Monday, April 7, 2008

History Pulitzer to Howe

"What Hath God Wrought: the Transformation of America, 1815-1848," by Daniel Walker Howe (Oxford University Press) has won the 2008 Pulitzer Prize in History. A review by Jill Lepore in the New Yorker is noted here.

Finalists in this category were: "Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power" by Robert Dallek (HarperCollins), and "The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War" by the late David Halberstam (Hyperion).
The Biography prize goes to "Eden's Outcasts: The Story of Louisa May Alcott and Her Father," by John Matteson (W.W. Norton).

Finalists in this category were: "The Worlds of Lincoln Kirstein" by Martin Duberman (Alfred A. Knopf), and "The Life of Kingsley Amis" by Zachary Leader (Pantheon).
The General Nonfiction prize is for "The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945," by Saul Friedlander (HarperCollins). A New York Times review by Richard J. Evans is noted here.

Finalists in this category were: "The Cigarette Century" by Allan Brandt (Basic Books), and "The Rest Is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century" by Alex Ross (Farrar, Straus and Giroux).
The full list is here.

McFaydin on politics and the history of public employment

Public Servants, Political Activities and Policy Advocacy is a new paper by Elgie McFaydin, Jr., Kentucky State University. Here's the abstract:
By the late 1800's United States policy makers realized they had to adopt a model for selecting public servants based on job related requirements. The model would have to separate career public servants from politics and the unorthodox and often non-standardized approach to policy and program implementation employed by the ever changing administrations. The selection of employees based on merit and limited political influence could lead to a standardization in terms of policy implementation and equity in service delivery. The assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 by a person seeking employment was the event which finally compelled policy makers to act. Congress went on to pass the Pendleton Act of 1883 which established the Civil Service Commission and implemented a system of merit employment for most federal employees. In 1939 the United States Congress passed the Hatch Act, the legislation limited the political activities of public servants at all levels of government. This paper examines the relationship between career merit system employees and changing political administrations. While the merit system provides a clear division between administrations and career public servants and makes it possible for merit employees to carry out their duties based on a legislative charge, there still appears to be inequities in this system. The system limits the extent to which administrations can influence how agencies carry out their missions, however, it does not limit the impact merit employees have on how policies are formulated and implemented. Essentially, policy makers rely on information and expertise from career public servants to help them make informed policy decisions. This gives career merit system employees the opportunity be policy advocates. This paper is an attempt to determine whether not career merit system employees should be policy advocates particularly when they have the knowledge, experience and expertise in areas which could lead to greater efficiency, savings and an overall improvement in the quality of service. More importantly, when merit employees become policy advocates, does this constitute a political activity and does this activity run counter to the underlying premise of the Hatch Act of 1939.

Pether on Reviving the Subject of Law

Penelope Pether, Villanova, has posted the abstract for a new essay, Reviving the Subject of Law. It will appear in ON PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN LAW, Francis J. Mootz III, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Here's the abstract:
This essay is an advanced draft of work that will be published in On Philosophy and American Law (Francis J. Mootz III ed. forthcoming, Cambridge U.P., 2009). This edited collection includes responses by a wide range of scholars working in legal theory to Mootz's challenge to respond to the current state of American legal philosophy, using Karl Llewellyn's 1934 University of Pennsylvania law review account of the emergence of legal realism as a prompt. Drawing on the author's recent scholarship on the emergence of a distinctive and impoverished model of "common law" judging in the U.S. since the mid-c 20th, and taking its lead from Duncan Kennedy's suggestive argument that Realism failed to gain traction in Europe because of the obscene cast that the Third Reich gave to its project, the essay gives a critical account of the contemporary inheritances of the Realists' account of law and their reliance on social science. It argues that interdisciplinary work in studies of law and the linguistic humanities and human sciences might be deployed in reviving the subject of law, generating a thick account of what law is and might be, of how its institutions, discourses, texts and subjects are formed in culture and history, and of how legal subjects reproduce culture and make history in their turn.

Sunday, April 6, 2008

National Styles in Archives


Thank you to Mary Dudziak, who invited me to guest blog for a few weeks. Mary asked me to say a few words about foreign archives since I have been spending time this year at the British Library and the French Bibliothèque Nationale. The appearance and design of these buildings challenges national stereotypes. Where one expects a magnificence or verve in a signature French building, the Bibliothèque Nationale offers an ugliness so looming and all-enveloping as to be heroic. Did one of the Sun-Presidents of the French Republic want to build on a Pharaonic scale in a time of tight budgets? Nondescript towers rise from a windswept concrete plaza to incarcerate the books. But the reader does not ascend into the towers. Escalators take the reader deeper and deeper into the ground past several security check points that have a science-fiction buzz, as if the architects blended Disney’s Futureworld with the soul of the sternest librarian that haunted Gallic elementary schools. By contrast, the British Library is more welcoming, warmer in design, and, shockingly, has considerably better food. It also has more books in English.

Reviewed: books on 1919, King, and Naval Academy integration

"'A rampaging mob literally demolished every radical meeting place in Oakland to show that 'law and order shall prevail,' ' Anthony Read tells us at one point in 'The World on Fire: 1919 and the Battle with Bolshevism,' his whirlwind global survey of 1919 and the historical conflagrations playing out in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union at the time." Steve Kettmann reviews the book in today's San Francisco Chronicle. Kettman suggests that "what emerges from looking back at the Great Red Scare of 1919 is a shocking testimonial to how craven people can be, how thuggish and quick to discard the Constitution, if they are afraid - and, in particular, if a runaway media mob chooses to fan the flames of fear and anger and twist information to serve their purposes."

BLUE & GOLD AND BLACK: RACIAL INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY by Robert J. Schneller Jr. (Texas A&M) is reviewed for the Washington Times by Paul Dickson. This book "traces the transformation of an institution that goes from an ugly Jim Crow environment ruled by a bigoted minority of midshipmen to one which strives to empower minorities. This transformation was not without social cost and black midshipmen bore the brunt of it, first only males and then the black women who were described as "double insults" because of race and gender." For Dickson, "the power of this book is that it allows us to follow these men and women in their own words." The author "meshes this approach with information from the official records to produce a hybrid which perfectly suits this subject. As he explains in the introduction, most institutional history is written from the top down, while most social history is written from the bottom up. This book does it from both perspectives. The result is vivid history which blends the style of Studs Turkel with the rigor of the best academic writing."

David L. Chappell is less enthusiastic about April 4, 1968: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Death and How It Changed America by Michael Eric Dyson (Basic), in a Chicago Tribune review.

'The Word of the Lord Is Upon Me: The Righteous Performance of Martin Luther King, Jr.' by Jonathan Rieder is discussed by David Garrow in the Los Angeles Times. This book, Garrow finds, is "rich, thoughtful" and "extremely learned." It is
"not biography, history, or theology," Rieder emphasizes. Instead, the Barnard College sociologist focuses on "King's language and the way he deployed it," as distinct from King's public activism or the substance of his beliefs. The result is an extended meditation on the deeper meanings of the civil rights leader's words and how he used them, featuring a mosaic of carefully chosen and closely analyzed quotations....Uppermost in Rieder's treatment is his heartfelt desire to see King as a fundamentally universalist public voice rather than an essentially black voice.
Adam Fairclough weighs in on Reider's book in the Washington Post. He notes that King
embodied the tension between the moral universalism of the black church and its racially specific character. Leading a movement dedicated to the destruction of racial barriers, King extolled the ideal of integration in hauntingly beautiful language. Yet King's own organization was specifically designed to be a black organization, not an interracial one. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference rested upon a base of African American churches. It accepted help from whites but insisted that primary leadership rest firmly in black hands....

In pursuing his moral vision of a "beloved community," King did not reject his racial heritage or identity. Although he straddled the black and white worlds, the black one remained more personal and intimate....He extolled racial pride and empathized with "the bitterness of fellow blacks." Yet King's blackness, Rieder argues, was more style than substance, and it "never came close to a full-fledged 'black theology.' " Moreover, King never regarded black identity as fixed or sufficient.
The Post notes other new MLK-related books here.

Saturday, April 5, 2008

Hurst fellowship changes focus

The J. Willard Hurst Fellowship in Legal History at the University of Wisconsin will, sadly, no longer be a legal history fellowship. From 2009 on it will be the Law & Society Post-doctoral Fellowship (no longer named for Hurst, and no longer focused on history, though legal historians can apply). The Hurst Summer Institute in Legal History remains in place, with an Institute directed by Barbara Welke, Minnesota, planned for 2009.

Wisconsin has been a traditional leader in American legal history. It's not just that Wisconsin was home to J. Willard Hurst, but other leaders in the field (Lawrence Friedman, Robert Gordon, Hendrick Hartog, and Richard Ross) spent important parts of their careers teaching at Wisconsin. I'm told that Wisconsin is not withdrawing from the field, but legal historians will be looking to Wisconsin, hoping for a reinvigoration rather than a retreat.

This leaves Harvard and NYU as the two schools with legal history fellowships. The field is so strong right now that it would be a good time for another school with strong legal historians and good ties between its law school and history department to create a new center for junior scholars.

Sheehan on The Origins of the Mistake of Law Bar in English Law

Duncan Sheehan, University of East Anglia, has posted a new paper, The Origins of the Mistake of Law Bar in English Law. Here's the abstract:
This paper examines the origins of the mistake of law bar in English law. It notes that it came about as a result of confusion, evident initially in Bilbie v Lumley and developed later between different concepts of voluntary payments and the idea of inexcusable mistake. There were other pressures - philosophers such as Austin thought the bar essential for the administration of justice. Influential commentary writers, such as Joseph Story believed it essential, and this won over judges such as Lord Brougham, who solidified the bar in Scots law. By the 1840s the view was that mistake of law barred recovery and the removal of the excusability requirement in mistake of fact cases could not alter that.

Friday, April 4, 2008

Martin Luther King in Memphis, April 4, 1968

The 40th anniversary of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., is being remembered around the web. Michael K. Honey, author of Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King's Last Campaign, discusses King's work in Memphis in a recent op-ed, setting it in the context of contemporary politics. Hat tip.
"Americans are...coming around to seeing King as more than a civil rights leader who 'had a dream.' Most people know King died in Memphis, but many now want to know why," Honey writes. "Most people don't know King died fighting for the right of workers to organize unions, in one of the most dramatic and significant battles of the 1960s. King was far more than a dreamer. He said a union is the best anti-poverty program available to poor people with jobs, and he supported unions all his life."
When King came to Memphis, he shined a beacon of hope, and media attention, on underpaid, overworked laborers for the city of Memphis....Five weeks into the strike, on March 18, 1968, King delivered an impromptu speech at Mason Temple of the Church of God in Christ. More than 10,000 crammed the auditorium, many overflowing into hallways and stairways, creating the largest indoor mass rally of the civil rights-era South. "All labor has dignity," King preached. "You are reminding, not only Memphis, but you are reminding the nation that it is a crime for people to live in this rich nation and receive starvation wages. And I need not remind you that this is our plight as a people all over America."

After passage of the civil rights and voting rights bills in 1964 and 1965, he said, "one era of our struggle came to a close and a new era came into being. Now our struggle is for genuine equality, which means economic equality. For now we know that it isn't enough to integrate lunch counters. What does it profit a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he doesn't earn enough money to buy a hamburger and a cup of coffee?"
Honey continues here.

King's last speech, on April 3, 1968, is here. He builds to this conclusion:

We've got some difficult days ahead. But it doesn't matter with me now. Because I've been to the mountaintop. And I don't mind. Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the promised land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the promised land. And I'm happy, tonight. I'm not worried about anything. I'm not fearing any man. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.
The day is remembered by Joe Warren, who was a Memphis sanitation worker forty years ago, involved in the strike. IntLawGrrls has video of Robert Kennedy's extraordinary speech the night of April 4.

Chen on State Fair Employment Practices Legislation, 1945-1964

Anthony S. Chen, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, has posted an abstract for a new article, The Party of Lincoln and the Politics of State Fair Employment Practices Legislation in the North, 1945-1964. It is forthcoming in the American Journal of Sociology. Here's the abstract:
From 1945 to 1964, more than a score of northern states passed laws mandating non-discrimination in employment. Why did some states pass such fair employment practice (FEP) laws much more slowly than other states? This article presents archival and statistical evidence that partisan control of policy-making institutions - namely, Republican control of veto points in the legislative process - is associated with a substantial reduction in the likelihood that a state would pass FEP legislation, even when controlling for potentially confounding variables. This finding casts doubt on the leading account of the electoral realignment that began in the mid-1960s and culminated in the Reagan-Bush years. Well before the advent of affirmative action, key numbers of GOP office-holders - allied with organized business and motivated by a free-market, anti-regulatory ideology - worked successfully to block the adoption of color-blind laws mandating formal racial equality.

Alfieri on Ely in Gideon v. Wainwright

Gideon in White/Gideon in Black: Race and Identity in Lawyering by Anthony Victor Alfieri, University of Miami School of Law, explores the role of legal icon John Hart Ely in the landmark case Gideon v. Wainwright, and the impact of this on Ely himself. The essay is forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal. Here's the abstract:
This essay endeavors to show that the politics of community-based legal action is a remedy too often out of the reach of liberal lawyers, even when their springboard is the work of John Hart Ely in Gideon v. Wainwright. Part I describes the history of Gideon v. Wainwright, documenting Gideon's personal background and the procedural contours of the litigation. It chronicles Ely's participation in the litigation and its continuing hold on his legal imagination. Part II uncovers the jurisprudential roots of Ely's vision of lawyering in a legal process conception of political access rights and minority equality rights developed through his writings on civil rights, constitutional law, and criminal procedure. It explores how Ely's process vision was enlarged by the civil rights movement and at the same time tempered by separation of powers considerations of role competence, institutional function, and political legitimacy. Part III exposes the legal process underpinnings of client-centered lawyering models erected in defense of the unrepresented. It demonstrates that these liberal-lawyering models of representation in the fields of poverty law and criminal justice focus on adversarial rights and material outcomes at the expense of democratic empowerment and minority collaboration. Part IV examines Ely's work for lessons of clinical legal education, criminal defense practice, and poverty law advocacy in impoverished communities of color. It seeks to discern in Ely's work a core set of democratic norms and narratives of political access and minority equality generalizable to multicultural clients and communities. Further, it sketches community-centered guidelines for lawyers laboring to advance the legal, political, and economic interests of unrepresented individuals and groups.

Thursday, April 3, 2008

Calabresi and Agudo on Individual Rights Under State Bills of Rights When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified

Steven G. Calabrasi, Northwestern, and Sarah E. Agudo, Northwestern and Harvard, JFK School of Government, have posted a new article, Individual Rights Under State Bills of Rights When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition? It is forthcoming in the Texas Law Review. Here's the abstract:
A consistent theme of the U.S. Supreme Court's substantive due process caselaw over the last thirty years has been that, at a bare minimum, rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition are constitutionally protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement. Some justices think the Fourteenth Amendment protects newer unenumerated rights as well, but all the justices including Scalia and Thomas agree that it protects unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition.
Given this, we thought it would be valuable to do a survey of exactly what rights were protected under state bills of rights in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. We thus do a nose-count of rights protected by the thirty-seven state constitutions in 1868. We found that almost all of the rights in the federal Bill of Rights were also recognized as being fundamental rights by state bills of rights in 1868. We think this finding may be significant because it may suggest that the incorporation of the rights in the federal Bill of Rights on the ground that they were fundamental rights protected as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process was correct. We found in addition that several provisions of the federal Bill of Rights that have not been incorporated arguably ought to have been incorporated. Our evidence suggests that the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial and the right to indictment by a Grand Jury probably ought to be incorporated. Perhaps surprisingly, the case for incorporation of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as an individual right is a closer question.
We also found that state bills of rights protected a number of rights as being fundamental in 1868 that are not in the federal Bill of Rights. The most important such right is the right to a public school education, which was recognized in some form in thirty-six out of thirty-seven state constitutions in 1868. This provides new and never before published evidence of why Brown v. Board of Education was correctly decided. This finding alone is an incredibly striking one. In addition, it turns out that an Article V consensus of more than three-quarters of the state bills of rights in 1868 recognized either that there were natural law rights that were not enumerated in the state bills of rights which were just as important as the enumerated rights or that the enumeration of specific rights in state bills of rights ought not to be construed to deny or disparage other retained by the people. This is an exceptionally important finding because it suggests that if one looks at what rights are deeply rooted in history and tradition in state positive constitutional law in 1868, it turns out that as a matter of state positive law at that time the existence of unenumerated rights was taken for granted. This means that the whole effort of cabining substantive due process by looking at history and tradition may well be circular since history and tradition just point us back to natural law as it was understood in 1868.

Zasloff on Beisner on Acheson

Dean's List: Power, Institutions, and Achesonian Diplomacy is a forthcoming review essay by Jonathan Zasloff, UCLA School of Law. It will appear in the American Journal of International Law (2008). Here's the abstract:
This review essay, forthcoming in the American Journal of International Law, considers Robert Beisner's recent magisterial biography of Dean Acheson. I ask what Acheson's diplomatic record tells us about the nature of world politics, and consider the question in light of international relations theory and international legal thought. I argue that Achesonian diplomacy demonstrates the interrelatedness of the four major paradigms of international relations theory - realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism. Each theory explains a crucial part of the impact of Acheson's record, but none can explain it by themselves. I suggest in conclusion that while the Cold War might have begun with or without Acheson, his diplomatic leadership helped ensure that it ended as soon as it did - even though he was gone by the time it occurred.

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

CHLA Vol. 3: The Twentieth Century and After

Volume 3 of the new Cambridge History of Law in America, edited by Christopher Tomlins and Michael Grossberg, covers The Twentieth Century and After, but because Vol. 2 on the "long nineteenth century" covers 1800 to 1920, this volume gives us something of a short 20th century, beginning in 1920. Authors were given the latitude to set their topics in a longer time-frame, however. For example, Robert Gordon's chapter on the legal profession covers 1870-2000.


Here's the description from the press:

Volume III of the Cambridge History of Law in America covers the period from 1920 to the present, ‘the American Century’. It charts a century of legal transformations - in the state, in legal thought and education, in professional organization and life, in American federalism and governance, in domestic affairs and international relations. It shows how, politically, socially and culturally, the twentieth century was when law became ubiquitous in American life. Among the themes discussed are innovation in the disciplinary and regulatory use of law, changes wrought by the intersection of law with explosive struggles around race, gender, class and sexuality, the emergence and development of the particularly American legal discourse of ‘rights’, and the expansion of this discourse to the international arena. The main focus of this last volume of the Cambridge History of Law in America is the accelerating pace of change, change which we can be confident will continue. The Cambridge History of Law in America has been made possible by the generous support of the American Bar Foundation.


Previous posts covered Vol. 1 and Vol. 2.


Contents for Volume 3:
1. Law and state, 1920–2000: institutional growth and structural change Daniel R. Ernst

2. Legal theory and legal education, 1920–2000 William W. Fisher III

3. The American legal profession, 1870–2000 Robert W. Gordon

4. The courts, Federalism and the Federal Constitution, 1920–2000 Edward A. Purcell, Jr.

5. The litigation revolution Lawrence M. Friedman

6. Criminal justice in the United States Michael Willrich

7. Law and medicine Leslie J. Reagan

8. The Great Depression and the New Deal Barry Cushman

9. Labor’s welfare state: defining workers, constructing citizens Eileen Boris

10. Poverty law and income support: from the progressive era to the war on welfare Gwendolyn Mink, Samantha Ann Majic and Leandra Zarnow

11. The rights revolution in the twentieth century Mark Tushnet

12. Race and rights Michael J. Klarman

13. Heterosexuality as a legal regime Margot Canaday

14. Law and the environment Betsy Mendelsohn

15. Agriculture and the state, 1789–2000 Victoria Saker Woeste

16. Law and economic change during the short twentieth century John Henry Schlegel

17. The corporate economy: ideologies of regulation and antitrust, 1920–2000 Gregory A. Mark

18. Law and commercial popular culture in the twentieth-century United States Norman L. Rosenberg

19. Making law, making war, making America Mary L. Dudziak

20. Law, lawyers and empire Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth.
You can read an excerpt from LAW AND THE STATE, 1920–2000: INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE by DANIEL R. ERNST.

Griffin on California Constitutionalism: Trust in Government and Direct Democracy

Stephen M. Griffin, Tulane Law School, has posted a new paper, California Constitutionalism: Trust in Government and Direct Democracy. Here's the abstract:
This article provides a fresh perspective on direct democracy by focusing on its origins and persistence in California and by employing evidence from historical and social science research. My main thesis is that the origins and persistence of direct democracy has to do with the problem of trust in government. Focusing on the problem of trust establishes a new context for understanding direct democracy. In particular, I argue that the problems of direct democracy cannot be solved without confronting the equally serious problems citizens perceive with representative government. The two are twinned for all practical purposes.
In order to show this, I retell in Part I the story of the adoption of direct democracy to highlight the difficult situation faced by California as a new state that featured the large-scale failure of the founders' eighteenth-century representative institutions to cope with the conditions present in late-nineteenth century America. In Part II, I first review the contemporary status of direct democracy in California in relation to the problem of trust in government. I then present a detailed historical explanation of the decline of trust in government in the U.S. by reviewing the most relevant social science evidence. The discussion shows that the problem of trust in government is a national problem extending back to the 1960s and that the use of direct democracy in California and other states will persist until the problems citizens have with representative government are acknowledged and addressed.

Tuesday, April 1, 2008

Announcing...WikiLaw!

Do we live in a world governed by a rule of law? WikiLawyers think that we should. And so, inspired by the creators of Wikipedia, a new on-line community has been formed to craft legal norms. Just as Wikipedia brought us information 2.0, in which, as Steven Colbert put it, "reality is just what the majority agrees upon," WikiLaw aspires to bring interactivity to the rule of law. Sounds like democracy to me.
Our lawmakers in Washington are often distracted by matters that seem so far from our daily lives. For example, does the FISA court’s jurisdiction really matter when the president will simply by-pass it anyway? WikiLawyers tend to focus on matters closer to our everyday experience. For example, one entry recommends a sentence of 10 years at hard labor for throwing gum on the sidewalk. Don’t you hate that?

Just as disputes sometimes spring up at Wikipedia, with different authors rewriting entries based on different views of, well, reality, the same thing has been happening at WikiLaw. For example, someone created a WikiLaw entry on the crime of double-parking, with rather harsh penalties. Objections came from folks who just needed a minute to run in for that latte. After much back-and-forth, the ban on double-parking was modified to include a "Starbucks exception."

Another dimension of WikiLaw is legal history 2.0. Authors of legal history-related pages have taken seriously Jack Balkin’s collection What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said, and have rewritten the Brown decision itself. At first the WikiLaw version of the decision was re-written to uphold separate but equal. But then someone realized that the Supreme Court had also rewritten Brown in its ruling last year, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle, and so Chief Justice John Roberts’ views on the history of Brown, once simply a revisionist take in a new opinion, have now become part of the WikiLaw reconstruction of what Brown actually said. It used to be that in order to rewrite the past, you had to be either a revisionist historian or a Supreme Court Justice, but at WikiLaw, you can do it, too.

If Wikipedia is, to quote Colbert again, "the Encyclopedia where you can be an expert even if you don't know what the hell you're talking about," I suppose with WikiLaw you can create a rule of law even if you don’t give a damn about justice. So what’s new about that?

Monday, March 31, 2008

CLHA Vol. 2: The Long Nineteenth Century

The second of the three volumes in the new Cambridge History of Law in America, edited by Christopher Tomlins and Michael Grossberg is titled "The Long Nineteenth Century (1789–1920)."

It deals with the formation and development of the American state system, the establishment and growth of systematic legal education, the spread of the legal profession, the growing density of legal institutions and their interaction with political and social action, and the development of the modern criminal justice system. We also see how law intertwines with religion, how it becomes ingrained in popular culture, and how it intersects with the worlds of the American military and of international relations.

More on the project as a whole and information about Volume 1 is here. There is a preview chapter for Volume 1, but not for Volume 2.

Contents, Volume 2
1. Law and the American state, from the Revolution to the Civil War: institutional growth and structural change Mark R. Wilson

2. Legal education and legal thought, 1790–1920 Hugh C. MacGill and R. Kent Newmyer

3. The legal profession: from the Revolution to the Civil War Alfred S. Konefsky

4. The courts, 1790–1920 Kermit L. Hall

5. Criminal justice in the United States, 1790–1920: a government of laws or men? Elizabeth Dale

6. Citizenship and immigration law, 1800–1924: resolutions of membership and territory Kunal M. Parker

7. Federal policy, Western movement and consequences for indigenous people, 1790–1920 David E. Wilkins

8. Marriage and domestic relations Norma Basch

9. Slavery, antislavery, and the coming of the Civil War Ariela Gross

10. Law, personhood and citizenship in the long nineteenth century: the borders of belonging Barbara Young Welke

11. Law in popular culture, 1790–1920: the people and the law Nan Goodman

12. Law and religion, 1790–1920 Sarah Barringer Gordon

13. Legal innovation and market capitalism, 1790–1920 Tony A. Freyer

14. Innovations in law and technology, 1790–1920 B. Zorina Khan

15. The laws of industrial organization, 1870–1920 Karen Orren

16. The military in American legal history Jonathan Lurie

17. The United States and international affairs, 1789–1919 Eileen P. Scully

18. Politics, state building, and the courts, 1870–1920 William E. Forbath.

US News recycles its History rankings

The U.S. News law school rankings for 2008, with all their limitations, have been making the rounds in the blogosphere. U.S. News also ranks History graduate programs, but has simply posted a repeat of its 2005 rankings. According to U.S. News, "Rankings of doctoral programs in the social sciences and humanities are based solely on the results of peer assessment surveys sent to academics in each discipline." More on methodology is here. Hat tip.

Zietlow and Pope on the 1934 Toledo Auto-Lite Strike as Popular Constitutionalism

The Auto-Lite Strike and the Fight Against Wage Slavery is a new article on SSRN by Rebecca E. Zietlow, University of Toledo College of Law and James Gray Pope, Rutgers Law School, Newark. It appeared in the University of Toledo Law Review (2007). Here's the abstract:
In April, 1934, workers at the Auto-Lite plant went on strike, demanding that their employer recognize their union and engage in collective bargaining with them. Despite the ill effects of the Depression on Toledo and an unemployment rate of over 50%, workers at the Auto-Lite transmission plant risked their jobs and the possibility of employment at other factories for what they believed were fundamental rights - the rights to organize into a union, engage in collective bargaining, and strike. With help from the Toledo Central Labor Union and the AWP, the Auto-Lite workers resisted an injunction and enforced their right to organize on their own through collective action.
As of 1934, the Constitution had yet to emerge as a major public issue. Unlike the sit-down strikers in 1936 and 1937, a period in which the courts considered the constitutionality of the NLRA, the Toledo strikers rarely raised constitutional issues. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Toledo strike was one episode in a long-term popular movement for constitutional change. In later interviews, those workers stressed that the deplorable conditions and the way that their employer treated them that led them to strike. While most leaders of the Auto-Lite strike did not mention the Thirteenth Amendment, a number of them invoked opposition to wage slavery in their speeches and leaflets to rally their supporters. In this manner, the workers on the Auto-Lite picket line carried on labor's tradition of recognizing the right to organize as a human right as well as an economic right. This article thus considers an important chapter in the history of American popular constitutionalism, the belief of labor activists that they had a fundamental right to organize into a union, and Congress' codification of that belief in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.

Sunday, March 30, 2008

HNN Blogs the OAH

Updated (3/31). I was too busy to blog during the Organization of American Historians meeting in New York this weekend, but Rick Shenkman at History News Network had it covered. His post from Friday, Day 1, includes You Tube video of a panels on History from the Bottom Up, Academic Freedom and the Early Cold War, a paper by Charlotte Brooks on my panel on Race, Political Activism, and the Cold War and a major panel on the anniversary of 1968. He includes a highlight from the conference: remarks by the historian of race and civil rights Manning Marable on his experience in 1968, when he traveled to Atlanta at the age of 17 to cover the funeral of Martin Luther King, Jr., for a black newspaper.

Shenkman's superb coverage continued on Saturday, Day 2. The morning began with a panel remembering historian Roy Rosenzweig. HNN's post includes You Tube coverage of panels on The Forgotten War (the Mexican American War), Does liberalism have a usable past?, Conspiracies, and a debate about the meaning of the 40th anniversary of the death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

A conference highlight was the Presidential Address delivered by Nell Irving Painter, Princeton. Shenkman writes:


A pioneer in whiteness studies, she has taught a course on it at Princeton. She is finishing a long awaited book on the subject. And last night she gave her peers reason to be jealous that they hadn't thought to work on the topic themselves.

The ingredients were familiar. What Americanist hasn't come across Emerson's book on English traits, if only in a used book store? What historian hasn't heard America described as an Anglo-Saxon culture? Who hasn't been told over and over again that Magna Carta was a kind of American freedom charter? But it is Professor Painter who has had the wit to think hard enough about these subjects to construe their role in the making of what she calls the Anglo-Saxon myth.

I am afraid I have bad news for Emersonians. They will never feel the same about Emerson after watching Professor Painter's talk. Brilliant as he was, he came to believe in a kind of ethnic determinism every bit as looney as the daft doctrines of white supremacists or anti-Semites.
Painter's address on You Tube is here.

Coverage of Sunday, Day 3, including Marilyn Young, NYU, Michael J. Kramer, Northwestern and Mark Lawrence, Texas on Vietnam, and Elizabeth Borgwardt, Washington University, on the Geneva Accords and John Yoo is here.

Friday, March 28, 2008

The Cambridge History of Law in America

Years in the making, The Cambridge History of Law in America, edited by Christopher Tomlins and Michael Grossberg, is about to be released by Cambridge University Press. A three volume set, with essays by many of your favorite legal luminaries, this work was made possible, according to the press, "by the generous support of the American Bar Foundation." The project is described this way:

Law stands at the center of modern American life. Since the 1950s, American historians have produced an extraordinarily rich and diverse account of law and legal institutions in American history. But even though our knowledge has increased enormously, few attempts have been made to draw its many parts together in some greater whole that summarizes and synthesizes the history of law in America. The Cambridge History of Law in America has been designed for just this purpose. Sixty of the leading historians of law in the United States have been brought together in one enterprise to present the most comprehensive and authoritative account possible of the history of American law.

begins the account of law in America with the very first moments of European colonization and settlement of the North American landmass. It follows those processes across two hundred years to the eventual creation and stabilization of the American republic. The book discusses the place of law in regard to colonization and empire, indigenous peoples, government and jurisdiction, population migrations, economic and commercial activity, religion, the creation of social institutions, and revolutionary politics.
Contents, Volume 1:
1. Law, colonization, legitimation and the European background Anthony Pagden;
2. The law of Native Americans to 1815 Katherine A. Hermes;
3. English settlement and local governance Mary Sarah Bilder;
4. Legal communications and imperial governance: British North America and Spanish America compared Richard J. Ross;
5. Regionalism in early American law David Thomas Konig;
6. Penality and the colonial project: crime, punishment and the regulation of morals in early America Michael Meranze;
7. Law, population, labor Christopher Tomlins;
8. The fragmented laws of slavery in the colonial and revolutionary eras Sally E. Hadden;
9. The transformation of domestic law Holly Brewer;
10. Law and religion in colonial America Mark McGarvie and Elizabeth Mensch;
11. The transformation of law and economy in early America Bruce H. Mann;
12. Law and commerce, 1580–1815 Claire Priest;
13. Law and the origins of the American Revolution Jack P. Greene;
14. Confederation and constitution Jack N. Rakove;
15. The consolidation of the early Federal system, 1791–1812 Saul Cornell and Gerald Leonard;
16. Magistrates, common law lawyers, legislators: the three legal systems of British America James A. Henretta.

You can read an excerpt from Volume I, Law, Colonization, Legitimation, and the European Background by Anthony Pagden

You can order all three volumes (or ask your library to do that) here.

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Legal history at the OAH

The Organization of American Historians annual meeting begins tomorrow in New York. There are many interesting panels scheduled. Here is just a sampling of interest to legal historians.

I'm speaking Friday at 3:00 pm on this panel:

Race, Political Activism, and the Cold War
Chair: Penny Von Eschen, University of Michigan

Cold War Politics and the Making of an "American Asian" Identity
Charlotte Brooks, Baruch College, City University of New York

Race, Hawaiian Statehood, and the Construction of the Model Minority
Ellen Wu, Indiana University

Rethinking the History of U.S. Civil Rights Struggles during the Cold War through a Multiracial, Los Angeles Lens
Shana Bernstein, Southwestern University

Comment: Mary Dudziak, University of Southern California

Other panels of interest:

Friday 10:00 am
The CORE of the Solution: Achieving Justice in the Mississippi Burning Murder Case
Allison Marie Nichols, Georgetown University
Brittany Saltiel, University of Wisconsin
Barry Bradford, Adlai E. Stevenson High School
Sarah Siegel, Yale University

Friday 5:00 pm
Storm Warnings: Rethinking 1968, "The Year that Shook the World"
Cosponsored by the Center for Contemporary Black History at Columbia University
Moderator: Peniel Joseph, Brandeis University

Jeremi Suri, University of Wisconsin
Michael Kazin, Georgetown University
Matthew Lassiter, University of Michigan
Thomas Sugrue, University of Pennsylvania
Heather Thompson, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Manning Marable, Columbia University

Saturday, 1:00 pm
What Every Historian Should Know (and Doesn’t): How Federalism Has Shaped American History

Chair: Hendrik Hartog, Princeton University

Structuring the Balance of Power: How American Federalism Has Shaped the History of Railroads, Chain Stores, and Other Corporations
Colleen A. Dunlavy, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Pragmatic Federalism in Modern U.S. History
William R. Childs, The Ohio State University

The Constitution, Federalism, and America’s Destiny
David Brian Robertson, University of Missouri, St. Louis

Making the New American Family: The Cold War Origins of International Adoption
Chair: Ellen Herman, University of Oregon

From Billy Graham to Pedro Pan: Evangelicals, Anticommunism, and Immigration Law in Transnational Adoption to the U.S.
Laura Briggs, University of Arizona

A Measure of Fitness: The African American Family and Early U.S.-Korean Adoptions
Kori Graves, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Harry Holt versus The Welfare: The Fight Over Proxy Adoption
Arissa Oh, University of Chicago

Comment: Ellen Herman

Lived Histories of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands since World War II
Chair: Rachel St. John, Harvard University

Ser Mujer, Ser "Mojada" (Being a Woman, Being "Wetback"): Gender, Sexuality, and Immigration Reform, 1947-1956
Ana Elizabeth Rosas, University of California, Irvine

Alex G. Jácome, and Political Culture in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands, 1950-1970
Geraldo Cadava, Yale University

Immigration, Conservative Backlash, and Chicano Student Response: Movimiento Estudiantil Chicana/o de Aztlán, 1970-2000
Gustavo Licon, University of Southern California

Comment: Kelly Lytle Hernandez, University of California, Los Angeles

Saturday, 3:00 p.m.
Representing the Race: African American Mediators, Negotiators, and Cultural Brokers at the Turn of the Century
Chair: Richard Pierce, University of Notre Dame

"Her Claim for Pension Is Lawful and Just": African American Claims Agents, Civil War Widows, and the Military Pension Bureau
Brandi Brimmer, Vanderbilt University

Holding the Ear of the President: Black Barbers and Black Politics in the late Nineteenth Century
Quincy Mills, Vassar College

Foster Mothers of Humanity: Black Nurses as Civil Rights Fighters in the early Twentieth Century
Andrea Patterson, California State University, Fullerton

Comment: Stephanie Shaw, The Ohio State University

Forty Years Since King, A Roundtable Discussion: Struggling to End Racism, Sexism, Poverty, and War
Sponsored by the Labor and Working-Class History Association
Chair: Clayborne Carson, Stanford University

The Social Gospel Radicalism of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Clayborne Carson

King, Black Workers, and the Spirit of Memphis
Michael Honey, University of Washington

Women, The Black Poor and the Diverse Politics of Freedom
Barbara Ransby, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

The King Legacy and Today’s Freedom Struggles
Manning Marable, Columbia University

A reception will follow this session.

Sunday, 8:00 a.m.
Citizenship: Law, Status, and Rights in the American Nation-State
Chair: Mae M. Ngai, Columbia University

Wanted, But Not Welcome: Designs for Labor Immigration Without Citizenship
Ari Zolberg, Th e New School

From "Separate but Equal" to "Equal but Different": Changing Conceptions of Civic Equality in Twentieth-Century America
Rogers Smith, University of Pennsylvania

The Making of Modern American Citizenship Law
William Novak, University of Chicago

Comment: Willy Forbath, University of Texas, and Mae M. Ngai

Reviving the Federalists
Chair: Doron Ben-Atar, Fordham University

The "Yankee Dialect": Ames, Quincy, Pickering, and the Emergence of Radical Federalists, 1805-1812
Dinah Mayo-Bobee, University of Massachusetts

Federal Boston and the Taming of the American Revolution, 1795-1805
Thomas Conroy, Stonehill College

Nullification, Secession, or "a Great Pamphlet?": Reexamining the Hartford Convention Movement
Kevin Gannon, Grand View College

Sunday 10:00 a.m.
Off site at Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture
White Violence and the Great Migration: Two Approaches, Sundown Towns and A Little More Freedom
Sponsored by the Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era
Chair: Darrel Bigham, University of Southern Indiana

Shirley Portwood, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville
Sundiata Cha-Jua, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Comment: James Loewen, Catholic University of America, and Jack Blocker, Huron University College

Teaching Judicial History: Federal Trials and Great Debates in United States History
Chair: Lucy Salyer, University of New Hampshire

Designing Curriculum for Historic Federal Trials
James Landman, American Bar Association

Historic Trials in the Classroom
Jeanne Barr, Francis W. Parker School

Court History Narratives for Teachers and Students
Bruce Ragsdale, Federal Judicial Center

Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board: An Examination of the Documents
Bob Pannozzo, Stone Bridge High School

Sunday 1:00 pm
Roundtable: Civil Rights Lawyering: Then and Now

Moderator: Patricia Sullivan, University of South Carolina

Kenneth Mack, Harvard Law School
Lani Guinier, Harvard University
Lewis M. Steel, Outten and Golden, LLP

You can find the full program on-line here.

Barron and Lederman on The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, by David J. Barron, Harvard, and Martin S. Lederman, Georgetown, is the second installment in a two part project published in the Harvard Law Review (2008). Part I, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, is noted here. Here's the abstract to Part II:
Over the past half-century, discussions of constitutional war powers have focused on the scope of the President’s “inherent” power as Commander in Chief to act in the absence of congressional authorization. Professors Barron and Lederman argue that attention should now shift to the fundamental question of whether and when the President may exercise Article II war powers in contravention of congressional limitations, when the President’s authority as Commander in Chief is at its “lowest ebb.” This Article is the second part of a two-part effort to determine how the constitutional argument concerning such preclusive executive war powers is best conceived.
In the companion Article, Professors Barron and Lederman described the structural forces responsible for this shift in the ground of debate and demonstrated that evidence from the Founding era does not reveal an original understanding that the Commander in Chief enjoyed preclusive authority over matters pertaining to warmaking. In this Article, they move the story forward and systematically examine how the three branches have actually considered and treated this issue from 1789 to the present day. They examine those cases in which the President has asserted or relied upon a claim of preclusive war powers. They also review the discussions of this issue that have appeared in Supreme Court opinions; in major debates on the floor of Congress; and in the leading constitutional and war powers treatises, articles, and books of the past two centuries.
This historical review shows that the view embraced by most contemporary war powers scholars — namely, that our constitutional tradition has long established that the Commander in Chief enjoys some substantive powers that are preclusive of congressional control with respect to the command of forces and the conduct of campaigns — is unwarranted. In fact, Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle and the conduct and composition of the armed forces and militia more generally, while the Executive (at least until recently) generally has accepted such legislative constraints as legitimate. Although history is not dispositive of the constitutional question, legislators and executive branch actors should not abandon two hundred years of historical practice too hastily, and should resist the new and troubling claim that the Executive is entitled to unfettered discretion in the conduct of war.

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Mosteller on Evidence History

More on the history of evidence. Robert P. Mosteller, Duke, has posted a new article, Evidence History, the New Trace Evidence, and Rumblings in the Future of Proof. It appeared in the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2006). Here's the abstract:
This paper is in two parts. The first part is about developments in the rules of evidence and particularly about developments in the federal rules of evidence, which has had a major impact on evidence rules in many states. This part turns out to be largely about the past because my sense is that the impact of changes in the formal rules of evidence, which were substantial, are largely historic. To be sure future changes in the formal rules, particularly those that may be made as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington (2004) that dramatically changed confrontation and may unleash hearsay reformulation, may be significant.
The second part deals with my sense that technological and scientific advances may make have a dramatic impact in altering the way cases, particularly criminal cases, are proved and evaluated in the future. For example, the development and proliferation of a new type of "trace evidence" - electronic "trace evidence" - is providing dispositive proof of a larger and larger group of cases. As jurors come to understand such dispositive proof exists in many cases, they are suggestions they may come to expect it in all, potentially changing how proof in criminal cases is evaluated. Of course, this speculation - these rumblings in the future of proof - is just speculation. However, there are reasons to suspect at least that as a result of the accumulation of events brought on by scientific and technological change, something significant is beginning to occur.

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Simowitz on The Original Understandings of the Capture Clause

The Original Understandings of the Capture Clause is a new paper by Aaron D. Simowitz, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. Here's the abstract:
The Congress shall have power to . . . To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11.
Although the Capture Clause may seem obscure today, the power it embodies was crucially important to the early republic. General Washington declared, even during the Revolutionary War, that a centralized and standardized system for the handling of prizes was vital to the war effort. The first court established by the fledgling federal government was the federal appellate court of prize. This court heard over a hundred and eighteen cases before it was dissolved by Article III of the Constitution.
The federal government, first under the Articles of Confederation and then under the Constitution, was responsible for prescribing the rules under which enemy ships and prisoners could be taken. The value of captured ships was the chief means by which the early navy and privateer system was financed. However, the early law of capture also concerned captured persons, who could sometimes be redeemed or ransomed for head money. Later scholars have correctly concluded the capture of property was more important to the Framers of the Constitution. However, they have also assumed that the Capture Clause did not cover people. This is not the case.
This paper will show that the received wisdom that the Capture Clause covers only property is based on a faulty and possibly disingenuous statement dating from 1833. This paper will also show that the received wisdom is inconsistent with the era's admiralty law and with Congressional practice. The Framers made prescribing rules concerning captures on land and water an enumerated power of Congress. This power covered enemy persons as well as property.

Finkelman on The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution

Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution is an earlier article by Paul Finkelman, Albany Law School, just posted on SSRN. It appeared in the Akron Law Review (1999). Here's the abstract:
In 1787 the Constitutional Convention made a series of compromises on slavery that led to the creation of a proslavery Constitution. This article argues that this was the nation's first form of "affirmative action" as the Constitution explicitly protected only one form of private property: slaves. The Constitution of 1787 was a proslavery document, designed to prevent any national assault on slavery, while at the same time structured to protect the interests of slave owners at the expense of African Americans and their antislavery white allies. To understand this earliest form of affirmative action, this article examines the argument that the constitution was proslavery and then explains the Convention that wrote the Constitution and the document that convention produced.

Monday, March 24, 2008

Mnookin on an Intellectual History of Expert Evidence

Jennifer Mnookin, University of California Los Angeles, has posted a new article, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts; An Intellectual History of Expert Evidence. It is forthcoming in the Villanova Law Review. Here's the Abstract:
This Article, published in a symposium issue focusing on science and expertise, traces the early reception of the modern expert witness. It describes in some detail the widespread frustrations with expert witnesses in court in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, focusing in particular on the two most vociferous critiques: that experts too often became partisans, mere mouthpieces for the party that hired them; and that expert testimony was so frequently contradictory that it confused and perplexed, rather than enlightened, the lay jurors who heard it.
The Article argues that these criticisms can only be properly understood by recognizing two important aspects of how expert evidence was being wielded and understood in this period. First, it is important to recognize that even amidst the rampant complaints by the bench, bar, and experts themselves, about the content and methods of expert testimony, the actual use of expert evidence was simultaneously increasing. Second, I argue that a key source of the dissatisfaction with expert testimony was a disjunction between a set of idealized expectations for scientific evidence and the practical realities of its use in the courtroom. It was precisely because of what science was thought to be able to offer to the process of legal decisionmaking, that the spectacle of warring experts provoked such frustration and anger. Science ought to have been able to offer proof more objective, more certain, and more neutral than that of the lay eyewitness, or so believed scientists and legal commentators alike. When it failed to do so, this failure was frequently attributed to partisan excess or the problems of adversarialism, rather than recognized as being, at least in significant part, the result of unrealistic expectations for science itself. In the conclusion, I suggest that this idealized conception of science lingers with us today as well, and continues to influence how we understand and critique expert evidence in court.

Sunday, March 23, 2008

English Medieval Legal Documents Wiki

"Wiki" and "Medieval" may not seem to belong in the same sentence, but they do now thanks to the efforts of the amazing Hazel Lord, Senior Law Librarian, University of Southern California Law Library. Lord has created the English Medieval Legal Documents Wiki. According to the website:

The goal of this project is to create a collaborative database on the published sources of English medieval legal documents, and to provide links to the growing number of online sources currently being developed.

Lord explains that

The project originally arose from a perceived need for an up-to-date bibliography of published material in the field of medieval legal documents. This need was made more pressing by the fast growing body of material to be found online. However, the true scope of the work did not become clear until what I had projected as a bibliography of a couple of hundred items turned into a major database of close to one thousand records … and growing!
Dan Klerman, the Charles L. and Ramona I. Hilliard Professor of Law and History at USC, advised Lord on the project, and it was his idea to turn it into a wiki, "since this would solve the obvious problem of how to keep it up-to-date." Lord continues:

There are in fact several advantages to converting a large bibliographical database like this to a wiki. The obvious one...is the ease of keeping it up-to-date. Another advantage is the open source aspect of it. A wiki, unlike a static text file can become a truly cooperative resource, where scholars who have information to share are able to register as contributors, and add to the value of the resource. I also foresee it becoming an intermediary for linking to scanned files of the original manuscripts, so that scholars could view high definition images, rather than transliterations. This would mean that in some cases they would not necessarily need to visit the local archives in order to carry out their research. This function may prove to be its greatest value. Furthermore I expect the wiki, now launched to the academic community, to take off in directions I have not even conceived of!

A third major advantage of a wiki is the ability to link to relevant information on other web-sites. For example, each of the entries in the introductory list of Kings and their Dates of Accession is linked to a page of Wikipedia with biographical and other information on that monarch. Links are made to the homepage of the National Archives as well as to those of many local historical and record societies who, in large part, have been responsible for the publication of legal documents from local archives. Also of value are the links (still under development) from the highlighted OCLC numbers for each title. These links will take users directly to WorldCat, where they can determine which local libraries hold the item.

This is the first wiki attempted by the USC Law School, but already faculty are coming up with ideas of how such cooperative databases could help them with their own joint research. We are very excited about it. I have to acknowledge the support I have received from Albert Brecht on this experimental project and the wonderful help I have received from our IT department.
You can begin wiki-ing medieval documents here.

McGinnis' and Rappaport's Consequentialist Originalism

A consequentialist argument for originalism? That's what John O. McGinnis, Northwestern, and Michael B. Rappaport, University of San Diego, have in mind in their paper The Desirable Constitution and the Case for Originalism. What is perhaps most interesting about the paper, however, is that its defense of originalism depends on an assumption that the constitution was enacted under a "supermajority process," and yet they acknowledge that a majority of those living in the United States (women and African Americans) were excluded from participation, thereby making supermajoritarianism impossible. Here's the abstract:
In this article we argue that originalism advances the welfare of the present day citizens of the United States, because it promotes constitutional interpretations that are likely to have better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist theories. A constitution that is enacted under a strict supermajority process is likely to be desirable, because such a process has features appropriate for determining the content of entrenched laws. In other words, the desirability of a constitutional provision derives from the consensus support it gained among the enactors. Preserving the meaning of the constitution which the enactors intended preserves that beneficence for today.
We show that the enactment and amendment process of the United States Constitution largely followed an appropriate supermajoritarian template, which strongly suggests the desirability of the original constitution and its amendments. Nevertheless, we recognize that the original constitutional enactment process was defective in that it excluded African Americans and women. Accordingly, to address the issues that arise when a constitution is enacted pursuant to faulty supermajority rules, we develop a theory of supermajoritarian failure.
We demonstrate that when the supermajoritarian process for enacting a constitution has been defective (and has not been corrected), the nation faces three choices: enacting a new constitution, following the existing constitution despite its imperfections, or permitting the judiciary or some other entity to correct these imperfections outside of the supermajoritarian amendment process. We also show that, given the limited nature of the existing defects in the Constitution, following the Constitution better preserves the benefits of constitutionalism than the alternatives of enacting a new constitution or judicial correction.
Our argument does not merely explain why originalism is the preferable theory of interpretation; it also reveals the type of originalism that should be employed. Rather than attempt to determine the best originalist interpretive theory in some abstract sense, we should employ the interpretive rules that the constitutional enactors intended to apply. In that way, we use the meaning that actually passed through the supermajoritarian process. We call this form of originalism "original methods originalism. "

Truck Stop, by Fletcher (on adoption/removal of American Indian children)

George glanced around the restaurant. It was cavernous, with the tables empty and set far apart from each other. Otherwise, it looked like any old diner, except that it still had telephones without dialers in the booths.

So begins Truck Stop, a fictional narrative by Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan State University College of Law, forthcoming in the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review. Fletcher explains its purpose in this abstract:

Every American Indian person - repeat, every American Indian person - is related to or knows someone or is someone who has been adopted out of or removed from their reservation family. A significant percentage of each recent generation of American Indian people has grown up among strangers, either adopted by non-reservation families or force-fed through a state foster care system. This is, of course, one of the fundamental issues Congress hoped to address when it enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978. This fictional narrative is my take on what it means for an Indian person to lose their family - and to regain it much, much later.

Hobsbawm, Scottsboro and more in the Sunday Book Reviews

Eric Hobsbawm, On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy (Pantheon) is reviewed today in the Los Angeles Times. Kristina Lindgren describes the book as arguing "that the greatest danger in the 21st century is in 'the global ambitions of an uncontrollable and apparently irrational government in Washington' bent on exporting an ideology of liberty and democracy and, in the process, squandering America's moral authority and influence." Hobsbawm "notes persuasively that the United States, the world's sole superpower (by virtue of its high-tech military capability), is the only major empire in history that "has also been a major debtor.'...The question is whether the U.S. will try to 'maintain its eroding global position [with] politico-military force . . . and in so doing promote . . . not global peace but conflict.'"

A novel, Scottsboro, by Ellen Feldman (Norton) is reviewed in the San Francisco Chronicle. According to Jonah Raskin, Feldman "revisits the celebrated case in a social-protest novel that once again indicts bigots and bigotry, and focuses on the role of two women largely neglected by historians, dramatists and fiction writers....She breathes new life into the real Ruby Bates, a white woman who initially testified that she was raped by the defendants but later proclaimed their innocence. Ruby appears in the novel under her real name, and her voice - she narrates much of the story - gives 'Scottsboro' resonance and a sense of authenticity."

This is a great Sunday for the New York Times Book Review, with Michael Kazin on Walter McDougall, Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era, 1829-1877; Emily Bazelon on Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality; Amy Chua on Anthony Pagden, Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle Between East and West; Nicholas Kristof on Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population, and more. Ralph Luker at Cliopatria, has it covered in a great book review round-up.

Saturday, March 22, 2008

Teaching vs Writing while on the Market

This is for those thinking about taking a Visiting Assistant Professor position or adjunct teaching while looking for a permanent job. Claire Potter at Tenured Radical has a typically wise post geared toward history job candidates who didn't find a job the first time around and now need to plan an upcoming year and another try. While she offers advice about finding a temporary position, she also says:

But here’s the other piece of advice I will give you. It is a real question whether you should get a full time visiting teaching gig; or whether you should stay away from teaching for a year, delay submission of your dissertation until April, and get some articles out to journals. If you can teach and write at the same time, fantastic. But also know that full time teaching is often consuming, even for a veteran teacher, and it is also really interesting, which means that you will want to spend time on and with your students that should probably be spent on your writing at this stage of your career. If you do not yet have publications and/or a polished dissertation, writing is a better use of your time in the long run, as long as you can find some other way to feed, house and clothe yourself, and as long as your committee will agree to keep you on the books for another year.

Because honestly? Showing that you are a mature scholar who can see an article through to publication and a person who has a clear sense of how the dissertation will become a book is going to help you far more than a year of teaching when, in the fall, you pull out your c.v., dust it off again, and go back on the market.


I agree. And if you have no dissertation because you are a J.D. and not a Ph.D. candidate...it is all the more important to develop your scholarship before going (back) on the market. If you are moving from practice to teaching and you have student loans payments, a mortgage and other financial obligations, carving out time may be a stretch, possibly making a VAP position more attractive. But think creatively about whether you could swing a leave of even a few weeks, perhaps coupled with vacation time, by downsizing if needed. Six weeks of intense work may enable you to make the progress you need on the article that will be the topic of your job talk. More from Potter is here.

Larson on The Revolutionary American Jury: A Case Study of the 1778-79 Philadelphia Treason Trials

The Revolutionary American Jury: A Case Study of the 1778-1779 Philadelphia Treason Trials is a new paper by Carlton F.W. Larson, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Here's the abstract:
Between September 1778 and April 1779, twenty-three men were tried in Philadelphia for high treason against the state of Pennsylvania. These trials were aggressively prosecuted by the state in an atmosphere of widespread popular hostility to opponents of the American Revolution. Philadelphia juries, however, convicted only four of these men, a low conviction rate even in an age of widespread jury lenity; moreover, in three of these four cases, the juries petitioned Pennsylvania's executive authority for clemency. Since it is unlikely that most of the defendants were factually innocent, these low conviction rates are a mystery that has never been adequately explained.
This Article offers such an explanation, and, in the process, uses these trials as a case study of jury service in late eighteenth-century America. We know surprisingly little about this important subject, as legal historians have focused almost exclusively on the more visible role of judges. Drawing on a wide variety of sources, this Article seeks to remedy this imbalance by providing the most thorough study yet written of a group of eighteenth-century American jurors.
The Article demonstrates, for the first time, how eighteenth-century American defense counsel creatively used peremptory challenges, deployed along religious, political, and economic lines, to create favorable juries, composed almost entirely of men who had previously served in treason cases. Through careful study of demographic records, this Article reconstructs the Philadelphia jury box and allows us to identify not only the social status of the jurors, but also the intricate network of connections linking the grand jurors, the trial jurors, and the defendants. It explains how Philadelphia jurors repeatedly balked at the death penalty, effectively nullifying Pennsylvania's capital law of treason. It also examines the subsequent attacks on jury independence triggered by these acquittals, ranging from strident newspaper criticism to a deadly militia attack on the home of James Wilson, signatory to the Declaration of Independence and defense counsel in many of the treason trials. By examining the actions of juries in a convulsive, violent civil war, the Article also illuminates the jury's historical role in balancing liberty and national security, an issue that continues to confront America today.

Friday, March 21, 2008

Muller and Secunda on Bill Murphy

William Murphy of the University of North Carolina Law School, who passed away last fall, has inspired two new papers just posted on SSRN, one by Eric Muller, University of North Carolina, and one by Paul M. Secunda, University of Mississippi. Eric had a blog post last fall remembering Professor Murphy, whose contract was not renewed by the University of Mississippi in 1962, after he insisted on teaching his students that Brown v. Board of Education was the law of the land and should be enforced.

Eric Muller's paper is Bill Murphy and the Hidden Inner Layer of Academic Freedom.
Here's the abstract:
This essay, which relates the dramatic story of Professor William P. Murphy's repudiation by, and departure from, the University of Missouri amidst the campus protests of 1970, illustrates the importance of faculty governance to a robust and healthy academic institution.

Paul M. Secunda's paper is A Tribute to William P. Murphy: Labor Law Trail-Blazer and Man of Unflinching Principle. It will appear in the Mississippi Law Journal (2008). Here's the abstract:
It is somewhat strange to write a tribute to a person that one has never had the pleasure to meet. Yet, I feel than I am compelled to write about a great man, William Bill Murphy, for in two significant ways he made my career as a law professor at the University of Mississippi School of Law a possibility.
First, post-Brown in 1950's Mississippi, Bill sought to make the transition to integration as painless as possible for his fellow Southerners and he would not accept talk about the illegitimacy of the Supreme Court or its constitutional holdings. Of course, he was mistaken in his optimism, but his adherence to the rule of law and to his principles, when many others sought to avoid the racial situation altogether, was not only praiseworthy, but utterly courageous.
Second, Bill used his position of prestige at the law school to state that labor unions were legitimate, reasonable, and important institutions for the development of the South. Although unions are still anathema to many in this region, his writings helped to raise the level of the dialogue immensely on this controversial topic.
So, quite simply, Bill Murphy, a man I never met, is a not only an inspiration to me, but a trail-blazer who made it possible for me to write freely about civil rights, labor, and employment issues in the Mississippi of today.

Fellowships for Aspiring Law Teachers

Tax Prof has an excellent round-up of resources on fellowships, Visiting Assistant Professor positions and more for aspiring law professors. It includes programs targeted to legal history, the Raoul Berger Visiting Fellowship in Legal History, Harvard, the Golieb Fellowships in Legal History, NYU and the J. Willard Hurst Fellowship in Legal History at Wisconsin.

Update: the Hurst Fellowship at Wisconsin no longer has a legal history focus. Details here.