Wolf on Property Law as History

Michael Allan Wolf, University of Florida Levin College of Law, has posted Property Law as History, which is forthcoming in The Urban Lawyer:

Because property law and history are so inextricably intertwined, it has become even more important for law professors to share with students and colleagues the ways in which knowledge of history unlocks difficult concepts, suggests workable solutions to contemporary puzzles, and makes very dry concepts—destructible contingent remainders, running covenants, privity, and the Rule in Dumpor’s Case—much easier to digest.

Sampling from the doctrinal menu of a typical first-year property course--adverse possession, present estates and future interests, landlord-tenant, concurrent interests, servitudes, land transactions, eminent domain, regulatory takings, and zoning--this article identifies two aspects of the law of property as history, using two sets of property cases and doctrines. The first set of cases illustrates how history helps us to understand property law. The second set contains examples of how property law has actually made history. Because this article is presented to honor David Callies, many of the cases discussed share provenance in the Aloha State. 

--Dan Ernst 

Anderson on the Trinity Church Property Dispute

Jerry L. Anderson, Drake University Law School, has posted The Battle for Lower Manhattan: Trinity Church versus the Bogardus Heirs:

Trinity Church (NYPL)

The descendants of Dutch colonists fought for over two centuries to reclaim title to sixty-twoacres in lower Manhattan, granted by England to Trinity Church in 1705. The battles, both physical and legal, reached a climax in the mid-1800s, when New York's highest court ruled for Trinity in a series of cases. The rulings relied on Trinity's lengthy possession of the tract, illustrating how adverse possession in early American history helped create the certainty of title necessary for economic development. 

--Dan Ernst 

History at the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference

The 23rd Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, to be held October 14–16, 2026, in
London, England, has at least two session of interest to legal historians.

Roman, English, and Other Legacies: The Role of History in Property Law

More than other areas of basic private law, property draws upon and reflects historical sources and practices in a wide range of contexts and applications.  This panel will explore how and why historical considerations shape contemporary property law.  Discussion will address the uses and limits of historical analysis in property theory and doctrine, including questions about continuity, adaptation, and divergence. The panel will also consider how appeals to history inform present-day debates about ownership, authority, and the evolution of property institutions.

Of Locke, Bentham, and Blackstone: English Contributions to Property’s Philosophical Foundations

This panel will discuss normative justifications for property law, with a special emphasis on the contributions of major English theorists.  It will explore how themes of labor, productivity, security, and legal order have shaped enduring understandings of ownership and its moral underpinnings.  The discussion will consider the continuing influence of writers like Locke, Bentham, and Blackstone on contemporary property theory, as well as the tensions among their approaches.

--Dan Ernst 

Guerra-Pujol on Two Views of Miller v. Schoene

Property teachers take note: F. E. Guerra-Pujol, University of Central Florida and the Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico, has posted Buchanan v. Samuels: The Cedar Rust Case Redux:

One of the most fascinating sessions at the 2025 meeting of the History of Economics Society (HES) was a roundtable on “The 50th anniversary of the Buchanan-Samuels Exchange.” As it happens, this intellectual exchange was motivated by an old takings case—Miller v. Schoene, decided in 1928—and takings law is one of my areas of expertise. The remainder of my paper reframes the Buchanan-Samuels exchange as a three-act drama and is thus organized as follows: Act I sets the stage of our story by revisiting the dispute in Miller v. Schoene. Next, Act II compares and contrasts Samuels’s framing of this case with Buchanan’s alternate framing. For Samuels, in brief, Miller v. Schoene is a textbook case of reciprocal harms, while for Buchanan, this case is about the sanctity of property rights. Lastly, Act III concludes with the climax and Buchanan’s denouement.

--Dan Ernst 

Mumford on Holmes and Anglo-American Equity

Ann Mumford, Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London, has published "Re-Enacting The Judicial Philosophy Of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Saunders v. Vautier and Claflin v. Claflin Compared"open access, in Comparative Legal History.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (NYPL)

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. sat on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1889, when, in the case of Claflin v Claflin, he joined the decision that a trust may not be modified if the intention of the testator would be undermined. Claflin rejected Lord Cottenham's reasoning in Saunders v Vautier that, under certain circumstances, beneficiaries may compel the termination of the trust and transfer the property to them. Claflin v Claflin and Saunders v Vautier are perhaps the two most famous cases in Anglo-American Equity. Through a detailed examination of manuscripts, this article offers a comparative expansion of the US and English histories, and particularly considers the role played by Holmes. Re-enactment theory offers the possibility of creating, or reliving, the intellectual process that led to Claflin, thus revealing a significant moment in the history of US federalism. 

--Dan Ernst 

Weekend Roundup

• From In Custodia Legis: A Brief Legislative History of the U.S.-Canadian Border and Nathan Dorn on James Wilson and Natural Law in the First Years of the Republic. 

• Rodger Citron interviews Samantha Barbas on the Civil Rights setting of her book on New York Times v. Sullivan (Touro Law Review Podcast).   

• On May 5, the Historical Society of the New York Courts and the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department, will host New York’s Own Revolution: The Anti-Rent War of the Hudson Valley and Its Relevance Today, a film screening with Bruce W. Dearstyne, Nancy Newman, and Victoria Kupchinetsky, 

• On June 24, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum will host The Original Debates over Constitutional Interpretation with Jonathan Gienapp. 

• On June 25, Jesse Wegman, a Senior Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice, will speak at the Atlanta History Center on his book The Lost Founder: James Wilson and the Forgotten Fight for a People’s Constitution.

• On September 17, the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College will hold the latest version of its annual event, What the Constitution Means to Us, with Doris Kearns Goodwin and Akhil Reed Amar. 

• For Law Day, the Supreme Court Historical Society posted Judge Jon O. Newman's conversation with Ross Davies on three lost early circuit court opinions by the justices. 

• When, in his address to Congress, King Charles III said that “the U.S. Supreme Court Historical Society has calculated that Magna Carta is cited in at least 160 Supreme Court cases since 1789, not least as the foundation of the principle that executive power is subject to checks and balances” he apparently was referring to Catholic University professor Derek Webb’s article in the Journal of Supreme Court History, “What Say the Reeds in Runnymeade? Magna Carta in Supreme Court History,” says the Supreme Court Historical Society.   

• Part 2 of the Lawbook Exchange's April 2026 list of Scholarly Law and Legal History is here.

• ICYMI: A Lancaster, PA, museum opens an exhibit on Thaddeus Stevens (WGAL). Frankfort, Kentucy, courthouse may be renamed in honor of John Marshall Harlan (Kentucky Today). The Rise and Fall of Judge William H. Simmons (History Link).  Lawrence Glickman, Cornell University, on birthright citizenship in the advice columns (Atlantic).

 Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers 

Rudolph on Colonialism and Blackstone's Family Wealth

Julia Rudolph, North Carolina State University, has published William Blackstone, Family Man: New Contexts in Gender, Jurisprudence, and Jamaica in Law and History Review:

While much has been written about William Blackstone, the jurist, politician, and legal writer, this article provides a critical new understanding of Blackstone, the husband, friend, and investor. It considers Blackstone’s legal and economic actions as well as ideas, analyzing his strategies for managing family wealth and comparing them to the strategies employed by a member of his extended family who was a Jamaican planter. Here, the article contributes to recent scholarship on the global dimensions of English and British legal history. It offers a fuller account of Blackstone’s proximity to the colonial plantation economy by investigating how economic change and imperial controversies impacted his personal and professional life. It also exposes Blackstone’s conventionally masculine bias by detailing the different ways in which he privileged male interests when making personal investment choices and when coming to judicial decisions about women’s property claims. A gendered ideology, which positioned male authority as central to the success of the household, state, and empire, furnished the framework within which Blackstone justified the operation of law and directed his own actions as head of his family. Placing Blackstone’s jurisprudence and experience within the contexts of patriarchy and colonialism, the article sheds new light on this influential figure, showing how he embodied the core features of an eighteenth-century family man and shaped modern ideas about male authority, property, and power.

--Dan Ernst

Dardini on the 14th Amendment, Human Rights, and American Samoa

Ross Dardani, Muhlenberg College, has published, open access, The Influence of Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the U.S. Empire, in Law and History Review:

This article analyzes the influence of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) during congressional debates in 1949 that focused on establishing a territorial government for American Samoa. In these hearings, naval leaders argued that Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as demanding colorblindness and others that established property ownership as a fundamental right, along with the creation of the UDHR, meant that Samoans might not be able to protect their land from further white-settler colonialism if Congress passed legislation establishing a civilian government in American Samoa. U.S. military leaders believed that the Court’s decisions in Buchanan versus Warley (1917) and Shelley versus Kraemer (1948), and the UDHR, could prohibit American Samoa from enforcing race-based land ownership restrictions if lawmakers extended citizenship, equal protection, or due process to American Samoa. Members of Congress, however, believed that the Court’s past rulings in the Insular Cases, models set in other unincorporated territories (e.g., the Philippines and Hawaii), and Federal Indian law established legal precedents that meant Samoans would be able to continue restricting land ownership on the basis of race if they became U.S. citizens and were governed by equal protection and due process. Samoan leaders demonstrated the unsettled nature of constitutional law in American politics by emphasizing that any congressional act that extended citizenship, equal protection, or due process to American Samoa would ultimately be reviewed and interpreted by the Court. For these Samoans, even if members of Congress were interpreting past Court precedents correctly, a future majority of justices could adopt a different understanding of what the extension of U.S. citizenship, equal protection, or due process meant for American Samoa by ruling that non-Samoans had fundamental constitutional rights to land ownership in American Samoa. This article thus helps explain how and why Samoan and naval leaders influenced U.S. lawmakers when Congress was considering legislation that would extend citizenship, equal protection, and due process protections to American Samoa in 1949. This legal history demonstrates how different interpretations of the Constitution, the UDHR, and fundamental rights influenced various actors within the context of the U.S. empire, illuminating the ambiguous nature of constitutional law in the U.S. unincorporated territories.

--Dan Ernst 

AJLH 64:4

We're a bit late in noticing it, but the American Journal of Legal History 64:4 has been published: 

Mr Locke’s enclosure: the uncommon law of property in the Second Treatise
Hannah Carrese

John Locke, famously, told a property origin story. This article tells a property theory origin story, asking how Locke’s property theory, which omits common rights, emerged from a common law of property that centred them—and showing how this omission influenced the colonial American law that Locke drafted. Locke was silent on or rejected the common law of property, which recognized common rights and defences against privatization of commons through enclosure. Instead, Locke adopted law reform arguments lauding enclosure because it improved waste land. Locke’s property theory therefore attempts to improve the common law of property by orienting it around private rather than common property. He asks a question about the origin of property absent from common law: how do we create private rights to common land? He takes ‘waste’ to have purely negative connotations, avoiding the neutral meanings of that word at common law. And he stipulates that enclosure of English commons requires only tacit consent of commoners, excluding common law defences against enclosure. Locke’s is an equal opportunity enclosure. His spoilage principle and plan to reform Virginia’s land laws sought to benefit the poor by preventing vast enclosures and rural depopulation. However, he theorized a clean chain of title, absent in common law, which could prevent messy disputes over wealthy estates. This article shows the common law background from which Locke departed, thus deepening understanding of both our private property regime, often justified by Locke’s property theory, and a sometimes-overlooked alternative to it, the common law of property.

The laws of ‘an old and settled society’? The law of contract in New South Wales 1815–1850
Warren Swain

The history of contract law in New South Wales in the decades after the closure of the Court of Civil Jurisdiction in 1814 has not received much attention from legal historians. This is an important omission. At the heart of this story is a simple but critical inquiry: the way in which the law of contract in the colony mirrored or diverged from the law of contract that applied back in London. This was rarely a matter that judges addressed explicitly. Piecing together the relationship is an exercise in reconstruction. This can only be done by examining the body of case law. The creation of the Australasian Colonial Legal History Library, combined with readily searchable newspaper reports, has made this easier. The evidence in the mid-nineteenth century is still sometimes sketchy. Context is relevant. The colony moved from a quasi-military penal colony to a significant hub of commercial activity. The period also saw a shift in the legal system as the old informal systems evolved into a much more legalistic one. For the most part, New South Wales contract law was aligned with that in England. Some issues, like the desertion of sailors demanded local solutions. There are other examples in which well-established English contract doctrine did not necessarily fit very well with the conditions of the colony.

Who is a central bank for? The founding and legal design of the Bank of Canada
Dan Rohde

The Bank of Canada is an independent Crown corporation that sees its primary responsibility to be promoting Canada’s economic welfare by maintaining low and stable inflation. When it was first created in 1934, however, the Bank was a radically different institution—a privately owned corporation primarily meant to anchor Canada’s economy globally and manage foreign exchange. Not only was the Bank not tasked with managing inflation, but key policymakers behind its founding thought doing so would be a severe mistake. This article offers the first legal history of the Bank’s founding. It maps the enormous public debate that accompanied the creation of the Bank and the various, often contradictory visions expressed for it. The article labels these five visions: a Bankers’ Bank, a Government Bank, an Imperial Bank, an Economists’ Bank, and a Bank of the People. The article then looks at the original legal design of the Bank and argues that it largely fit the Imperial Bank model. Charting this history helps us better understand this vital organ of Canadian government, and has the potential to upset many of our accepted, contemporary notions of central banking.

--Dan Ernst 

Barnett and Barnett on the Burwood Ejectment Case

Katy Barnett, Melbourne Law School, and Lynne Barnett have posted "Equity’s Darling" and the Burwood Ejectment Case: A Turning Point in Colonial Australian Law, which appeared in Australian Law Journal:

The Burwood Ejectment case arose when the ad hoc executor and trustee of a will in early colonial Sydney sold off Burwood Estate to meet the testator's debts, after receiving a court order empowering him to do so. Twenty years later, the testator's de facto wife and children successfully voided the sale. The purchaser was ejected, notwithstanding the fact that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The decision undermined confidence in security of transactions in the Colony and created a political furore and ongoing disputes. It is suggested that the case was a contributing factor to the creation of the Judge in Equity in New South Wales and illustrates broader issues with security of title and the political and legal organisation of early colonial Australia. 

--Dan Ernst 

Notre Dame Graduate Legal History Colloquium

We have word that the Notre Dame Graduate Legal History Colloquium will reconvene on March 7, 2026, from 10 AM to 3 PM on the Notre Dame Law School campuses in South Bend, Indiana, and Chicago, Illinois. The organizers write that "All students and faculty, regardless of institutional affiliation, are welcome," that all "presenters and attendees will receive complimentary lunch and refreshments," and that virtual opportunities to participate will be available for those unable to attend in-person.  

Those wishing to attend should register here, a form that reproduces the schedule for March 7 at right.  More information about the Colloquium can be learned here or via email to Dennis Wieboldt at dwiebold@nd.edu. 

--Dan Ernst

Brady on Wolford and the Level-of-Generality Problem

Maureen E. Brady, Harvard Law School, has posted Property v. Guns: The Level-of-Generality Problem in Wolford:

Wolford v. Lopez presents the Supreme Court with a novel question: may states require property owners to affirmatively consent before armed persons enter private property that is held open to the public? Hawaii enacted such a default rule after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen instructed courts to assess modern gun regulations by analogy to historical restrictions that are “relevantly similar” in “how and why” they burden the right to armed self-defense. In Wolford, the parties have turned to colonial-era hunting statutes limiting armed entry onto private land, but they disagree fundamentally about what those laws represent.

This Essay shows how Wolford crystallizes the level-of-generality problem embedded in Bruen’s historical framework. Outcomes often turn on the frame courts choose for “the relevant tradition”: defined too narrowly, no analogue fits; defined too broadly, almost anything does. Wolford poses that problem on both “why” and “how.” On “why,” the parties and lower courts dispute whether Founding-era hunting laws targeted “poaching” alone or broader concerns about armed trespass. On “how,” they dispute whether bans tied to “enclosed” or “improved” land map onto the modern category of “private property open to the public.”

Reexamining the record through property history clarifies what the hunting laws can—and cannot—do in the analogical analysis. Even an “anti-poaching” frame does not resolve whether the laws addressed theft of game or a broader bundle of concerns including trespass, property damage, and violence associated with armed strangers. And “enclosure” and “improvement” functioned as publicly legible property signals—proxies for claim and notice—rather than precursors to contemporary zoning-era distinctions between residential and commercial space. The Essay closes by arguing that when history is genuinely ambiguous and competing constitutional values are in tension, courts should be transparent about the level-of-generality choices that drive outcomes and candid about the extent to which those choices inevitably reintroduce means-ends reasoning under another name.

--Dan Ernst 

ASLH Burbank Article Prize to Fei

Continuing with our notices of the awards, prizes, and fellowships announced at the recent meeting of the American Society for Legal History, we turn now to the Jane Burbank Global Legal History Article Prize. About this prize: 

The Jane Burbank Article Prize in global legal history will be awarded annually to the best article in regional, global, imperial, comparative, or transnational legal history published in the previous calendar year. Submissions may address any topic or period, and may focus on case studies in which the analysis relates to broader processes or comparisons. Articles on methodological or theoretical contributions are also welcome.

The 2025 Burbank Prize winner was Du Fei (University of Oklahoma), for “Fatima’s Inheritance: Law, Islam, and Gendered Archive-Making in India’s Early Modern Global Connections,” Past and Present 266:1 (2025): 40-74. The citation:

In this piece, Du uses a source long familiar to South Asianists—a collection of letters and documents which includes a short account of a court case between a free Muslim woman and enslaved people she owned, conducted in multiple legal fora across the Indian Ocean—to ask new questions. Du considers the case at three levels: the case summary itself and its process, in a pluralistic legal world where “Islamic law” was central but not hegemonic or monolithic; the way it came to be included in a South Asian manual of different prose genres that usually focused on male actors; and the way that manual itself became an iconic source for western orientalists with their own ideas about gender and Islam. In doing so, he draws on scholarship from multiple fields to show how women in the Indian Ocean world helped “co-produce” legal and archival records, only for their presence to be silenced through the layers of recension that create primary sources in the form they come down to us. Du’s excavation of Fatima’s case can serve as a model for legal historians of any era or region in teasing apart the different gendered actors and social meanings that construct the records we use.

An Honorable Mention went to Rui Hua (Boston University), for “The Cheese, the Worm, and the Law: Grassroots Legal Cosmopolitanism in the Manchurian Borderland, 1906-1927,” Modern Asian Studies 58:4 (2024): 1201-1221.

Congratulations!

-- Karen Tani 

 

JACH Fall 2025

The Fall 2025 issue of Journal of American Constitutional History is now online:

Of Guilty Property and Civil/Remedial Punishment: The Implications and Perils of “History” for the Excessive Fines Clause and Beyond by Beth A. Colgan

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s historically based determination that in rem forfeitures are nonpunitive, substantial historical evidence—including the Court’s own early opinions—show that in rem forfeitures were understood to constitute punishment.

The Birth of the Dead Constitution: Arthur Machen Jr.’s Early Twentieth-Century Originalism by Austin Steelman

Arthur Machen Jr.’s 1900 Harvard Law Review article “The Elasticity of the Constitution” influenced the long rise of originalism—revealing many of originalism’s now essential features--and helped give birth to a dead Constitution that proved ironically vital and ever-evolving.

Dialogue

Madisonian Liquidation Unliquidated by Jack Rakove

William Baude’s provocative essay on “Constitutional Liquidation,” published five years ago, is the best treatment of the subject. Whether the liquidation of constitutional indeterminacies, to Madison’s way of thinking, is equivalent to the fixation of constitutional meaning, is another matter entirely.

Liquidation, Then and Now by William Baude

If it is true that liquidation did not “deeply engage Madison’s interest,” as Rakove writes, James Madison’s “interest”-level is not something that binds constitutional lawyers. Our historical accounts should be accurate, but our reasons for caring about historical accounts are reasons of our own.

Symposium: Tenth Anniversary of Obergefell—Queer Constitutional History

Queer as U.S. Constitutional History by Felicia Kornbluh and Marie-Amélie George

Most of queer constitutional history is loss, as well as consolation and survival in the face of devastation. This is a fairly easy conclusion after two decades of the Roberts Court, in the wake of Skrmetti, and amid ongoing efforts to repeal Obergefell.

The Tenth Anniversary of Marriage Equality: How Traditional Marriage Law Led to Constitutional Protection for Same-Sex Marriage by Joanna L. Grossman

Had the history of marriage law been more uneven, it might not have been so relevant to this analysis. But the federal government’s longstanding deference to states in determinations of marital status made clear that this was a case of anti-gay exceptionalism.

The Missing History of Romer v. Evans by Marie-Amélie George

Although the outcome of Romer is well-known, as is its reasoning, the events that produced the jurisprudential turn have largely been forgotten. Uncovering this missing history helps explain how and why the Supreme Court inaugurated a new era in queer rights jurisprudence.

Good Plaintiffs: The Women of Marriage Equality by Zoe M. Savitsky

The early women who sought marriage equality did not look like “perfect plaintiffs.” Neither did many of the successful female plaintiffs in this study. There are, clearly, limits to the current perfect plaintiff tale if we have failed to see these women, intersectionally and multidimensionally.

A Queer Constitutional History of Loss: Mayes v. Texas (1974), Privacy, and the Struggle for the Right to Be Trans in Public in the 1970s by Scott De Orio

The history of privacy and substantive due process rights is usually narrated from the perspective of those cases the Supreme Court decided and that advocates for gender and sexual rights won. But it is also crucial to pay attention to losses, and even cases the Court turned down and to which it declined to grant cert.

“I’m Not Sleazy and I Don’t Frequent Bars”: Respectability as a Legal Strategy in Transsexual Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 1971-1995 by Shay Ryan Olmstead

Transgender workers did more than simply assert their own normativity—they also actively distanced themselves from other gender crossers.

Weekend Roundup

• The University of Pennsylvania digital history site, Building Inequality: Mapping the spatial and racial inequalities of FHA Section 608 rental housing, 1942-1950, is well worth a visit.

• We have updated information on that inaugural session of "Historicising Jurisprudence," a first-book symposium co-sponsored by the Selden Society and the School of Law, Queen Mary University of London, and co-hosted and co-organised by Maks Del Mar and Michael Lobban.  It will be held on September 30, and devoted to Natasha Wheatley's The Life and Death of States: Central Europe and the Transformation of Modern Sovereignty (Princeton UP, 2023).  Registration and more information is here.  

• 
  Sara Butler, Ohio State University, discusses her book, Forensic Medicine and Death Investigation in Medieval England (2015) on the Medievialists.net podcast (YouTube).

• The Balkinization symposium continues on Serena Mayeri's Marital Privilege: Marriage, Inequality, and the Transformation of American Law (Yale University Press, 2025). Recent contributions include reflections by Kris Collins and Doug NeJaime.   

• A recording of Dylan Penningroth's talk on his book Before the Movement: The Hidden History of Black Civil Rights at The City Club Forum (ideastream).

• Over at the Jackson List: John Q. Barrett on the appointment of Harold Burton to the U.S. Supreme Court.  

• The historian Joan Wallach Scott recalls the firing of her father, a high school teacher in New York City, during the McCarthy Era  (Boston Review).  

• A concurring opinion in Alan Dershowitz v. CNN cited Samantha Barbas's article,  “New York Times v. Sullivan: Perspectives from History,” to provide historical context for the ongoing debate over defamation law (Iowa Law).

• On Thursday evening, Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School, and Michael Klarman, Harvard Law School, debated “Is There a Constitutional Crisis? How Would We Know?” at Colgate University.

• Jill Lepore's We the People had a substantial presence on the internet this week.  Professor Lepore's op-ed in the NYT.  Reviews in The Guardian and the LA Times.  Her argument that originalism "killed" the Constitution in The Atlantic; to which the National Review dissents.

• ICYMI: The Desegregation of Local 53 in New Orleans (1969) (BlackPast). The 18th-century legal case that changed the face of music copyright law (WIPO).  John Yoo on the long history of presidential discretion (Law & Liberty).  The Heritage Foundation's Guide to the Constitution.  The entire Constitution is on display for the first time in US history (Smithsonian; WTOP; USA9).  The Georgia Historical Society displayed its own rare copy, once owned by the Georgia’s signer Abraham Baldwin (TOC11).

 Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.

Aulakh's "Empire and the Peasant Proprietor"

Preet S. Aulakh,York University, has published Empire and the Peasant Proprietor: Inter-Colony Land Reform in the Victorian Era (Oxford University Press):

As the British Empire consolidated its geographical possession of distant lands by the 19th century, the agrarian nature of its colonies necessitated careful considerations about land tenure relationships. After intense debates around property rights and political economy, several land laws were enacted across the Empire between 1868 and 1875, which recognised the proprietary rights of peasant cultivators. Empire and the Peasant Proprietor examines this transformative shift in the imperial approaches to land tenure.

Through a comparative analysis of historical land tenure arrangements in three diverse colonial sites, Punjab, Ireland, and Prince Edward Island, the book identifies two crucial mechanisms which facilitated the institutionalisation of peasant proprietorship. One, there was a fortuitous ideological alignment between important governing agents in the three colonies. Two, the debate about the impact of land reform in the colonies on the 'sanctity' of English principles was redirected, allowing for inter-colony analogies and precedents to support the proprietary rights of peasant cultivators.

Empire and the Peasant Proprietor demonstrates the importance of these reciprocal influences within the imperial system and provides insight into contemporary challenges of secure land rights for a large proportion of the global population that continues to be dependent on agriculture for sustenance.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

--Dan Ernst

ASLH/Notre Dame Graduate Legal History Colloquium

[We have the following announcement.  DRE]

ASLH/Notre Dame Graduate Legal History Colloquium

September 27, 2025  | 10 AM - 3 PM (CST)
Notre Dame Law School | Chicago, IL

Registration/Welcome, 09:45 - 10:05 AM
Coffee & Morning Refreshments

Paper #1: Property Law and Indian Removal, 10:05 - 11:00 AM

"Indigenous Incendiaries: Forest Fires, Arson Law, and Ute Removal in 1870s Colorado"

Author:     Jacquelyn M. Davila, Yale University 
Respondent:    M. Todd Henderson, University of Chicago Law School

Paper #2: Colonization and Property Law, 11:05 - 12:00 PM

"Property Law as Colonial Forerunner"

Author:     Nathan Lee, New York University 
Respondent:    Nadav Shoked, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

Afternoon Break (Lunch), 12:05 - 1:00 PM

Paper #3: International Taxation, 01:05 - 2:00 PM

"Southern African Mining and the Modern Formation of Offshore Finance, 1860 - 1925"

Author:     Simon Rakei, University of Michigan
Respondent:    Ajay K. Mehrotra, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

Paper #4: The Common Law and the Fourth Amendment, 02:05 - 3:00 PM

"What is a House? Investigating the Meaning of Curtilage at Common Law" 

Author:     Mitchell Del Bianco, University of Virginia 
Respondent:    R. H. Helmholz, University of Chicago Law School

Dinkel on Transnational Inheritances from the US

Also new online from Law and History Review: “The Rich Uncle from America”: Transnational Inheritance Transfers between the United States, Germany, and Russia, 1840s–1980s, by Jürgen Norbert Dinkel, University of Leipzig:

This article examines cross-border inheritance transfers between the United States, Germany, and Russia between the 1840s and the late 1980s. These transfers were not only characterized by private considerations and kinship networks but were also strongly intertwined with national and international political developments. This article argues that the history of transnational inheritance transfers since the 19th century can be subdivided into three distinct periods. The first period, from the mid-19th century to 1914, witnessed the gradual development and expansion of professional networks and legal agreements designed to facilitate cross-border estate transfers. By contrast, the second period, from World War I and the October Revolution of 1917 through the late 1960s, was a time of unprecedented global disruption. Unlike the half-century before World War I, governments and probate courts complicated, delayed, and prevented inheritance transfers across state borders due to military and ideological conflicts. During the third period, beginning in the 1960s, governments, international organizations, lawyers, and families resumed efforts to create structures that would legally protect and enable cross-border estate transfers in an increasingly globalized world.

--Dan Ernst

O’Brassill-Kulfan on Rent Distraint in Early New York

New online in Law and History Review: “Distressing the Distressed”: Rent Distraint in Early Republic New York by Kristin O’Brassill-Kulfan, Rutgers University:

This article documents the legal and social history of “distress for rent” (also known as rent distraint) in early Republic New York, a legal tool that allowed landlords whose tenants were in arrears to seize tenants’ belongings and sell them to offset the cost of the unpaid rent. Rent distraint was a practice and topic around which New Yorkers contested ideological and practical conceptions of class, the rights of property, the role of law, and welfare. In 1811, New York City officials began tracking tenants in arrears of rent, creating a deep archive of documents that reveal the nuances of landlord-tenant relations and subsistence in this period. This article follows that paper trail, exploring distraint in this context as a legal remedy, as an experience with major impacts on individuals’ lives, and of efforts to reform the law and the lived experience of law. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, poor, middling, and wealthy New Yorkers were engaged in knowledge exchange around distraint and the social categories and experiences associated with it. Their stories document a materialist sensibility that crossed class lines and was attuned to the practical dimensions of working people’s living conditions.

--Dan Ernst 

Brady on "Public Use" in State Constitutions

Maureen E. Brady, Harvard Law School, has posted Debates Over "Public Use" in the State Constitutional Conventions:

Historians and legal scholars alike have previously noted that the meaning of "public use" began to change in the nineteenth century, continuing into the twentieth. In the hands of some state courts, "public use" expanded from an approach dependent on "use by the public" to one that at least occasionally tolerated "use for the public benefit." This shift in meaning laid the groundwork for Berman v. Parker, the urban renewal decision from the United States Supreme Court that provided support for the broad reading of "public use" in the 2005 decision Kelo v. City of New London. 

In this Essay, I focus my attention on one of the vectors for the emergence of "public benefit" conceptions of the public use requirement: state constitutional text itself. In the nineteenth century, several states specifically authorized takings for private use in their state constitutions, usually to benefit local and economically critical industries. In other states, this approach was explicitly rejected. 

Although these private-use provisions have been noted by other scholars, this Essay collects and examines them as a group, including the lessons about "public use" that one might glean from the fruitful and fascinating debates that these provisions engendered among nineteenth-century lawyers at constitutional conventions. The conventions are an important site for understanding the logic underlying "public benefit" conceptions of "public use." And they might shape the future of "public use" doctrine by offering historical grounding for alternative conceptions of the line between permissible and impermissible takings, whether as a matter of federal or state constitutional law. 

Dan Ernst