understood by examining parliament’s naturalization power. By the mid-eighteenth-century, Parliament had power to define by statute who would be recognized as a “natural born subject” – a power that, along with others, was called naturalization. In a succession of Acts, Parliament extended this designation (which originally only applied to those born in England) to various categories of people born outside the country. In adopting the phrase “natural born” from English law, the American framers likely understood that they were using a phrase without a fixed definition and subject to legislative alteration through the naturalization power. That conclusion in turn provides sound support for the modern view that Congress can create categories of “natural born” citizens by statute.
But in an op-ed in today's Washington Post, Mary Brigid McManamon, Widener/Delaware Law,  argues that "the common-law definition was accepted in the United States, not the newfangled British statutory approach."  She concludes, not as "a so-called birther" but as "a legal historian," that Senator Ted Cruz "is not a natural-born citizen and therefore is not eligible to be president or vice president of the United States."

How to let go of a first book

We recently heard from our resident advice guru, Ms. Peppercorn, about the difficulties of starting a second book. This is a post about a related topic: how to let got of a first.

To echo the words of Serena Mayeri, who blogged about this topic for us a few years ago (and whose first book went on to win many accolades), the thought of "never being able to fix anything ever again" has "filled me with abject terror." I let got of my book manuscript grudgingly and nervously, on the day my page proof corrections were due and not a day sooner. I felt similar bouts of anxiety at other moments of seeming finality -- the day I sent in the manuscript to the press, the day that I sent back my copy edits. Rather than celebrating these accomplishments, I brooded and agonized. I imagine others have different relationships with their first book projects, but, for me, the nagging questions were these: How could I ever say that the book was finished when I felt that more could be done to make it better? How could I let it go when some smarter, richer version of the book seemed within my grasp?

These questions continue to keep me up at night, I'm afraid, but I wanted to pass along some of the advice that I have appreciated in recent months and that gives me comfort now that the book manuscript is largely out of my hands:
Guido Calabresi (credit)

1. Beware of "over-doing." I actually received this piece of advice well before I started the book, when I was clerking for the Honorable Guido Calabresi. An esteemed scholar and astute reader of people, Judge Calabresi warned me of my tendency to, in his words, "over-do" -- that is, to invest too much time and energy into my assignments, beyond what was necessary to do the job. If you know him only by his scholarship (he was a law and economics pioneer), you might be tempted to translate this advice into the idea of diminishing returns. If asked to elaborate, I suspect he would say something more reflective of his personal warmth and humanity. Or, more likely, he would tell you a story -- perhaps about a famous friend whose work is absolutely brilliant but not perfect, or about another friend whose quest for perfection proved paralyzing. The point is, there are junctures at all phases of a project where doing it well turns into over-doing, and the costs may be significant. I can't tell you where the line is, unfortunately, but I found it helpful to remember that a line exists and that part of being a good scholar is knowing to look for it. [NB: Laura Kalman captures Guido beautifully in this recent essay.]  

Coming soon...whether I like it or not!
2. Remember that you're aiming to spark conversation, not end it. This piece of advice (paraphrased) came from one of the commentators at a little conference I put together to workshop a draft of my book manuscript. In an exchange about what a book's conclusion should do, this commentator -- who is the author of multiple well-respected books -- noted that sometimes you end a project without having 'figured it out' and that's OK. One model for a conclusion would actually acknowledge what continues to puzzle you -- as a way of leveling with readers about the complexity of the issues and prompting further reflection. Extending the advice a bit further, I think this commentator was getting at two broader points. First, there is value in grappling with good questions, even when airtight answers elude you. That, in itself, is a form of advancing knowledge. Second, pursuing one set of research questions will naturally open up a host of others, not all of which can possibly be answered in a single volume. To the first-time author, these dangling threads might be unsightly -- or worse, evidence of failure -- but readers may well have a different view. One scholar's dangling threads may be valuable raw material for the tapestry that the broader scholarly community is weaving.

3. Relatedly -- recognize your limitations, and embrace the capacities of others. When talking to a historian friend about the final phases of her first book, she said something to the effect of: "I had done as much with the material as I could do. Someone else might be able to do more, but I had reached my limit." Her tone, notably, was not one of defeat. Looking back on that conversation, the image that springs to my mind is of a long-distance relay runner: she had run as far as possible with the baton and covered valuable ground; she was now ready for her teammates to continue the journey. This advice has been helpful to me because it is a reminder that we all have limitations -- of imagination, of time, of training. We go as far as we can with what we have, and, in a perfect scenario, we inspire others to bring their skills and energies to the enterprise.

4. Think about all those projects waiting in the wings and get excited! Multiple seasoned veterans gave me some version of this advice. It's a reminder that, if all goes well, your first book is just that -- a first book. There will be other publications, and through them, you will continue chipping away at the big questions that fuel your broader research agenda. I am just now starting to take this piece of advice and, indeed, there is something exhilarating about turning to a blank page. I'm still not sure whether I let my book go at the right moment, but the feeling of starting fresh is a nice reward. 

Readers, do you have advice to add? I would also be interested hearing the views of my fellow LHB bloggers, as well as our current guest blogger, Anne Kornhauser (who recently finished a first book that I very much admire).

Tuesday, January 12, 2016

CFP: Law's Empire? Justice, Law & Colonialism

[We have following Call for Papers for Law's Empire? Justice, Law & Colonialism, which we understand for its convenors, Raza Saeed and Carol Jones, is “a  sub-stream of the Socio-Legal Studies Association Conference 2016".  Note that the deadline for submissions is Monday, January 18, 2016.]

This theme aims to approach the categories of Law, Empire and Colonialism from a variety of angles: Law within Empire and the Empire within Law; Law within Colonialism and Colonialism within Law; as well as the multiple theoretical and historical links between these categories. It will address how the instrumentality of law is employed by Empire and Colonialism to initiate and strengthen the control of the dominant regimes. Law in these context(s) becomes tied with the creation of a particular kind of knowledge – one based on classification, differentiation, enumeration and creation of hierarchies of culture, power, customs and normative orders.

This 'violent' and 'totalising' control by colonial regimes led to the fossilisation of local normative orderings, but also dramatically altered the nature of law and justice (as well as the state) in the colonies. But this introduction of a particular tendency in relation to law and the state did not end with the ‘de-colonial’ moment; rather, it has continued in the 'age of Empire' as well. This does not imply that colonialism and Empire should be considered as specific, disparate historical events, but also as conceptual categories that are interwoven in history and interconnected in their logics.

In this regard, the theme will request scholars and researchers working in this field to approach the issue from a variety of standpoints. Possible topics might include: the legal experiments in (Empire's) colonies; the encounters between local and hegemonic legal and normative orders; legal histories; gender, law and colonial; nature of the state in (pre/post)colonial environment; the creation and governance of the colonial/Empire's subject; transplantation of law and justice from Metropole to the colony, and so on.

Abstracts may only be submitted via the Easy Chair Platform. They must be no longer than 300 words and should include your title, name and institutional affiliation and your email address for correspondence.

Belt on the Deific Decree Doctrine and the Insanity Defense

We recently learned that When God Demands Blood: Unusual Minds and the Troubled Juridical Ties of Religion, Madness, and Culpability, University of Miami Law Review 69 (2015): 755-94, by Rabia Belt, Stanford Law School, is available online from the law review.  Here is the abstract:
The deific decree doctrine allows criminal defendants who believe that God commanded them to kill to plead not guilty by reason of insanity to murder. The insanity defense has remained moored to its Judeo-Christian roots, which has artificially limited its bounds.  While civil law has focused on individualism within religion, criminal law has imposed state-defined limits on what religion (or socially acceptable religion) is. This article argues that the deific decree doctrine is too closely tied to artificial limits on insanity imposed by nineteenth-century developments in the mental health profession and criminal law. The doctrine unacceptably privileges certain mentally ill criminal defendants whose delusions fit within an outdated model that is not psychiatrically valid. Moreover, it has disparate gender consequences that harm women with postpartum psychosis who kill their children while supporting men who kill their female partners. The article concludes by calling for the end of the deific decree doctrine and expanding the insanity defense so it more accurately tracks psychiatric understanding of mental illness.

Witt's Reflections on a New Haven Courthouse

Modernism and Antimodernism in the Federal Courts: Reflections on the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut on the 100th Anniversary of Its New Haven Courthouse, published by John Fabian Witt, Yale Law School, in the Connecticut Law Review 48 (2015): 219-32, is available on-line:
The  story  of  the  federal  courthouse  on  the  New  Haven  Green  is  a perfect parable for the modern history of the federal district courts around the country. One hundred years ago, architect James Gamble Rogers built a post office with a courtroom attached as an afterthought. In the century since, the United States has built its lower federal courts into institutions of the first rank. If we want to understand the federal district courts and their contribution,  including  the  District  Court  for  the  District of  Connecticut, we  need  to  be  students  of  recent  American  history.  And  there  is  no  better structure  for  encapsulating  the  story  of  the  lower  federal  courts  than a building built as if a post office for the ancients, repurposed as a temple of justice for moderns, backed by the authority of the federal government, and filled with people who for one hundred years now have heroically taken the rule of law to be a sacred mission.

Law Talk: Finding the Rule of Law Among German Émigré Intellectuals in Wartime

[by Anne Kornhauser]

How did a group of German émigré intellectuals end up in a book about American liberalism and the rise of the leviathan state? As mentioned in my previous post, my book identifies three areas of concern among liberals who supported the newly enlarged, executive-centered, bureaucratized state but who did so with reservations about the absence of legitimating principles and the direction in which the state might be heading. The areas under threat were democracy, the rule of law, and individual autonomy. Here I will focus on the second, the rule of law.

As Joanna Grisinger superbly shows, the campaign to shore up weakened legal institutions turned technical and piecemeal in the 1940s. In legal thought, meanwhile, most legal realists were dabbling in a sort of eclecticism that lent itself to specific social and political reforms and viewed law as merely instrumental to these goals. By contrast, a group of German émigré intellectuals, who were trained in law and who advised the U.S. government on its strategy to defeat the Nazis and to reconstruct the German state, thought in broad terms about the erosion of legal norms in the wake of the administrative state at war.

There are good reasons why the Germans took up the mantle of what I call "legalism" in the 1940s, but before delineating them let me take a step back to comment on the very presence of the Germans in my book about American liberalism and its state. Although this was less the case when I started this project, German-born intellectuals have been enjoying a scholarly renaissance of late, not least among historians. No small part of this resurgence can be attributed to an outburst of scholarship on Henry Kissinger alone. The reasons for this are rather obvious and I will not rehearse them here.

This revivification of German émigré intellectuals goes well beyond the hoopla surrounding Kissinger. Intellectual and legal historians have brought newfound attention to a larger group of "foreign policy intellectuals," as they ride the wave of transnational historiography and seek to understand what lay behind the postwar assertion of U.S. power. These scholars trace the growth and transformation of the national security state in which German émigrés played a significant, if underappreciated, role. One notable multidisciplinary effort has focused on the concept of "militant democracy," which, put crudely, claims radical limitations on democracy to prevent a threat to its existence. (This concept will be the subject of my next post.)

Faced with a state determined to eradicate all vestiges of fascism and to prevent its resurrection, German legalist émigrés, including Arnold Brecht, Carl Friedrich, Otto Kirchheimer, Karl Loewenstein, and Franz Neumann, among others, turned to the rule of law ideal, as they understood it. Broadly, this ideal valorized the constraining influence of law on political power--including democracy itself in some instances--and its concomitant protection of the individual. In my book, I use "legalism" to describe this set of ideas, as it did not follow precisely either the German concept of the Rechtsstaat or the Diceyean idea of the rule of law.

Legalism was useful for thinking about the state in wartime because it defined legitimate state action under the simultaneous conditions of great duress and maximal power. The state was constrained by circumstances alone. In the legalist view, law had distinct properties, such as generality, impartiality, and non-retroactivity, which would help limit arbitrary power and ensure both procedural and substantive justice for the individual. This set of ideas did not map neatly onto any extant American legal language. Yet if one looked at academic writings, including law journals, and occasionally the popular press, not to mention the documents they wrote for the OSS, concern for legality was at the forefront of the émigrés' thinking about postwar reconstruction and justice. Why the Germans? Among other reasons, they had been thinking about the rule of law and the state since the rise and fall of Weimar and their intellectual training was better suited to the times.

To return to the theme of interdisciplinarity, one lesson I learned from my journey among the Germans is that scholars need to be aware of different disciplinary idioms rather than identifying a single language, such as the language of law in the mid-twentieth-century United States, and assuming this language exhausts the contributions of a discipline--in this case how "the law" was imagined, discussed, and fought over. They might also look in different places: much of this law talk about the American state took place on German soil.

Monday, January 11, 2016

Lash on the "Due Process Understanding" of the 1866 Civil Rights Act

Kurt T. Lash, University of Illinois College of Law, has posted The Due Process Understanding of the 1866 Civil Rights Act:    
Scholars have long looked to the 1866 Civil Rights Act for clues to understanding the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite widely divergent conclusions about the Amendment, almost all scholars share two key assumptions about the Act. First, the framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to retroactively constitutionalize rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Second, the framers of the Civil Rights Act sought to enforce the “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” protected under Article IV and described in the antebellum case Corfield v. Coryell. A close look at the original sources, however, suggests that neither of these assumptions are correct. The members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who passed the 1866 Civil Rights Act sought to enforce the equal due process rights of all persons, not just the special privileges and immunities of citizens. Scholars have failed to recognize this by failing to study the original and final versions of the Civil Rights Act.

The original version of the Civil Rights Act guaranteed all persons certain equal rights relating to the protection of person and property. Proponents described these rights as essential aspects of the due process rights of life, liberty, and property originally declared in the Declaration of Independence and constitutionalized by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, due to concerns that Congress lacked power to enforce the rights of non-citizens, proponents amended the Act to protect only citizens. John Bingham, the man who framed Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, expressly viewed the 1866 Civil Rights Act as an effort to enforce the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but he refused to support the Act. According to Bingham, the amended version unjustly failed to protect all persons’ due process rights. Bingham also insisted that protecting anyone’s due process rights required a constitutional amendment. Bingham subsequently submitted his second version of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment — a version that included due process rights for all persons. Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress repassed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 but extended its key provisions to protect all persons and not just citizens. Satisfied that Congress now had the power to enact such legislation, Bingham supported the final version of the Civil Rights Act. The debates of Congress, including the objections of John Bingham, were well published and prompted public commentary which reflected the due process reading of the Civil Rights Act and suggest a Civil Rights Act public understanding of the Due Process Clause.

Spring 2016 in the NYU Legal History Colloquium

The Spring 2016 line-up for NYU’s Legal History Colloquium has been announced.  With the exception of Professor Hill’s session, which will be held on a Tuesday, the colloquium meets Mondays, 4:00-5:50. (And, Professor De, we like your title's hommage to Hendrik Hartog.)

Monday, February 1, 2016
Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties in Class War Time

Tuesday, February 16, 2016
Roderick M. Hills Jr. The Saints Come Marching Into Constitutional Federalism:  Southern Embrace of a National Evangelical Morality, 1890-1918

Monday, February 29, 2016
Thomas H. Lee, The Influence of Civil Law on American Constitutionalism and the Early Federal Courts

Monday, March 21, 2016
Jenny Martinez, El Pulpo: the United Fruit Company, Corporations, and the Development of International Law

Monday, April 18, 2016

Rohit De, Cows and Constitutionalism: Religious Rites and Economic Rights in the Indian Republic

Monday, May 2, 2016

Samuel Moyn, From Antiwar Politics to Anti-torture Politics: The Vietnam War and the Global War on Terror in Comparison

Janken, "The Wilmington Ten Violence, Injustice, and the Rise of Black Politics in the 1970s"

New from the University of North Carolina Press: The Wilmington Ten: Violence, Injustice, and the Rise of Black Politics in the 1970s (January 2016), by Kenneth Robert Janken (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). From the Press:
In February 1971, racial tension surrounding school desegregation in Wilmington, North Carolina, culminated in four days of violence and skirmishes between white vigilantes and black residents. The turmoil resulted in two deaths, six injuries, more than $500,000 in damage, and the firebombing of a white-owned store, before the National Guard restored uneasy peace. Despite glaring irregularities in the subsequent trial, ten young persons were convicted of arson and conspiracy and then sentenced to a total of 282 years in prison. They became known internationally as the Wilmington Ten. A powerful movement arose within North Carolina and beyond to demand their freedom, and after several witnesses admitted to perjury, a federal appeals court, also citing prosecutorial misconduct, overturned the convictions in 1980.
Kenneth Janken narrates the dramatic story of the Ten, connecting their story to a larger arc of Black Power and the transformation of post-Civil Rights era political organizing. Grounded in extensive interviews, newly declassified government documents, and archival research, this book thoroughly examines the 1971 events and the subsequent movement for justice that strongly influenced the wider African American freedom struggle.
A few blurbs:
“Kenneth Janken's Wilmington Ten is a fast-paced, deeply researched investigation of an atrocity whose ordinary black and white victims might otherwise have remained all but forgotten and whose large civil rights significance holds lessons to be taught ever and again.”--David Levering Lewis

“The story of the Wilmington Ten, despite its tragic aspects, demonstrates the power of an inclusive, eclectic, and morally grounded movement to triumph over repression and wrong. Kenneth Janken has written an utterly fascinating account of a tumultuous and transformative episode in the struggle for democracy in America.”
--Timothy B. Tyson
More information is available here.

Sunday, January 10, 2016

"Washington Confidential" and the Washington Lawyer

In today’s Washington Post, John Kelly revisits Washington Confidential (1951), by Jack Lait and Lee Mortimer, two bottom-feeding journalists who wrote popular exposés of the seamy side of American cities.  The title of the on-line version of Kelly’s column, “Commies, clip joints, easy women,” aptly describes the book’s principal concerns, and Kelly gives his readers a good taste of the authors’ misogyny, racism, homophobia, and red-baiting.  He also notes the outraged reaction of the Washington establishment, but he does not mention the dismay of the capital's lawyers.

Wedged between the book’s chapters on the philandering diplomatic corps and possible ties to national organized crime syndicates is “The Right to Petition,” which tars Washington’s lowliest lobbyists and most high-toned law firms with the same brush.  “The law firm of Thurman Arnold, Abe Fortas and Paul A. Porter has practically everything for its field,” Lait and Mortiner wrote.  “Fortas, onetime stooge of Harold Ickes, is the boy to see for anything in the Department of the Interior.”  The $1 million fee earned by “Dean Acheson’s law firm”–Covington & Burling–gets a mention, and readers are urged not to “shed tears for Louis D. Johnson.”  Although “fired as Secretary of Defense,” he had founded Steptoe & Johnson and become “one of the biggest operators on government contracts in town.”  Indeed, thanks to “Truman inflation,” his firm’s cut was now seven-and-a-half percent, rather than the wartime standard of five percent.

Washington Confidential was by no means the only reason why Washington lawyers felt a need to explain themselves in the early 1950s.  The scandals of the Truman administration, for example, provided the occasion for Thurman Arnold’s defense of the revolving door for government lawyers before Senate subcommittee.  Still, the book’s calumnies stung.  Among the grateful reviewers of The Washington Lawyer (1952), in which Charles Horsky, a member of Covington & Burling, defended the Washington bar as an indispensable fourth branch of government, was Lloyd Cutler.  Horsky’s book, Cutler wrote, was “a good antidote for ‘inside’ tipsheets such as Washington Confidential” and “a far better guide for avoiding legal clip joints.”

Sunday Book Roundup

Here's another short version of the Sunday Book Roundup: