Monday, November 16, 2026

JACH 4:4


The Journal of American Constitutional History completes its fourth full year of quarterly publication with issue 4:4, now available online:

Constitutional Interpretation without a Constitution: Debating Union in the Early United States
Jonathan Gienapp

Debates over the American union that preceded the drafting of the U.S. Constitution of 1787 are often overlooked, but they had lasting significance. In particular, because these early debates followed an unusual path, they helped entrench a particular interpretive habit: deciphering the powers of the United States required first understanding the nature of the United States. Before American statesmen had codified articles of union outlining the formal powers of the national government, that government was exercising broad power to prosecute the war for American independence. This experience taught American statesmen how to engage in constitutional interpretation without a formal constitution at hand—by debating the unwritten constitution of union that all were capable of discerning and delineating. That habit of interpreting union first and constitution second did not disappear once formal constitutional documents were adopted but rather deeply shaped constitutional interpretation for decades to come.
A Patchwork Oligarchy: State Court Approaches to the Police Power During the Progressive Era
Joseph A. Ranney

During the Progressive Era (1890-1920), reform-minded politicians and jurists criticized court decisions cabining legislative use of the police power to meet the needs of a society and economy increasingly based on collective rather than individual forces. Many accused the courts of using doctrines (collectively labeled substantive due process) to preserve an inequitable economic and political order; others argued that the courts’ decisions were legally principled, not political. The debate continues to this day. Most scholars have concentrated on federal rather than state court decisions and have failed to test each side’s arguments through systematic analysis of court decisions. This article is an initial effort to fill both gaps.

The article examines the Supreme Court decisions of six states—New York, Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina, Colorado and California—from multiple perspectives including the proportion of police-power laws each of these courts struck down over the course of the Progressive Era, and their approaches to different categories of laws that came before them for constitutional review. The six courts listened to Progressive criticisms: as those criticisms peaked (1909-1913) the courts’ strike-down rates began to decline, and they continued to do so until the end of the Era in 1920. Judicial use of the doctrine most frequently invoked in striking down police-power laws, namely due process as a shield of property and liberty rights, also declined.

Not all categories of police-power laws met with judicial hostility. Business regulation laws, labor laws, and laws authorizing government enterprises were the most likely to be struck down, but public health and safety laws and sumptuary laws received substantial judicial deference throughout the Progressive Era. There was also variation among the six states. Five followed the pattern of strike-down rate decline during the late Progressive Era but at different paces, and North Carolina’s Supreme Court maintained a very low rate throughout the Era. It remains to be seen whether other state courts responded to Progressive criticisms in similar ways, but the consistency of patterns among six states from different regions suggests that that may be the case.

The Chief Magistrate
Daniel D. Slate

This Article recovers an overlooked historical source for the American presidency and identifies its implications for executive power. Founding-era portrayals of the “‘Hebrew Republic”’ not only had not only an exclusionary influence that forever delegitimized kings in America but also shaped the creation of the Article II executive. Cognate scholarly disciplines, including history and political theory, have recently acknowledged the decisive influence the Hebrew Republic had on early modern theories of constitutional government, including those of the American Revolution. The legal community has yet to grapple with the implications of these recently rediscovered sources for current debates about executive power. Additionally, although the broader scholarly recovery of Hebraic republicanism and its influence has focused on its antimonarchism, to date there has to date been little study of the model of executive power internal to the Hebrew Republic. This Article initiates that study and argues that model had a significant effect on Founding-era thinking about what made for an ideal republican executive and ultimately shaped the Article II presidency. Although the delegates to the 1787 Federal Convention arrived divided, differing sharply on about what an executive for a national republic ought to look like, by the end of the Convention the president they instituted shared a remarkably close resemblance to the chief magistrate of the Hebraic republicans, including: (1) being commander in chief of a federated polity’s national military efforts, yet being neither king nor dictator; (2) operating through the rule of law and being subject to legal process, including criminal penalties and removal from office; (3) sharing significant powers concurrently with a senate; (4) being constitutionally required to be a natural-born citizen; (5) being the only national figure acclaimed as the representative of the people at large; and (6) bearing the non-kingly title of President. My claim is not that the writings of the Hebraic republicans are the only pertinent source material, but rather that studying their effect on Founding-era America is necessary for any analysis of the original presidency that aspires to be comprehensive and account for all relevant historical evidence. One implication of my argument is that we should resist recent attempts to give a “royalist” interpretation to the Article II presidency. Instead, this Article argues that our law should reflect that the president shares many of the features of the Hebraic republicans’ chief magistrate, including: being always and immutably subject to the rule of law (and not in any way above it); being a decidedly republican and not a royalist executive; and, when exercising discretionary powers, doing so in ways controlled by respect for the worth of the individual person, even under the exigent pressures of emergency and crisis.

--Dan Ernst 

Electing Women Judges: Moving Beyond Famous Firsts

The 2026 election blue tsunami included women judges, most prominently, the Texas Supreme Court, which is now majority women. It joins 20 other states that boast female majorities. Yet in 8 states, there is only one woman on the highest state court. Overall, women are 43 percent of state supreme courts. Which still lags behind women’s proportion of the general population (51 percent), JD graduates (55 percent), and law students (56 percent).


Ohio Supreme Court, 1932
courtesy of Bowling Green University Library,
Center for Archival Collections

A Long Time Coming

After Florence Allen was elected the nation’s first woman state supreme court judge in 1922 Ohio, it would take another 60 years until another woman was elected to that court. It was 40 years until a woman was elected to any state supreme court. A similar delay was seen on the federal court of decades after Allen’s appointment in 1934. I detail this in my new book, The First Woman Judge: The Life & Legacy of Florence Allen (UC Press 2026). 

In the long run, Allen’s legacy won out, but it was muted by the glacial pace of appointing women judges. . . .   


The next woman appointed to the Sixth Circuit, by President Jimmy Carter in 1979, twenty years after Allen’s retirement, was conservative Michigan jurist Cornelia Kennedy, initially nominated to the district court by President Richard Nixon. Judge Kennedy ruled against women in a ban on coed sports, upheld the right of voters to restrict civil rights for LGBTQ people, vacated Detroit school desegregation remedies, ruled against Black plaintiffs in most race-based cases against the police or pris­ons, and ruled against the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case, writing that “civil rights law did not protect a woman from a boss’s obnoxious or suggestive words.”

  

Beyond the Sixth Circuit, it would take decades before Allen’s famous first triggered second and third appointments of women. It would be sixty years, over half a century, before a woman was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. It was not until 1981 that Ronald Reagan, faced with a demonstrable gender gap, wooed women voters by making a campaign promise to appoint the first woman Justice, which he did in nominating Sandra Day O’Connor, an Arizona jurist and legislator. It would also take sixty years before another woman served on the Ohio Supreme Court. Blanche Krupansky was temporarily appointed by a Republican governor in 1981, and Alice Robie Resnick was elected in 1989. It would be almost forty years after Allen’s first before a woman served on the highest court of any state, with the ascension of Rhoda Lewis in Hawaii and Lorna Lockwood in Arizona. And it would be thirty years before a woman was appointed to any federal appellate court, as it was not until 1968 that President Lyndon Johnson nominated Shirley Hufstedler to the Ninth Circuit.

 Systemic Shift

What ultimately triggered the shift then, if the advent of the first woman judge was not enough to open the judicial doors to women? At a basic level, it was the increase in the number of women lawyers, bringing not just more candidates, but more familiarity with and acceptance of women in these judicial roles. But more was needed. 

As scholars have explained, although token women like Allen “in a highly visible and powerful office may provide a ‘role model’ for women, they do not automatically trigger an increase in appointments,” because tokenism can operate in the opposite way, restricting rather than expand­ing opportunities due to the “mistaken belief that inequality has been eradicated.”  It would take a systemic disruption to change this status quo and include women in meaningful numbers. That disruption came at the federal level in the form of President Carter’s 1977 executive order changing the process for nomination of federal judges and prioritizing the recruitment of women and racial minorities. The new process de-emphasized the practice of senators recommending political candidates and created mandatory nominating commissions composed of diverse lawyers and leaders, including women, to generate a merit-based list of candidates that included certain numbers of women and people of color. First Woman Judge, 205.

Why Women Matter

Focusing on the pace and number of women judges raises the question of why electing women matters. Political scientist Sally Kenney, in her book, Gender & Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (Routledge 2013), explains the research and the theory of why it is in fact democratically important to have women judges. I placed this research into the specific context of Judge Allen:

[I]t is clear that gender and the advent of the first woman judge made a “profound change in the status of women and a radical departure in the conception and work of the courts.” Allen’s gen­der made a tremendous difference in her symbolic role in shattering the glass ceiling of the judiciary, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the courts. She was a powerful, nationally visible role model of “what a judge looks and sounds like” for women, lawyers, judges, politicians, and the general public, displaying how women could effectively govern in judicial roles. As Allen explained, her breakthrough also empowered all women, for “when women sit in government, women as a whole become conscious of their individual interest and ownership in government.” Diversifying the bench to include women improved the legitimacy of the courts by ending the systemic dis­crimination the law itself created and enforced. As Allen said, since women are litigants, citizens, and persons in the courts, “they are entitled to play their parts equally with men in the administration of justice.” It is impor­tant, she said, that courts, as defenders of the rule of law, not be seen as systems of exclusion and oppression. Thus, it was justice simply to no longer exclude one-half of the human race from judicial office.

 

Women on the bench also critically enhance the representational role of the courts as impartial tribunals by expanding the diversity of arbiters to include a broader portion of the polity. This representation functions to improve people’s trust in the decisions of the courts, with judges demo­cratically reflecting the populace as a nonexclusionary body. Integrating the bench to include women makes for a “fairer legal system” beyond mere “window dressing or political correctness,” by more inclusively reflecting the norms of a wider and more representative community. Allen explained how women judges recalibrated the court’s structural impartial­ity by centering women’s experience and by negating stereotypes of women in the legal system that unfairly disadvantage litigants, witnesses, attor­neys, and jurors. First Woman Judge, 204. 

That it has taken more than a century to crawl towards this democratization of courts, shows how radically transformative was the first woman judge.

--Tracy Thomas

Saturday, November 14, 2026

Weekend Roundup

  • The Supreme Court Historical Society has posted a short video on Court's role in the presidential election of 1876 (YouTube). 
  • The View from ASLH Banff
    "The Other Roe," a 17-minute documentary on Margie Pitts Hames and Doe v. Bolton (Hollywood Times).  
  • Greetings from ASLH Banff!  Mountains make the best backdrop for legal history. 
  • "The Saatchi Gallery is hosting Sketches that Shaped History, a free exhibition of courtroom art capturing some of the most pivotal moments in legal history. Running from 14th–17th November and presented by Harvey, the AI platform for legal and professional services" (LOTI).
  • West Chester University's Department of Theatre & Dance presents "Sacco & Vanzetti: A Tragedia dell’Arte from Nov. 19-22, blending historical drama with the comedy and theatrical traditions of commedia dell’arte" (MyChesCo). 
  • A notice of that HLS panel on the rule of law, with Aziz Z. Huq, Kevin C. Newsom, Jamal Greene, and Jill Lepore (Harvard Law Today).  

Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.   

Friday, November 13, 2026

Ablavsky Replies to Nelson on Public Rights

Gregory Ablavsky, Stanford Law School, has posted Retconning the Law: A Reply to Prof. Nelson:

“The details of organization of the land system,” Henry Adams wrote in 1879, “implied much labor and minute attention, but they are not interesting.” Caleb Nelson and I evidently disagree with Adams. In my 2022 article Getting Public Rights Wrong, I argued that nineteenth-century administrative adjudication of private land claims unsettles the claim that vested property rights historically required judicial resolution. Prof. Nelson has now responded arguing that this history was, in fact, “consistent” with his framework.

I appreciate Nelson’s thorough and thoughtful engagement with my argument, and we agree on much. My core objection is that Nelson’s response is a retcon: a retroactive rewriting of the past to fit present narrative needs. Confronted with the private land claims, Nelson crafts a new exception: His framework, he now says, encompassed only “judicially cognizable” vested rights. But this new exception eliminates much of the value of Nelson’s original proposal, since it merely restates the test from Murray’s Lessee, the case his framework set out to clarify. It also turns a supposed limit on Congress into something closer to a drafting requirement. As for our other disagreements—whether imperfect titles were vested, the meaning of the California Land Act of 1851 and Botiller v. Dominguez—Nelson attempts to render the history “consistent” with his framework by positing distinctions largely unarticulated by the historical actors, plausible only by ignoring contrary evidence.

Our exchange also raises a larger question. If current doctrine turns on how nineteenth-century officials parsed perfect and imperfect titles in Sainte Genevieve and Natchitoches, Chief Justice Roberts’s mocking hypothetical about Kant and eighteenth-century Bulgaria has become serious business. That is not “ordinary lawyering,” as Baude and Sachs attempted to categorize uncovering the law of the past. It involves an ever-more sweeping, detailed, and technical inquiry into prior jurisprudence--ordinary history, you might call it. But relying on such fine-grained research to make law renders our law less transparent, less accessible, and more dependent on expert augury.

In the end, whatever the normative merits of Nelson’s framework as a solution to the problem of private rights, I don’t think he offers a faithful account of their framework—that is, of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. And if it takes over 30,000 words to try to explain away one “pocket” of law, perhaps that framework was never that coherent to begin with.

Hattem's "Declaration of Indepedence"

Michael D. Hattem has published The Declaration of Independence: A Concise History (Oxford University Press):

The Declaration of Independence is one of the world's most important historical documents. It has been lauded by generations of historians as "American scripture" and the "American version of the Magna Carta," but the Declaration began its life as a press release, intended to serve an immediate purpose, after which it was stored with no special care alongside the rest of the records of the Continental Congress. Its creators could not have anticipated that it would become one of the most iconic symbols of the Revolution they were waging and the nation they were building.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the Declaration would begin to assume its place in the mythos and civic religion of the United States. It provided Americans with a shared political language that would shape how subsequent generations understood the Revolution and the politics of their own times. Liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness became keywords in American politics, and each generation has redefined those terms and, by extension, the Declaration.

In this book, historian Michael D. Hattem offers a fresh history of the Declaration of Independence. He moves beyond how it was written and approved by Congress to tell a story that spans a quarter of a millennium and features a cast of countless individuals and groups from around the world who dared to realize the Declaration's ideals more fully than the revolutionary generation could ever have imagined. He shows how the Declaration has reflected many of the inherent contradictions at the heart of the American experiment and has been used equally by liberal and conservative political movements to achieve their different political aims. The result is a compelling story of the Declaration's origins and the creation of its legacy over the past two hundred and fifty years.

--Dan Ernst 

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Schorr on "Colonial Law" in British Legal Literature

David Schorr, Tel Aviv University Buchmann Faculty of Law, has posted The Creation of “Colonial Law” in British Legal Literature, which is forthcoming in Legal Unification Through Case Law: Supreme Courts and the Emergence of Uniform Law in the Modern Era, ed. Martin Loehnig (2027):


As an extension of ongoing research on the case law of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (hereinafter: the Privy Council), which served as a court of appeal for the empire (excluding Britain itself), this chapter examines the ways in which legal books of the time developed and reflected a consciousness of a diverse yet somehow unified corpus that could be compiled and comprehended as a new legal system-'colonial law'. More particularly, it argues that it was the existence and activity of the globe-spanning, empire-wide jurisdiction of the Privy Council, alongside various other facets of the imperial legal system administered from Westminster, that spurred the creation of this new 'colonial law'.

--Dan Ernst 

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

See You in Banff!

The American Society for Legal History starts its annual meeting in Banff, Alberta, today with preconferences on Canadian Legal History, Chinese Legal History, Radical Lawyering, and Paleography--all before a full program's worth of sessions on Friday and Saturday.  We hope to see you at the meeting!

--Dan Ernst 

Langum Prize in American Legal History or Biography

[We have the following announcement.  DRE]

David J. Langum, Sr. Prize in American Legal History or Biography

This $1,000 prize is made annually to the best book in American legal history or biography that is accessible to the educated general public, rooted in sound scholarship, and with themes that touch upon matters of general concern to the American public, past or present.

Publishers must submit books to be considered for this prize, and must submit three copies to the address indicated on the Contact page by December 1st of their first publication.  Books published in December are eligible and must be submitted for that year’s prize, but may be submitted by December 1st in advanced reading copies or proofs.

We hope that this prize will not only serve as an incentive for excellent writing, but also as a vetting process. It is intended to be a guide to the general public, bookstores, and acquisitions librarians—to all who may seek readable and sound legal history and biography, scholarship that is accessible to the educated general public.

Recent winners and finalists include:

Beth Lew-Williams  John Doe Chinaman: A Forgotten History of Chinese Life Under American Racial Law (Harvard, 2025)

Jill Lepore, We The People: A History of the U.S. Constitution (Liveright, 2025)

Stuart Banner, The Most Powerful Court in the World: A History of the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford, 2024)

Hendrik Hartog, Nobody’s Boy and His Pals: The Story of Jack Robbins and the Boys’ Brotherhood Republic (Chicago, 2024)

Dylan Penningroth, Before the Movement: The Hidden History of Black Civil Rights (Norton, 2023)

Inquiries or submissions (3 copies) for the Langum Prize in American Legal History/Biography should be sent to the chairman of its selection committee, William G. Ross, Cumberland School of Law, 800 Lakeshore Drive, Birmingham, AL 35229, wgross@samford.edu.

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Job Alert: Law, Philosophy and History at U Baltimore

[We have the following announcement.  DRE.]

The Law, Philosophy and History program at the University of Baltimore is hiring a full-time lecturer. Our preferred candidate will have a graduate degree in either History or Philosophy, in addition to having a J.D. The position is a full-time, one-year renewable contract appointment, 9.5-month faculty position, with a 4/4 teaching load, with salary range of $80,000 - $90,000.

The University of Baltimore is a federally designated Predominantly Black Institution with working adults and first-generation students making up a large proportion of our undergraduate population.  Our campus is convenient to Baltimore's public transportation and a block from Penn Station with easy access to commuter rail and Amtrak, making it an hour by train from Washington, an hour-and-fifteen minutes from Philadelphia, and two hours and forty-five minutes from New York City.

Our deadline for priority consideration is December 15.  Applications may be submitted [here].

Election Reform as Crucial to Electing the First Woman Judge in 1920

This election was a vivid reminder of how free and fair elections are—and have been—critical to electing women to office, including the judiciary. The 2026 blue tsunami electing women in unprecedent numbers to governor, Congress, and state and federal legislative office was driven by an anti-corruption philosophy—a challenge to the corporate and government overreach of overentitled leaders at the expense of individual rights and public welfare. That same motivation—women taking on corruption and unethical governance—fueled the first wave women electors and women candidates for public office at the turn of the twentieth century. That early historic movement was fueled by the Progressive Era in reaction to the excesses of the Gilded Age of millionaires and government corruption.

Judge Florence Allen, the first woman elected to a general jurisdiction court of the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) Court of Common Pleas in 1920 rode in on a similar wave of women voter’s challenge to the corrupt status quo. This result was enabled by the structural change of the newly ratified Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and progressive multi-candidate voting ballots, like ranked choice and proportional voting. The bipartisan support of the newly enfranchised women voters then implemented those systemic ideas and made all the difference to her election.

Swearing in Judge Florence Allen to the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Jan. 1921,
Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH

Nineteenth Amendment

The Nineteenth was ratified in late August 1920 when women won their federal constitutional grant of the vote without barriers based on sex. This status as electors thus was presumed to allow women to run for public office. However, many states interpreted the Nineteenth narrowly to apply only to the vote and continued to deny women the corollary elector rights of public office and jury service on grounds of originalism and coverture, all well documented in Paula Monopoli’s book, Constitutional Orphan.

Days after enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment, Florence Allen declared her candidacy for judicial office. She had missed the primaries, so she ran as an independent, thereby attracting the support of active women from both parties. Her own Democratic party did not endorse her, but behind the scenes the political bosses in Cleveland, including one of the first women shadow bosses, Bernice Pyke, buoyed her candidacy.

Voting Reform

A second critical systemic change that facilitated the election of the first woman judge was a Progressive movement for “proportional representation” voting. Allen came in first from a ballot of ten vying for four judicial positions.

These progressive voting reforms allowed a voter to select several from a group of candidates, sometimes in ranked choice, which often resulted in the election of more representative and diverse candidates like women and minorities. Cleveland and Ohio emerged as early leaders in the national movement for proportional representation reform. Ashtabula, just east of Cleveland . . . was the first city in the country to adopt proportional representation in 1915. Nationally, from 1913 to 1932, the Proportional Representation League “pursued a vigorous national campaign” for proportional voting, believing that it restored voting to ordinary people, as opposed to corruption funding single winner take-all candidates. Multiple-candidate voting also allowed voters to strategize by not voting all their possible choices, thus increasing the total number of votes for preferred candidates and decreasing the totals for other candidates.

 

Allen candidly admitted that this strategy of withholding votes, colloquially called “plunker voting,” explained her victory. She recounted a conversation she had after her election at a luncheon with Roscoe Pound, her infamous professor at Chicago and now dean of Harvard Law, who was giving a speech about his study of criminal justice administration in the Cleveland courts. She introduced herself by saying, “You will not remember me,” and he said snarkily, “I remember you perfectly: you’re Miss Allen.” Another lawyer jumped in to mediate, saying this is Judge Allen, a presiding judge in the court of common pleas. Pound said, “Oh! You’re the woman! Plunker votes, I fancy,” thus discounting her elective victory. But Florence ignored the slight. “I had to laugh at this. Unquestionably so-called plunker votes had aided me to lead the ticket. Persons who voted for me and for no one else on the list of ten candidates had deprived other candidates of possible votes.”

 

Women activists led the movement for proportional voting and city manager governance in Cleveland. The progressive women idealistically believed that women candidates would benefit from these proportional voting reforms because women were a “numerical majority but drastically underrepresented in political life.”  First Woman Judge, 66-67. 

Judge Allen ratified this form of multi-candidate form of voting in her very first published majority opinion as a state supreme court judge. She relied on expansive home rule powers of municipalities newly added to the state constitution to uphold the constitutionality of proportional voting. Reutener v.  City of Cleveland 141 N.E. 27 (Ohio 1923). 

Allen said it was the “first decision in the United States” to uphold “the radically different system of voting and counting,” which was technically true, though Michigan and California courts had reached similar results. In her opinion, she dismissed arguments that the voting system nullified votes, finding that it is “axiomatic” and “a matter of common knowledge” that minorities can determine outcomes, citing John Quincy Adams’s presidential election and the common practice of gerrymandering voting districts. In a companion case, she also upheld proportional voting against federal constitutional challenge. Cleveland’s proportional voting, however, would be repealed ten years later as wins by Italian and Irish candidates in Cleveland drew public ire, and as Democratic reformers became the majority party and lost interest in systemic reforms. First Woman Judge, 67-68.

In 2026, Ohio passed a law prohibiting any city from adopting alternative voting systems like ranked choice voting, in direct contravention of Allen’s precedent of the constitutional right to home rule. Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine Signs Bill to Crack Down on Ranked Choice Voting.  For multi-candidate forms of balloting continue to be an effective structure facilitating the election of more diverse and representative candidates. While these voting reforms continue to be unpopular, and misunderstood, across the political spectrum, they have been effective in states like Alaska and Maine and other  cities across the nation to open electoral politics democratically. Perhaps the most famous example is Mary Peltola’s prior congressional wins in Alaska, and likely 2026 win.

--Tracy Thomas

Monday, November 9, 2026

The Howlin Backlist

Niamh Howlin, University College Dublin, has posted several papers on Irish legal history from his backlist:

“Something More Than Tourists”: The American Bar Association in Ireland:
This article explores the relationship between the American Bar Association and the Irish legal professions in the twentieth century. It focuses in particular on two instances when the ABA visited Ireland; the first in 1924 and the second in 1957. Both were significant for different reasons. In 1924 the new Irish Free State had emerged from a period of violence to the formation of a new system of courts, new judicial appointments and other changes. The visit was an opportunity to demonstrate internationally that the rule of law had been reestablished. In 1957 the U.S. Supreme Court had delivered a number of significant civil rights judgments and the visit of Chief Justice Earl Warren to Ireland seems to have fed into the growing interest in American constitutional interpretation. The 1957 visit was also an example of the kind of soft diplomacy which further strengthened Irish-American relations. 

 A Wrongful Conviction: The Murder of John Donovan in Glenlara:

This is the story of a murder which took place in Glenlara, in the parish of Clonfert, in 1894, and the subsequent trial, conviction and hanging of a man from Castleisland, Co. Kerry. Initially a local story, it later attracted national attention, was discussed in the House of Commons, and generated endless columns of newspaper reporting. Stories about the murder, the trial and the hanging were told and retold in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, through books, articles, documentaries, culminating in the granting of a pardon by President Michael D. Higgins 127 years later. In this article, I explore some of the legal aspects of the investigation and the trial, to explain why it was considered necessary to grant a pardon after so many years. 

Law Reform Before the Law Reform Commission, which discusses "attempts in the 20th century to introduce systemic law reform in Ireland."

“On the Fly and on the Sly”: A District Court in Action, a study of a local court operating at the founding of the Free State and the passing of the Courts of Justice Act 1924.

–Dan Ernst

Saturday, November 7, 2026

Weekend Roundup

  • An obituary of Alan Rogers, professor emeritus of history at Boston College, who "transformed himself into a legal historian" after publishing his first book (AHA). 
  • A notice of Marco Basile, Boston College, who "explores whether the law should favor the weak when statutes leave room for interpretation" (BC Magazine).  
  • Anja Amend-Traut, Universität Würzburg, has just received a grant of 1.3 million euros for an AI-assisted project studying the protocol books of the Imperial Court Council of the Holy Roman Empire (UW). 
  • The Institute for Justice marked the centennial of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty with a symposium on zoning and a panel of experts including HLS's Molly Brady (Short Circuit).
  •  The Andalusian Studies Centre is sponsoring a seminar dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the 1876 Constitution, “the longest-lasting in contemporary Spain.”  It “aims to highlight the role of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, from Malaga, the main architect of a political system that provided institutional stability and laid the foundations for an order based on legality, coexistence and freedoms, values that remain fully valid today.” 
  • The American Political Science Association has just issued the call for its 123rd Annual Meeting & Exhibition, “The Institutions We Need: Design, Reform, and Renewal,” to be held in Washington, DC, September 2–5, 2027. 
  • The Law Library of Congress is digitizing and making available without charge its bound set of the records and briefs of the U.S. Supreme Court, which begins with the January Term 1832.  "Digitization will begin with year 2012 and work backwards.  Full-text searching will be available as well as metadata including case name, U.S. Reports citation, and file date, as available" (In Custodia Legis).
  • Update: A notice of a recent book event for Gautham Rao's White Power at Northwestern (DN)  

Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.   

Friday, November 6, 2026

Hodges's "Rise of US Military Legalism"

Doyle K. Hodges, the Dean of Academic Affairs at the Naval War College, has published The Rise of US Military Legalism A New Theory of Military Professionalism (Routledge):

The book documents a change over the past 50 years in the way in which US military officers make decisions about using force, which it calls "military legalism". Rather than relying solely on professional military judgment and professional military ethics, officers are increasingly using legal norms and reasoning to justify their choices. This book explores how widespread this practice has become, explains why it has emerged, and examines some of its implications. Using historical cases from World War II through the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, this book traces changes in the way in which civilian policymakers have governed US military decisions about the use of force, and how the military has responded to these changes. While military legalism is normatively neither good nor bad, legalistic reasoning has been used to justify morally deficient policies, and a reliance on legal reasoning may have unanticipated and unexamined effects on the norms of civil-military relations.

--Dan Ernst 

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Zatelli to Lecture on Vice-Admiralty Courts of Colonial NY

[We have the following announcement.  DRE] 

On November 10, the Helsinki Legal History Series will reconvene for Gustavo Zatelli, University of Helsinki, to give the lecture “Exploring the British Empire beyond the Common Law: A Comparative Study of the Vice-Admiralty Courts during the Eighteenth Century (New York).”  Time: 3 pm – 4.30 pm.  Location: Apollon Sali K134.  Link for online participation [here]

This paper examines legal pluralism in eighteenth-century British colonial vice-admiralty courts, focusing on how legal actors drew on different legal traditions, particularly the use of civil law, to elaborate their arguments. It presents preliminary findings from an ongoing research project funded by the Research Council of Finland, which compares legal argumentation used in the Vice-Admiralty Courts of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia and Jamaica up to 1775. Within this comparative framework, the paper concentrates on records from New York, where archival research is currently most advanced.

Through an analysis of legal argumentation, the paper investigates how the interpretation and application of imperial admiralty law occurred in colonial contexts. It asks how and why different legal traditions were invoked, and what these practices reveal about the relationship between colonial interests and imperial authority. The project’s central hypothesis is that vice-admiralty jurisdiction provided an institutional environment in which participants could strategically draw on different legal traditions to advance claims, articulate expectations about rights and obligations, and negotiate competing interests. By examining these practices, the paper seeks to clarify the relationship between legal pluralism and colonial governance, while considering how the preliminary findings from New York can inform the project’s broader comparative analysis.

Gustavo Zatelli Correa is a legal historian and Academy Researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki. His research focuses on comparative colonial legal history, the circulation of legal knowledge, and the history of administrative law and police regulation. His current project, funded by the Research Council of Finland, compares vice-admiralty courts in eighteenth-century British colonies. He previously worked on the University of Helsinki’s Comparing Early Modern Colonial Laws (CoCoLaw) project and has held research appointments in Frankfurt and Vienna. He obtained his PhD by the University of Brasília, Brazil.

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Stern Receives Cromwell Article Prize

As members of the American Society of Legal History know, the William Nelson Cromwell Foundationhas long awarded a number of prizes and awards to scholars nominated by committees of the ASLH.  Since 2022, Cromwell has also awarded, on the nomination of its own committee, a $10,000 annual prize for a legal history article.  This year, the Cromwell's committee was chaired by John Fabian Witt.  Its other members were Mary Bilder, Risa Goluboff, Amalia Kessler, John Langbein, and yours truly.

The winner of this year's Cromwell article prize is Rephael G. Stern, Boston University Law School, for "The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking," 134 Yale L. J. 1955 (2025).  Here is the committee's citation:

Stern takes up one of the most consequential procedures in American government—the notice-and-comment rulemaking enshrined in Section 553 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act—and asks where it came from.  Conventional scholarly accounts locate its origins alternately in congressional petitioning, nineteenth-century agency practice, and German administrative thought.  Drawing on original archival research, Stern shows instead that notice-and-comment rulemaking arose out of a series of American transplantations of U.K. procedures for delegated rulemaking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from the Rules Publication Act 1893 through the influential 1932 report of the Donoughmore Committee.  New Deal reformers borrowed the English framework, with its requirements of publication and consultation.  But the transplant was only partial.  In light of concern that congressional involvement might obstruct administrative rulemaking, and given the resounding defeat of the nondelegation doctrine, Americans declined to import a crucial accompanying institution.  They omitted the English practice of “laying” regulations before the legislature for consideration—a form of legislative veto that was integral to rulemaking in England.

"The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking" is a model of transatlantic legal history, recovering a largely forgotten Anglo-American world of administrative law and unsettling the origin stories that have dominated the field.  It is also a timely contribution to the present.  At a moment when administrative law has returned to large-scale constitutional questions like legislative veto and nondelegation, and in an era in which administrative law often seems beset on all sides, Stern’s history illuminates lost paths not taken in the past as well as new possible futures.  Readers of this article will ask themselves new questions, including whether some version of an English-style legislative veto might still offer democratic legitimacy to administrative procedures—or instead reproduce the very problems that led the New Deal’s architects to leave it behind.
--Dan Ernst

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

How and Why I Wrote a Book About the First Woman Judge

I began writing about Florence Allen, the first woman judge, because she was literally staring me in the face, hanging in a portrait on the wall in the classroom where I taught. My dean casually asked me, “you know Florence Allen, right?” I did not.

A Biographical Lens

Judge Florence Allen,
Ohio Supreme Court c.1923

A quick web search told me the basics. The first woman federal appellate judge, appointed by FDR in 1934. The first woman in the nation elected to any state supreme court, Ohio in 1922 and re-elected in 1928. Before that the first woman judge elected to any general jurisdiction court, elected to Cleveland’s Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in 1920, immediately after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. The first woman shortlisted to the U.S. Supreme Court, considered twelve times by three presidents from both parties—and it looked like she had the nod three times between 1938 and 1949. I wrote a law review article recovering these basics, The Jurisprudence of the First Woman Judge, in the William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice. There had been women in quasi-judicial administrative positions before Allen, but she was the first elected to a general trial court and was widely known in her time “the first woman judge.”

Judge Allen’s story, however, was more than the story of one woman. It was the story of women’s integration and transformation of the law more broadly. Thus, I thought a book length treatment was needed. For Allen was among the first one percent of women in the law at every stage: as law students, lawyers, trial attorneys, prosecutors, congressional candidate, as well as judge.

And as women entered these halls of justice, they brought with them transformative ideas of public law, fair process, and ethical adjudication. As external players to partisan politics, women activists had learned how to use alternative systems of lobbying, administration, and influence to achieve policy goals and correct injustices. They brought with them reform notions to restore the rule of law, ethical decisionmaking, and a democratic legal system accountable to all, not just the corporate and private business interests. Allen was at the forefront of this transformation, and her story tracks these changes demanding more responsive courts.

On the Research Trail

The research process was longer than I had hoped. I thought I had learned with my first scholarly monograph, ECS, how to better collect, scan, organize, index, and manage the archival process. But this second book project brought similar hurdles. Changing technology uncoding the coded. A pandemic, fire, and political machinations shutting down archives. Research assistants losing and erasing documents before they were backed up. Heavy teaching loads. Restarting writing each summer, and reinventing the wheel. Yet the story continued to drive me.

The research included over five thousand documents primarily at the Western Reserve Historical Archives in Cleveland and the Library of Congress. Digitization and the LOC as well as other libraries revolutionized the process. Even in the final days of proofreading and edits, the explosion of archival access to local papers with sites like Newspapers.com and NewspaperArchive provide rich new sources from sources in real time.

Reading Allen’s 800 federal and state opinions was also a challenge. First, just finding them was a battle, as many in this historical time frame were not readily available or did not indicate the writing judge in databases like Westlaw or Lexis. Frustrated, I finally went old school, asking the wonderful librarians in the Akron Law Library to help me find the dusty volumes of the reporters in the deep storage basement of the library. Lo and behold, I discovered in these a beautiful index at the front of each book listing opinions by writing judge, easily finding all Allen’s decisions including the per curiams. I also discovered in these indices that Judge Allen was always listed at the end of all seven judges, despite the alphabet placing her first and despite rising seniority over the years. It seems the woman judge, or “Miss” rather than “Judge,” as the volumes sometimes labeled her, could not be first.

The second research challenge from the cases was placing them in legal and historical context. Allen’s key years on the bench, 1920 to 1959, were among the least familiar to me. The least taught in Con Law courses, the least used in gender analysis, and often considered mere stopping points on the way to further developments. So learning the U.S. Supreme Court cases from this period, and the labor history, and the full legal history of the 1912 progressive Ohio Constitution were all required reading. It was fascinating—among the most generative and engaging projects of my career. There were rabbit holes galore as detours took me into hours of esoteric web searching. Producing a list of ancillary interests--enough to produce a list of six more books I’d like to write next.

Writing Women’s Legal History

The process of writing The First Woman Judge reminded me of some of the catches to writing women’s history. Writing women’s history is different because the sources may be difficult to find, less evidence is preserved by family members or institutions, women change their name at marriage, and women are often found externally to legal systems. See Oxford Legal History Bibliographies. Newspapers, organizations, and private collections offer potential gold mines, but do not offer easy access or indexation. Books about women’s history are often out of print, with the burst of scholarship in the early 1980s removed from shelves.

Allen’s story did not present as many of these methodological problems because she was unmarried, and was an internal institutional actor, who went to great lengths to preserve her own papers. Yet she culled these papers to omit much of the personal or political backstory and family members got rid of the rest. Even Allen’s opinions, had to be understood in gendered context as the chief justice refused to assign her important cases and male colleagues refused to engage with her in conference or join her opinions. The historical record thus requires gendered, as well as legal and historical, contextualization.

--Tracy Thomas

Monday, November 2, 2026

Mehrotra Reviews Williamson's "Price of Democracy"

Over at U.S. Intellectual History Blog, Ajay K. Mehrotra reviews Vanessa Williamson’s The Price of Democracy: The Revolutionary Power of Taxation in American History (Basic, 2025).  First, from the publisher:

Americans have always fought over the meaning of freedom and equality. What is not commonly recognized is that the battles most pivotal in defining our democracy, from the framing of the Constitution to the decades-long backlash to the civil rights movement, hinged on one issue—taxes.  

In The Price of Democracy, Vanessa S. Williamson challenges the myth that Americans are instinctively anti-tax, revealing that fights over taxes have always been proxies for deeper conflicts over who is included in “We the People.” Poorer people have repeatedly built movements that sought to tax all Americans to create a more equal and democratic nation. Wealthy people have responded by constraining the power to tax and stifling democracy through voting restrictions, gerrymandering, and violence. Yet as hard as anti-tax crusaders have fought to create an America that redistributes not from rich to poor, but from non-white people to rich white people, the battle rages on. 

The Price of Democracy uncovers how fights for fiscal fairness have defined American history, delivering a powerful message to the present: that taxes are the public’s most powerful weapon in the fight for a real democracy.

And from Professor Mehrotra's review:

In her brilliant and timely new book, Vanessa S. Williamson interrogates the changing historical relationship between taxation and American democracy. Chronicling the connection from the Revolutionary War Era to today, she contends that “taxes are a key ingredient in the recipe for successful representative government; leave them out and democracy struggles to rise.” While she acknowledges that voting is a pillar of democracy, holding free and fair elections is not enough. “A government also needs the resources and the organization to fill the demands of the voters. Thus, it is taxes that make democracy consequential,” she writes. Little wonder that opponents of American democracy, as Williamson persuasively shows, have historically sought to undermine – often simultaneously – both the franchise and robust tax systems.

--Dan Ernst

Welcome, Tracy Thomas

Tracy Thomas, the Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law, joins the blog this month to discuss her new book,  The First Woman Judge: The Life and Legacy of Florence Allen (University of California Press).  She is also the author of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist Foundations of Family Law (NYU Press 2016) and the editor (with Tracey Jean Boisseau) of Feminist Legal History: Essays on Women and Law (NYU Press 2011).  She also directs Akron Law's Center for Constitutional Law.  From the press's website:

Florence Allen was the first woman judge many times over—first federal appellate court judge, first elected to a state supreme court, and first shortlisted for the U.S. Supreme Court. During Allen’s forty years on the bench, the country swung between progressivism and conservatism, with passage of a constitutional amendment for women’s voting rights, two world wars, the Red and Lavender Scares, and the New Deal.

Amid these changes, women used their new political standing to transform the courts, first by becoming active agents in the justice system, and then by developing theories of public law, social justice, and fair process. Exploring Allen’s fascinating legal life, Tracy Thomas recounts the larger history of how women infiltrated the legal system as judges, lawyers, jurors, and legislators to demand a more representative system of justice for the welfare of all. 

Welcome, Professor Thomas!

--Dan Ernst

Sunday, November 1, 2026

Sunday Roundup

  • A notice of Felicia Kornbluh's investiture as the Mark A. Stoler Green and Gold Professor at the University of Vermont. 
  • The State Bar of New Mexico has received the Luminary Award for Excellence in Special Projects of the National Association of Bar Professionals for its Bar Bulletin: Commemorative Edition , which "explores more than 250 years of New Mexico’s legal history through original articles, archival photography, artwork and dual timelines" (Daily Post). 
  • "On November 12, The LA Local and the Japanese American National Museum will host a live staged reading of a historic Supreme Court decision, Korematsu v. United States, in Little Tokyo, using a script by the Asian American Bar Association of New York. George Takei will play Fred Korematsu (LA Local).

  • "A brief history of spoiler candidates and the unsuccessful legal challenges to them" (Conversation).

--Dan Ernst 

Saturday, October 31, 2026

Weekend Roundup

  • Alison LaCroix, University of Chicago Law School, "reflects on the perpetual struggle for a 'well-constructed union'"  (UC Magazine).  
  • Tomiko Brown-Nagin is interviewed as she leaves the deanship of Harvard Radcliffe Institute for the James Quillen Dean of its Graduate School of Education at Stanford University.
  • A recording of Jud Campbell's Scalia Lecture at Harvard Law, entitled "The Federalist Bill of Rights" (YouTube). 
  • Carlton F.W. Larson, UC Davis School of Law, has posted an interview on treason during the American Revolution (AAR).
  • Pennsylvania's now-closed Pennhurst State School and Asylum has a fascinating and troubling history, including a rich legal history. A new film captures some of that history, alongside footage of the current commercial uses of the space (a haunted asylum attraction, ghost hunting tours). Information about the film (The Haunting of Pennhurst) is here. I also recommended David Korostyshevsky's review, posted at the blog Nursing Clio. [KMT]  
  • Here is the Call for Proposals for the annual meeting of the Association of Law and Political Economy to be held in Boston on June 9-10, 2027.
  • ICYMI: A notice of A Concise History of American Law by the late William E. Nelson in the Law Society Gazette, and a review of Born Equal by Akhil Reed Amar in the Washington Independent Review of Books.

Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.  

Friday, October 30, 2026

Greenlee and Mocsary on Game Laws, Black Codes, and Bruen

Joseph G.S. Greenlee and George A. Mocsary have published the essay From Royal Decrees to Black Codes: Wolford v. Lopez and the Limits of Post-Bruen Evasion in the Yale Law Journal:

Historical practices can illuminate the scope of constitutional rights, but they can also embody the abuses those rights were intended to prevent. Hawai‘i’s reliance on a Reconstruction Era Black Code to justify restrictions on public carry brought this distinction into focus. This Essay argues that New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen’s history-and-tradition inquiry is constitutional, not merely descriptive: a historical law does not become an authoritative measure of constitutional meaning simply because it was enacted. Examining English game laws, Hawaiian monarchical restrictions, and Reconstruction Era Black Codes, the Essay distinguishes historical practices that exemplify the American constitutional order from practices that order rejected, most notably through the Reconstruction settlement’s repudiation of laws intended to disarm and subordinate newly freed citizens. Such enactments cannot be erased from history, but neither should they become affirmative precedents for modern restrictions merely because they existed. Instead, they should serve as “anti-analogues”—counterexamples illustrating the abuses that constitutional guarantees were intended to prevent. This approach accounts for the entire constitutional episode, including subsequent repudiation, and supplies a principled method for evaluating historical evidence without allowing discredited governmental practices to diminish constitutional rights.

--Dan Ernst 

Thursday, October 29, 2026

Insiders and Outsiders in the History of Law

It is publication day for the essay collection, Insiders and Outsiders in the History of Law, edited by Joanna McCunn and Gwen Seabourne (University of London Press):

Writing the history of law involves choices: whose stories are to be told, and how?  Traditionally, legal history has focused on influential ‘insiders’ like judges, lawyers and legislators, and on studying the records they produced. Today, increasing attention is being paid to the lives of ‘outsiders’, drawing on new sources and methods to understand their experiences of the law.

This book brings together new research that examines dividing lines drawn in the history of law and the experiences of those who have fallen inside and outside them. From prominent judges and law reformers to women, colonial subjects and gender nonconforming people, and from medieval Crusader states to twentieth-century England, this book examines the legal encounters of a wide range of individuals and communities. The authors explore how people became legal insiders or outsiders, how the law treated them, and how they sought to wield legal processes to their advantage. They demonstrate the malleability and contingency of any insider/outsider binary. From the Tudor queens of England to mixed-race people in colonial Jamaica, legal actors have transcended boundaries and interacted with law in potent and unexpected ways.

At this pivotal moment for legal history, this book prompts conversation between those engaged in legal and historical studies and legal practice, and demonstrates the potential for a reinvigorated and representative legal history to improve our understandings of law’s past.

--Dan Ernst.  TOC after the jump

Wednesday, October 28, 2026

Law and Diversity: Europe and Latin America

[We have the following announcement.  DRE]


Collin/Bastias Saavedra (eds.), Law and Diversity: European and Latin American Experiences from a Legal Historical Perspective. Vol. 2: Public Law.  [Global Perspectives on Legal History. Vol. 29] (A Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory Open Access Publication)

The principle of equality is one of the cornerstones of modern legal systems. Modern law is based on  equality, and therefore assumed to stand in sharp contrast to the law of pre-modern, estate-based societies characterised by special legal regimes for particular groups or individuals. However, it is worth asking if this dichotomy can perhaps only be maintained if one looks solely at the fundamental postulates and the major codifications with their equality-orientated system formations. ‘Modernity’, too, is highly socially differentiated and continues or transforms ‘pre-modern’ distinctions to a not inconsiderable extent. All of this is often reflected in special rules created by the state or by the groups themselves – even if, in the latter case, they are often not recognised as law.

In this volume, the term ‘diversity’ denotes constellations of social difference that are relevant to normativity. This understanding of diversity only partially overlaps with the categories of postmodern diversity discourses. Rather, this volume’s central questions ask what social differences are relevant to normativity, to what extent and in what respect. Or, to relate it more specifically to the relationship between law and diversity: which social differences also make a difference to the law?

A comparative look at European and non-European developments provides a broader perspective on these issues. In this context, Latin America is a particularly fruitful field of investigation. On the one hand, a translation of European legal traditions already took place during the colonial period and, after independence, Latin American states striving for modernity often took recourse to European legal ideas and regulatory models. On the other hand, the legacy of the colonial past continued to have a formative influence, and the social differentiation to which the law had to respond was largely different from that in European societies.

To ensure that bringing together European and Latin American perspectives did not result in a series of mere juxtapositions, the contributions on the development of a specific national legal system are accompanied by comments written by experts on other national legal systems. These comments, firstly, outline the comparative development in a different state and, secondly, highlight differences and similarities. European and Latin American authors alternate. The period under discussion is the last 200 years.    

These questions are addressed in the multi-volume publication “Law and Diversity: European and Latin American Experiences from a Legal-Historical Perspective”.  In volume 1, the authors dealt with fundamental questions of law and diversity. The present volume, the second in the series, focuses on public law. Further volumes on private law and criminal law will follow.

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

Shelden, "The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History"

Out today from the W. Hodding Carter III Books imprint of the University of North Carolina Press: The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History, by Rachel A. Shelden (Penn State University). A description from the Press:

Today’s Supreme Court justices bristle at the label “politicians in robes,” insisting that they operate above the fray of partisan politics. But for the first century of the nation’s history, the Court was unmistakably a political institution, both by design and in practice. Justices were fully expected to engage in partisan politics—there was no concern that such engagement would lead to corruption or undue bias—and they remained deeply involved in civic debate and the electoral process while on the bench. In addition to hearing cases in the capital, each justice spent much of his time “riding circuit” and presiding over federal trial courts. On circuit and in Washington, nineteenth-century justices wrote for partisan newspapers, drafted legislation, advised partisan allies, campaigned for colleagues, and even ran for political offices from the bench. Through these political interactions, members of the Court helped shape debates about the Constitution’s meaning at a time when most Americans did not believe in judicial supremacy.

In this sweeping history, Rachel A. Shelden, one of America’s leading voices on the history of the Court, brings readers inside the social and political world of its justices, recovering their essential role in the era’s turbulent politics. She also charts shifts at the turn of the twentieth century, when members of the Court and the legal community refashioned the judiciary as an apolitical institution, setting the stage for an increasingly more powerful—and more isolated—modern Court. The Political Supreme Court is required reading for anyone interested in the legal and political underpinnings of today’s judicial power.  

A sample of praise from reviewers: 

“A deeply researched and highly enjoyable study of how politics kept the early Supreme Court accountable—and the most important historical assessment of the nineteenth-century Court in a very long time.”—Stephen Vladeck
“Rachel Shelden compellingly describes the lively political world that nineteenth-century justices inhabited, one that contrasts sharply with the purported neutrality and isolation that our Supreme Court falsely claims to possess.”—Jack N. Rakove
“This is the single best book I have read on the history of the US Supreme Court. A remarkable achievement.”—Gautham Rao

More information is available here.

-- Karen Tani

A Symposium on Dubber's "New Legal Science"

In 2025, Markus D. Dubber published the essay “New Legal Science in the Dual Penal State: Critical Analysis of Law and the Legitimacy of State Power” in the Bergen Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice.  From its introduction:

New Legal Science is an approach to the study of law that aims to push legal discourse beyond its traditional parochialism by bridging the divide between common law and civil law systems, marked by the abandonment of the project of ‘legal science’ in the former and its persistence in the latter. Thus reconceived, the study of law would allow us to frame and face fundamental issues confronting all modern legal systems as such, most importantly the legitimacy of state power through ‘law.’

The journal has now published a symposium issue (14:1) on Professor Dubber's article.  Here is the TOC:

Introduction
Íñigo Ortiz de Urbina

The Coexistence of Parallel Worlds of Criminal Law Studies in the Face of the Development of the Dual Penal State
Anna Blachnio-Parzych

On Markus Dubber’s New Legal Science: Promises and Limits from a Feminist Perspective
Julieta Di Corleto

What is Left of Legal Science?
Aya Gruber

New Legal Science or International Legal Science?
Eric Hilgendorf

Can the New Legal Science Be Truly Universal?
Stefano Manacorda

A New Legal Science?
Martin Mindestrømmen

Towards a New Legal Science
Kimmo Nuotio

New Legal Science in the Post-Colony
Abhinav Sekhri

A New Legal Science Instead of an Old Parochial and Uncritical Criminal Law Science?
Adriano Teixeira

The Future of Criminal Law as a Global Discipline: The Liberal Project, the Persistence of the Penal Paradox, and the Role of Legal Scientists
Markus D. Dubber 

--Dan Ernst