Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Pfander on Removing Federal Judges

James E. Pfander, Northwestern, has posted a new article, Removing Federal Judges . It appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review (2007). Here's the abstract:
Scholars have in recent years raised a host of questions about Article III's provisions for judicial independence. In a provocative recent essay, Professors Sai Prakash and Steve Smith challenge the conventional view that federal judges may be removed from office only through the relatively cumbersome process of House impeachment followed by a trial in the Senate. Prakash and Smith base their argument against impeachment-and-removal exclusivity on the history of good behavior tenure and the role that courts played in adjudicating claims of misbehavior at common law. Prakash and Smith contend that this judicial mode of removing from office remains available for federal judges, something Congress may revive through the passage of appropriate legislation.
This Essay disputes the Prakash and Smith thesis. It shows that the English common law mode of removal from office through judicial proceedings had essentially disappeared by the time of the framing. Both in England, where the Act of Settlement of 1701 regulated judicial office, and in the newly independent states, constitutional documents almost invariably assigned the ouster of superior court judges to the legislative branch of government. The drafting and ratification debates reveal that the framers of the federal Constitution made a similar choice, providing a legislative mode of removing misbehaving judges and foreclosing alternative modes. In the end, the evidence sustains the conventional view that the Constitution permits the removal of federal judges only through the legislative process.

Lupu and Tuttle on Religion at Public Universities

More on William and Mary. The Cross at College: Accommodation and Acknowledgment of Religion at Public Universities is a new article by Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, both of George Washington University Law School. Their paper is forthcoming in the William & Mary Bill of Rights (2008). Here's the abstract:
In the fall of 2006, President Gene Nichol of the College of William & Mary decided that the college - a public institution - should no longer display a cross on the altar table of the college's Wren Chapel. He ordered the cross moved to a back room, from which it could be returned to the altar table during Christian worship. This decision sparked an outcry from many Christian conservatives, who asserted that President Nichol was undermining the college's historical legacy. After a period of campus furor, a special Committee proposed and the President accepted a compromise - the cross was returned to the side wall of the chapel, in adisplay case marked with a historical notation.
The controversy over the display of the Wren Chapel Cross provides a rich opportunity to explore the extent to which state-controlled institutions of higher learning can respond to the religious needs of students or commemorate the religious heritage of the institution. The paper briefly traces the history of the College from its original charter by the English Crown its present day public status. The paper also develops the relevant history of the Wren Chapel and the controversial cross. The paper argues that the competing arguments in this dispute over how the cross "injured" students represent far too thin a framework for exploring the relevant questions.
Instead, the paper argues, the only possible justifications for a public college manifesting a religious voice are theories of accommodation and acknowledgment of religion. The theory of accommodation can support the provision of a chapel for student worship, but cannot justify the central placement of a cross in the chapel as a default configuration. The paper breaks down the theory of acknowledgment into three separate strands - acknowledgment as an accurate rendering of history, acknowledgment as an expression of reverence, and acknowledgment as a response to secular elements of present culture. The paper unpacks the three theories, and tests the dueling claims about the placement of the Wren Chapel cross against each. The lessons to be drawn from this controversy should be illuminating for all public universities in their consideration of religious displays on campus.

Update: Related breaking news: today W & M President Nichol announced his ouster and immediate resignation in this statement.
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Monday, February 11, 2008

A Just Empire? Rome's Legal Legacy and the Justification of War and Empire in International Law

Upcoming conference:
NYU Law School
March 13-15, 2008



Roman law and other texts dealing with Roman armed expansion and warfare were among the most influential traditions in the 16th and 17th century development of the law of nations in Europe and in European imperial expansion. The first panels of this conference inquire into the importance of Roman law and of judgments about Roman practice as sources for later thinking about the law of nations, imperialism, and just war. Several of the papers will use the work of the sixteenth-century Roman law scholar Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) as one focal point for the discussion of these wider issues. The later panels consider connections between these Roman traditions and major European thinkers on international law in the 18th century such as Barbeyrac, Montesquieu and Vattel, and the impact of this tradition and of other justifications of European expansion in the Americas and elsewhere. The conference aims to bring together participants from several different disciplines, extending from ancient historians to specialists in modern international legal and political theory, in order to deepen understandings of this Roman tradition and of its ebb and flow among the different projects to justify and shape imperialism through law. The conference will also draw wider attention to Alberico Gentili’s work, and provides an opportunity for deeper evaluation of the traditions of Roman and international legal thought on war and imperialism to which he was a signal contributor.


The conference program is here.
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Meyler on Daniel Defoe and the Written Constitution

Bernadette A. Meyler, Cornell, has a new paper, Daniel Defoe and the Written Constitution. Here's the abstract:
Today, as constitutionalism spreads around the globe, it is embodied de rigueur in written documents. Even places that sustained polities for centuries without a written constitution have begun to succumb to the lure of writtenness. America, we think, spawned this worldwide force, inaugurating a radically new form of political organization when it adopted the U.S. Constitution as its foundational text. Yet the notion of the written constitution had, in fact, received an earlier imprimatur from the pen of Daniel Defoe, English novelist, political pamphleteer, and secret agent. Plying his trades in the early eighteenth century, Defoe, now known largely as the author of Robinson Crusoe, in a number of disparate literary and political guises advocated the development of written documents setting forth the basic principles of a governmental order and restraining the power of legislative majorities. Just as the individualist ethos of Robinson Crusoe grabbed the American imaginary from the mid-eighteenth-century onwards, a conception of written constitutionalism similar to the one promulgated by Crusoe's author took root on American soil.
My article elaborates the contours of written constitutionalism that Defoe outlined and demonstrates the close alignment of some of Defoe's arguments with the scholarship of today, an alignment that suggests the persistence of a number of the mythic ideals of written constitutionalism that Defoe elaborated in the early eighteenth century. Methodologically, the article illuminates the importance of looking to the emerging genre of the novel as well as other widely read forms--rather than focusing exclusively on more traditional historical sources--to discern the construction of a popular imaginary at the time of the Founding. At the same time, however, the article argues that the differences between the account of written constitutionalism that emerges out of Defoe's works and the claims made for written constitutionalism by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison and legal academics today illuminate the contingency of what writing may mean for constitutionalism and demonstrate the ways in which the mythic entailment's of writing are sometimes precisely that--myths.

Forbath on Constitutionalism and Social and Economic Rights

William E. Forbath, University of Texas, has a new article, Social and Economic Rights: A Brief Guide to the Constitution of Work and Livelihoods. It is forthcoming in WORKINGUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society (2008). Here's the abstract:
Constitutional democracy is impossible here, just as it is elsewhere, without some limits on social and economic deprivation. Mounting poverty and poverty wages, growing job insecurity, a renaissance of sweat shops, a lack of decent education, of access to health care, housing, and other basic social goods: millions of Americans thus afflicted lack more than money. They are at constant risk of physical and social debilitation. As a consequence, they can't participate on anything like a roughly equal footing in the world of work and opportunity or in the polity, where the terms of social and economic cooperation and competition are meant to be open to democratic scrutiny and revision. Equal liberty and the consent of the governed - the basic precepts of constitutional democracy - are a hoax in a system that allows such savage inequality as ours.
The rest of this short essay is divided into three parts. First and briefest, just a couple pages, is a plain-spoken philosophical explanation of why most Americans' reflective (now that I think about it) understanding of constitutional democracy demands social and economic rights. This seems like it might be useful, since the idea of fundamental rights to social goods rubs so sharply against the grain of our official legal and political culture today. Second is an historical account that shows that the idea is as rooted in American history and tradition as conservatives' laissez faire. It also shows how the tangled knot of race and class constrained efforts in the polity and courts to make good on the claims of social and economic citizenship during the twentieth century. And third are some suggestions about renewing and reinventing social and economic rights today.

Sunday, February 10, 2008

Sunday Book Review Round-up

It's a great Sunday for book reviews. Here are a few:

CHASING THE FLAME: Sergio Vieira de Mello and The Fight to Save the World by Samantha Power (Penguin) is reviewed in the Washington Post and the San Francisco Chronicle. James Mann in the Post finds that "The strength of the book lies in Power's use of Vieira de Mello's life (and death) as a well-placed window on the international community's successes and failures."

They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons, by Jacob Heilbrunn (Doubleday) is reviewed in the Chicago Tribune. On Iraq, Heilbrunn writes: "Unlike the Vietnam-era generation of Democrats, the neocons show no signs of remorse for the disaster they have created."
The New York Times finds that RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism by William A. Link (St. Martin’s Press) will be "the go-to biography of Helms for some time."

BASIC BROWN: My Life and Our Times by Willie Brown (Simon & Schuster), according to Matt Bai in the New York Times, is "an illuminating, if one-sided, story about the arc of politics in California and much of the rest of the country during the last quarter of the 20th century."

Maurice Isserman in the New York Times reviews DEFYING DIXIE: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950 by Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore (W. W. Norton & Company). A great photo of the amazing Pauli Murray, who dominates the book, fills the print edition.

Also in the NY Times, THE RACE CARD: How Bluffing About Bias Makes Race Relations Worse by Richard Thompson Ford (Farrar, Straus & Giroux) gets a sympathetic review from Orlando Patterson, while Jill Nelson's review of SELLOUT: The Politics of Racial Betrayal by Randall Kennedy (Pantheon Books) and A BOUND MAN: Why We Are Excited About Obama and Why He Can’t Win by Shelby Steele, finds them to "have a Rip Van Winkle feel to them," so that they "tell us more about what has been than what lies ahead."

Finally, reviewed in the San Francisco Chronicle and the New York Sun, a novel(!) about Frantz Fanon: Fanon, by John Edgar Wideman (HOUGHTON MIFFLIN).

Saturday, February 9, 2008

Hall on The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers

The patient as a figure in American legal history is considered in Mark A. Hall's (Wake Forest) new essay, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers. It is forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal. Here's the abstract:
Rich academic debate has emerged over multiple competing views of health care law. Under one view, termed essentialism, health care law is a distinctive academic field because the particular attributes of medicine and treatment relationships matter fundamentally, not just incidentally, to how law governs this field. The competing conceptualization, which has been denigrated as the law of the horse view, is that much of health care law consists of nothing more than conventional rules from other legal fields as they apply to the services, actors, and institutions that happen to populate the medical arena.
This essay supports the essentialism view by demonstrating that the legal system sees individuals who receive medical care more as patients than as consumers, even in the most commercial of settings - the payment for services. Normal rules of contract do not apply between providers and patients. Instead, like family law, medical law is as much about status as it is about contract. Patients' and physicians' contractual obligations are forged in the context of someone who is sick and vulnerable seeking care in a therapeutic relationship that entails special responsibility for the patient's welfare. This Essay documents how this contextualized view has affected law's treatment of medical transactions throughout history.

Hevia and Colon-Rios on The (Un)Rule of Law in Puerto Rico: A Republican Approach

The (Un)Rule of Law in Puerto Rico: A Republican Approach, has just been posted on SSRN by Martin Hevia, School of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Joel I. Colon-Rios, York University - Osgoode Hall Law School. Here's the abstract:
It is clear that the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is problematic from the point of view of representative democracy. It is difficult to understand how a juridical arrangement in which a non-elected legislative assembly routinely creates civil and criminal laws that are applied by a non-elected executive may be justified from a democratic perspective. In light of this, it is striking that Puerto Rico's juridical order receives little if any attention in contemporary constitutional theory. With the exception of a few essays, American constitutional theorists have treated the case of Puerto Rico as a curious but unimportant anomaly in an otherwise democratic polity, therefore undeserving serious academic consideration.
In this paper, we'd like to start changing this attitude. We want to suggest that there is a deep problem with this juridical arrangement and we propose to address it from the perspective of an old tradition in political philosophy: republicanism.In this paper we will consider the juridical relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States from a republican perspective. In the first part of the essay, we provide a historical background of the juridical relationship at issue. With this historical background, we intend to show how the relationship actually works, and not merely to provide an account of what courts and politicians have said about it. We will then discuss some of the main themes in contemporary republicanism, and, finally, we will analyze Puerto Rico's current relationship with the United States in light of the insights provided by republican theory.

Gordon on The Outlines of a Postwar American Fiscal Constitution

Cameron Gordon, University of Canberra, has posted a paper, Balanced Budgets and the Withering of U.S. Fiscal Policy: The Outlines of a Postwar American Fiscal Constitution. Here's the abstract:
In their famous book, Democracy in Deficit, James Buchanan and Richard Wagner define the notion of fiscal constitution: Whether they are incorporated formally in some legally binding and explicitly constitutional document or merely in a set of customary, traditional, and widely accepted precepts, wecan describe the prevailing rules guiding fiscal choice as a `fiscal constitution.'(Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 21) This paper analyzes the history of American fiscal policy from post-World War II to the Gramm-Rudman Act of 1985, using the fiscal constitution concept as a framework. The paper generally finds that the fiscal constitution loosened considerably during that period, but did appear to have some real tightening as a result of Gramm-Rudman.

Friday, February 8, 2008

Nobles on Politics of Official Apologies


Professor Melissa Nobles of the MIT Political Science Department has just published The Politics of Official Apologies with Cambridge University Press. Here is the description from the Cambridge website:
This book examines the political uses of official apologies in the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Nobles explores why minority groups demand such apologies and why governments do or do not offer them. She argues that apologies can help to alter the terms and meanings of national membership. Minorities demand apologies in order to focus attention on historical injustices, the rectification of which, they argue, should guide changes in present-day government policies. When employed by political actors, apologies play an important, if under appreciated, role in bringing certain views about history and moral obligation to bear in public life.
I'm looking forward to reading this.

University of Maryland's Course on Slavery

On the heels of William and Mary's discussion of its connections to slavery, the University of Maryland has announced that Ira Berlin and a graduate student will teach a two-semester course for thirty undergraduates, which will research the University of Maryland's connections to slavery. The Diamond Back, the University of Maryland's student newspaper, has all the details. Sounds like an excellent course to me. The Diamond Back also has an editorial about this.

Will be most interesting to see where this all goes. I find it interesting and worth more in-depth conversation at some point what happened with the state apologies for their connections to slavery last year. In every state except Maryland, that I can recall at least, politicians took the lead and did not draw on academics. (In Maryland some of the start academics, like Ron Walters, testified before the legislature, as I recall.) It struck me at the time as an odd disconnect: historians have some expertise in this area. They're also all over the map. James Cobb at the University of Georgia wrote a piece for the New Republic on-line edition criticizing state legislatures' apologies for slavery. (Here's an earlier version from Cobb's website; I can't find a working link to the New Republic piece.) In the most recent American Scholar Gorman Beauchamp also takes on apologies--in stronger terms than Cobb. This relates in some ways to the discussion of the Einhorn--Wood debate from the pages of the New York Review of Books last fall, which continued here at legalhistoryblog. And I suspect that lots of historians would be wildly pro-apology. Anyway, I thought it strange that more historians weren't asked to testify as part of the apology debates. But perhaps that's because we academics work on rather different schedules and with different questions from politicians. It's hard to know.

At any rate, I look forward to hearing more about this.

Thanks to Terry Meyers of William and Mary for bringing this to my attention.

Thursday, February 7, 2008

Blumenthal, Seo, Witt, and Mikhail on Common Sense Philosophy

The spring 2008 issue of Law and History Review is up on the history cooperative website. You may be particularly interested in the forum "Consciousness and Culpability on Trial," which features Susanna Blumenthal's The Mind of a Moral Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth- Century American Law. The comments are by Sarah Seo and John Witt, The Metaphysics of Mind and the Practical Science of the Law, and John Mikhail Scottish Common Sense and Nineteenth-Century American Law: A Critical Appraisal. Blumenthal also has a response, Metaphysics, Moral Sense, and the Pragmatism of the Law.

Close readers of legalhistoryblog may recall that we've spoken about the most interesting discussion between Blumenthal and Mikhail already. This forum is worth some serious attention and we're all eagerly awaiting Blumenthal's book on this topic.

Natelson on The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent

Professor Robert Natelson of the University of Montana has posted a 2007 article from the Ohio State Law Journal on "The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent." His abstract reads:
This Article addresses whether the American Founders expected evidence of their own subjective views to guide future interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. The Article considers a range of evidence largely overlooked or misunderstood in earlier studies, such as contemporaneous rules of legal interpretation, judicial use of legislative history, earlier American public debate, and pronouncements by state ratifying conventions. Based on this evidence, the Article concludes that the Founders were original-understanding originalists. This means that they anticipated that constitutional interpretation would be guided by the subjective understanding of the ratifiers when such understanding was coherent and recoverable and, otherwise, by the Constitution's original public meaning.

Given the enduring interest in original intent, I'm guessing this one will get a lot of attention.

A Patriot's History of the United States


I was in the Barnes and Noble in Tuscaloosa recently--yes, it's been almost exactly 25 years since I first set foot in the Barnes and Noble flagship store in Manhattan. Lots and lots of water under the bridge since then. But it's a pleasant surprise to still feel a little of that magic from that day long ago, now in Tuscaloosa. I spotted a copy of A Patriot's History of the United States on the remainder table. I'd skimmed this a year or so ago when it first came out, before I sent it out for review in Law and History Review.

I wanted to spend some more time with it and figured it a worthwhile investment at $6.98. (You may recall that I think book pricing is critical, if you want to get the book into the hands of readers. As Joe Jackson might say, there goes your proof.)

The authors (Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen) say that they are trying to be different from much other recent history, which focuses on the failings of our country rather than its successes. Their book begins in this way:
Is America's past a tale of racism, sexism, and bigotry? Is it the story of the conquest and rape of a continent? Is US history the story of white slave owners who perverted the electoral process for their own interests? Did America start with Columbus' killing all the Indians, leap to Jim Crow laws and Rockefeller crushing the workers, then finally save itself with Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal? The answers, of course, are no, no, no, no, and NO.
However, I think much of it is largely a change in emphasis rather than substance. (Their interpretation of some twentieth-century history may be different--on this I have no opinion right now.) There are pieces of the book that I find down-right mainstream--like the interpretation of the coming of the Civil War. Once a key battleground of historical interpretation, the authors view slavery as a central piece of the story and do not blame the silly abolitionists for causing a needless war. In fact, its focus on Christianity's critique of slavery lifts the abolitionists up as heroes.

Pretty interesting stuff and probably worth a read as well--even if you might have answered a partial yes to at least one of the questions that Schweikart and Allen pose.

I thought you might enjoy Jack Delano's 1941 photograph of a woman standing by a house flying the United States and Georgia flags near White Plains, Georgia, from our friends at the Library of Congress, by way of illustration.

Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Duffy on Inventing Invention

More on the history of intellectual property with a recent article, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, by John F. Duffy, George Washington University. It appeared in the Texas Law Review (2007). Here's the abstract:
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, all countries having patent systems required patentable inventions to be both new and useful. Now those two fundamental requirements have been joined by a third: Patentable inventions must also be nonobvious. The nonobviousness requirement is considered to be so central to patent policy that it has frequently been called the doctrine of invention, inventive step or simply the patentability requirement. This Article traces how this defining doctrine of invention was itself invented by the world legal culture. For scholars of intellectual property law, this history provides significant insights into the proper functioning and continued development of the doctrine. But the case study also gives much more general insights into the process of legal development, showing how one successful doctrine grew up and conquered the world while many failed doctrines with promising beginnings withered. The history reveals that the legal system itself is capable of generating true legal innovations - i.e., intellectual advances that are objectively better ways for accomplishing the purposes of the law. Such legal innovations can take decades, even centuries, to develop, and flawed doctrines can remain stable law for large portions of a century before their downfall. The case study has obvious relevance to the great debate over the so-called positive theory of the economic analysis of law and suggests that economic analysis should have a more unabashedly normative component, which might facilitate innovation and progress in law.

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

William and Mary's Discussion of Slavery


Legalhistoryblog readers may recall the discussion last year of Terry Meyers' article "A First Look at the Worst: Slavery and Race Relations at the College of William and Mary." (Paper available on ssrn here.) The Flat Hat, William and Mary's newspaper, now has an article on Meyers' research and discussion at William and Mary about the school's history.

Kiersten Flythe's article discusses both some of the school's connections to slavery, as well as some of its more recent work against racial discrimination. The Flat Hat newspaper has a history of taking courageous stances at a time when that was difficult. Flythe reports:

Former President of the College John Stewart Bryan spoke out against wage discrimination amongst the black staff during his tenure. Twelve students and a member of the faculty walked out of a lecture that Strom Thurmond, the segregationist presidential candidate, gave in 1948. The Flat Hat also has a history of supporting civil right issues on campus. The newspaper satirized the Ku Klux Klan in the May 20, 1940 issue and opposed a poll tax that prevented blacks from voting in a column on November 5, 1940. One Flat Hat writer, Jerry Hyman, spoke out against racial prejudice and inequality in a May 3, 1944 issue. As of late, the College itself has worked hard to increase diversity on campus and create a welcoming environment for minority students.

Wilf on The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law

Steven Wilf, University of Connecticut School of Law, has posted a new article, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law. It is forthcoming in the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts (2008). Here's the abstract:
During the New Deal period, intellectual property underwent a transformation. Copyright was recast from literary property to industrial property; trademark shifted from a common law tort of palming off to a regulatory regime for a mass consumer economy, and patent law was rethought to accommodate corporate invention. This essay begins by examining the advantages of looking at intellectual property as deeply situated in New Deal debates over political economy, and calls for a new history of intellectual property very different from conventional narratives moored in the introduction of new technologies. More broadly, it suggests that examining foundational past policy debates, and the ways these are contingent upon political, economic, and social change, might allow us to understand possible alternatives more clearly than absolute claims constructed using philosophical or economic justifications. The New Deal period has particularly important implications because it marked the beginning of the rapid expansion of intellectual property protection. Adapting intellectual property protection to an industrial economy, four features distinguished this new capacious conception of the products of knowledge, which I call the post-war paradigm: intellectual property becomes a national and international enterprise, propertized intellectual property is subject to modern regulatory interventions, Progressive Era anti-competitive anxieties in trademark and copyright decline - though these continue to prevail through the middle of the twentieth-century in the area of patent law, and intellectual property is envisioned as an economic motor for sustaining growth in developed economies. This article attempts to recover the complexity and the experimentation characteristic of these changes. It emphasizes the ways the post-war paradigm in intellectual property, which we continue to inhabit, extends property protection as it confers a major economic role for products of knowledge. Nevertheless, I also suggest that we have ignored other New Deal legacies: the use of limits, especially anti-competition law, as mechanisms to curb corporation leveraging of rights in markets, the preoccupation with distributive justice in the fields of trademark, copyright, and patent, and, most notably, the New Deal project of combining economic and civic elements of intellectual property to construct a modern form of citizenship.

Muller on The Compact Clause

Derek T. Muller, Notre Dame Law School, takes up the history of the Compact Clause in a new article, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. He has posted only the abstract. The article appeared in Election Law Journal (2007). Here's the abstract:
Despite previous historical failed attempts to abolish the Electoral College at the federal level, in the months following the 2000 election, several lawyers, politicians, and academics concocted a novel plan to abolish the College at the State level. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact would be enacted State by State and require each enacting State to give its electoral votes to the winner of a plurality of the national popular vote.
This Article does not attempt to address the merits or drawbacks of the system as a matter of policy. Instead, Part I begins with a brief history of the Electoral College, how the Compact works, and the current state of affairs regarding the Interstate Compact. In Part II, the Article analyzes the Compact Clause in Article I section 10 clause 3 of the United States Constitution. It first explores the history of the Clause, with roots that can be found in the Articles of Confederation. It then looks to three different theories of interpretation of the Clause: the Boundary Compact Clause, the Non-Political Compact Clause, and the Political Consent Compact Clause, which are progressively more permissive and have been adopted sequentially in some fashion by the Court, most recently accepting the most expansive interpretation. In adopting the Political Consent Compact Clause theory, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress must consent to a Compact that increases State political power at the expense of federal supremacy, but the Court and commentators have been less forthright when addressing the need for consent when a compact implicates the interests of non-compacting sister States. This Article concludes that non-compacting States are a fundamental concern of the Compact Clause alongside concerns of federal supremacy.
In Part III, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is examined and found constitutionally deficient. The Compact is actually a compact under the Compact Clause of the Constitution, because the Court has broadly construed what makes a compact. In particular, because the Compact is not effective until a critical mass of States have enacted it, and because States are constrained from withdrawing from the Compact too close to a presidential election, the Compact falls under constitutional scrutiny. Additionally, the Compact addresses a political matter that affects the interests of non-compacting sister States, and the compacting States enhance their political power at the expense of other States. The Article examines the various defenses of the Compact but finds that none of them overcome the political interests of sister States. Therefore, barring congressional consent, the Interstate Compact would fail.

Lubin, Punishment and Expiation: Overlapping Domains in Brahmanical Law

Timothy Lubin, Washington and Lee University, has posted a new article, Punishment and Expiation: Overlapping Domains in Brahmanical Law. It appeared in Indologica Taurinensia. Here's the abstract:
It has long been debated whether it is possible to distinguish between secular and religious elements in 'Hindu law'. At present, the general view is that law cannot be separated from religion in the Indic context, not least because, according to the Shastras, Veda is the chief source of Dharma. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Dharmashastra incorporates diverse elements: (a) explicitly stated norms of two types: (1) rules derived from priestly ritual codes, and (2) precepts drawn from the Arthashastra (political science) tradition; as well as (b) recognition of the authority of customs specific to region, caste, or profession. Although all these are subsumed within the Brahmanical system, we can discern different conceptions of the relative authority of brahmins and the ruler. This distinction of overlapping spheres of authority is reflected in the treatment of misconduct: the same act may entail punishment by the king as well as distant but automatic consequences due to the operation of karma, consequences that can be averted only by expiatory ritual performances. The ritual impurity of a sin also can have social consequences such as stigma or ostracism, which is likewise removed though expiation. Despite the interlinking of these spheres, their fundamental distinctness is acknowledged in the legal process prescribed in the codes as well as in the glimpses we have of actual legal practice in pre-modern India. Although the Dharmashastra overall represents a system of natural law based on the Brahmanical religious cosmology, it contains within it elements derived from a seemingly positive legal system based on the supreme authority of the king in settling disputes. Further, the distinction between brahmin and royal authority corresponds to a distinction, not between religion and law, but between two parallel and complementary legal subsystems, each with its own set of standards, procedures, and sanctions.

Monday, February 4, 2008

Kedar on David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Army and the Law

Nir Kedar, Bar-Ilan University, has posted another new paper, A Civilian Commander in Chief: David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Army and the Law. The paper draws upon primary sources in the Ben-Gurion Archives. Here's the abstract:
David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime-minister, is regarded more of a `security-minded leader' than a `civilian leader'. Nevertheless, as premier of a fledgling state, he played a major role in shaping Israel's civil institutions and establishing democracy and the rule of law. Even his attitude toward the army and security matters derived from a solidly-constructed civil-legal weltanschauung. This paper demonstrates the civil roots of his concept of army by analyzing his insistent demand for the enactment of a comprehensive and efficient military criminal code (known in Israel as the Military Justice Law).

Kedar on Democracy and Judicial Autonomy in Israel's Early Years

Nir Kedar, Bar-Ilan University, has posted a new paper, Democracy and Judicial Autonomy in Israel's Early Years. Here's the abstract:
The purpose of this article is to examine the question of judicial autonomy in the State of Israel during the first five years of independence in light of the tension prevailing between the idea of judicial autonomy and the principles of democracy and republicanism.Modern political culture in the West assigns great significance to autonomous courts because these institutions, which interpret the law and oversee its implementation, are largely responsible for the actual predominance of the rule of law. Judicial autonomy, however, is in constant tension with the ideas of democracy and individual sovereignty. This tension requires all democracies ruled by law to find a suitable balance between judicial autonomy and the need for democratic monitoring of the judicial authority.The question of judicial autonomy in early Israel deserves renewed attention because current historiographic research tends to describe the judges' status in Israel's early years as inferior to that of their colleagues in Western countries. According to this stance, not only did a long time elapse until judicial autonomy was formally ensured, but the public and government institutions also had little deference for, or understanding of, the judicial branch. This perception was detrimental to the courts' status and threatened their independence.The paper demonstrates that at the time of Israel's establishment judges already enjoyed independence, respect, and high status, and further argues that the attitude of the political elite toward the judges was compatible with the principles of democracy and the rule of law and followed from them.

Sunday, February 3, 2008

Forthcoming Books in African American Studies

Just in time for Black History Month, Choice magazine has posted forthcoming titles in 2008 in African American Studies. Among them is the widely anticipated eight volume African American National Biography, ed. by Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (Oxford, Feb. 2008), which is discussed in a recent Los Angeles Times article, and many other new books, including:

Emmett Till in Literary Memory and Imagination, ed. by Harriet Pollack and Christopher Metress. Louisiana State, Jan. 2008.

Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement, ed. by Peter Wallenstein. University Press of Florida, Jan. 2008.

Telling Histories: Black Women Historians in the Ivory Tower, ed. by Deborah Gray White. N. Carolina, May 2008.

Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans, ed. by Fred Ho and Bill V. Mullen. Duke, May 2008.

Big Enough to Be Inconsistent: Abraham Lincoln Confronts Slavery and Race, by George M. Frederickson. Harvard, Feb. 2008.
Black Communists Speak on Scottsboro: A Documentary History, ed. by Walter T. Howard. Temple, Jan. 2008.

The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, the Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Reconstruction, by Charles Lane. Henry Holt, Apr. 2008.

Harriet Tubman: Myth, Memory, and History, by Milton C. Sernett. Duke, Feb. 2008.

Ralph Johnson Bunche: Public Intellectual and Nobel Peace Laureate, ed. by Beverly Lindsay. Illinois, Feb. 2008e.

The Race Card: How Bluffing about Bias Makes Race Relations Worse, by Richard Thompson Ford. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Jan. 2008.

Race, Class, and the Death Penalty: Capital Punishment in American History, by Howard W. Allen and Jerome M. Clubb with Vincent A. Lacey. SUNY, May 2008.

Transnational Blackness: Navigating the Global Color Line, ed. by Manning Marable and Vanessa Agard-Jones. Palgrave, Jul. 2008.

The full list is here.

The Cost of Scholarship to Non-Elite Law Schools

I've been resisting the temptation to get into the discussion lighting up the legal academic blogs these days: responses to Brian Tamanaha's post on why non-elite schools (I'm guessing that's what US News calls the third and fourth tier, though perhaps that includes some schools in US News' top 100) should avoid interdisciplinary studies. Mary's been talking about the value of interdisciplinary work for a long time. There's a ton to be said here and I hope to talk about applied legal history at some point, though that'll have to wait for another visit since my time is drawing to a close. But right now I don't want to get wrapped into a debate over the value of interdisciplinary work.

Tamanaha's debate has crystalized, it seems to me, into a discussion of the cost of faculty who write scholarship, be it traditional or interdisciplinary. Tamanaha's moved in the direction of discussion of costs of faculty another recent post. It's important to ask what causes the high cost of legal education. It's easy to blame the faculty for them. I want to address a piece of the cost, which I have not yet seen anyone else mention.

One way to run a law school is to do away with the writing component of the job and ask faculty to teach more. And that might make a lot of sense for third and fourth tier law schools. (And I suspect that some third and fourth tier schools already have such a model--at least I suspect that some of those schools' faculty routinely teach more than four courses a year, which is the standard load in law schools these days.) You might think of this as the community college model of running a law school--a faculty of talented, smart, dedicated, excellent teachers.

How much would eliminating writing as a component of the law school faculty duties save our students? Well, there are a bunch of ways of thinking through this. One way is to ask how much we pay faculty and how much we would save if we eliminated those obligations.

So, take a hypothetical fourth tier law school with 21 faculty. Each faculty members costs $110,000 per year and teach 12 hours a year. Then increase their teaching load to 18 hours a year (a three-three load.) That increase by 50% in the teaching load would allow us to reduce the faculty to 14, for a savings of $770,000 per year. If all of that savings were passed on to student body of 630, that's a savings of $1222 per student. That is perhaps not the earth-shaking transformation in legal education (or the cost of it) that we might hope for. Yet, this might very well be something some schools want to do and it's a choice some students might opt for as well.


There's a lot that can and ought to be said for faculty scholarship; this is just a rough attempt to get a handle on the immediate financial costs to the law school.

Perhaps there is more of it already going on than I'm familiar with--but for the moment let's assume that increases in teaching loads beyond 12 hours/year are rare even at fourth tier schools. Why we're not seeing more of this? It would seem to me that there are sufficient opportunities for fourth tier schools to innovate in this direction, if there is a need for this and if it makes sense. In short, I'm wondering, if dropping scholarship is such a great idea, why hasn't it happened yet? I wouldn't imagine that the ABA's accreditation standards (particularly 402) would prevent this change.

Saturday, February 2, 2008

Reviewed: Burnett, Trying Leviathan: The 19th Century NY Case that put the Whale on Trial and Challenged the Order of Nature

TRYING LEVIATHAN: The Nineteenth-Century New York Court Case That Put the Whale on Trial and Challenged the Order of Nature, by D. Graham Burnett (Princeton University Press), is reviewed in the New York Times by Blake Wilson. The book concerns the case of Maurice v. Judd. According to Blake, "in December 1818, lawyers, scientists and laymen convened to argue a proposition before a jury of their peers: is a whale a fish? The case centered on whether a New York statute mandating the inspection of fish oil applied to three casks of whale oil owned by the merchant Samuel Judd. Burnett, an associate professor of history at Princeton, argues that more was at stake: this was a referendum on the status of science in public life." Along the way, Burnett explores "larger questions about the place of science in American society." Blake finds the book "better reading for historians than for a general audience," but if you're reading the Legal History Blog, that means it's just right for you.

Schorr on Blackstone

I'm just back from Sacramento where I tried out a paper on landscape art and antebellum property law at McGeorge Law School, University of the Pacific. It was good to see old friends, like Brian Landsberg whose recent book on the voting rights act, Free at Last To Vote: The Alabama Origins of the Voting Rights Act, you might enjoy. (Brian was with the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department and in Selma the night that Jimmie Lee Jackson was killed in Marion--that's a story for another time, though.) The comments were of great help and perhaps I'll talk a little bit about the paper before I turn into a pumpkin here (i.e., before my visit ends). One conclusion about traveling between Tuscaloosa and Sacramento: you can't get there from here! I saw the sun rise as I was on the first of three flights yesterday (it rose over the Rocky Mountains; quite beautiful, even if I'd rather have been sleeping at the time, as I was on my way from Sacramento to Salt Lake City). Well, airplanes beat the covered wagon, for sure....

You may be interested in "Who Said Blackstone Was a Blackstonian? " by David Schorr of Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law. Here is Professor Schorr's abstract:

Based on Blackstone's famous characterization of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe," "Blackstonian" property has become shorthand for a conception of property as individual, exclusive and absolute dominion. Yet the anointment of Blackstone as the symbol of property absolutism is odd; his characterization of property as sole and despotic dominion is largely at odds with his own exposition of the property law of England. Property in the Commentaries was full of complex arrangements of rights, creating communities with respect to specific assets and recognizing the rights of the community in what was nominally private property. Why has exclusive dominion as a model for property, then, come to be associated with Blackstone, of all people?

This paper begins by surveying the Commentaries, revealing that Blackstone placed property's complexity, and the typical lack of an owner with sole and despotic dominion over an external thing, front and center. Several possible explanations are offered to explain why Blackstone would first characterize property as sole and despotic dominion and give several hundred pages of illustrations undercutting this definition. It shows how Blackstone was long associated in the property context with doctrines portraying property as a bundle of rights, and how only in recent times, particularly in the United States, has Blackstone come to be associated with sole and despotic dominion. Finally, it offers an explanation for the new popularity of Blackstone as the avatar of absolute dominion.
It's available on ssrn.

Historians on the Candidates

Historians have weighed in on the leading presidential candidates of both parties. Jon Weiner has something of a round-up at Huffington Post: If Obama is JFK, Who Does That Make Hillary? Hat tip.

For other takes: Competing Visions of the Presidency by Sean Wilentz; 'The better angels' side with Obama, by Joseph Ellis; Shades of 1960, by Eileen McNamara, and various takes on "Obamarama" on History News Network, including this one by James Livingston. On the primaries themselves, Daniel Galvin, History as a Guide to the Presidential Primaries? Nah… And finally, The Dems are so 20th Century, and the Republicans, so 19th Century by Gil Troy. Hat tips HNN and Cliopatria.

Romero on the Emergence of a Tri-Ethnic Jurisprudence at the End of the 20th Century

Tom Romero II, Hamline University School of Law, has posted a new article, ¿La Raza Latino?: Multiracial Ambivalence, Color Denial, and the Emergence of a Tri-Ethnic Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century. It appeared in the New Mexico Law Review. Here's the abstract:
This article is a recent legal history concerning the complicated, inconsistent, and dramatic transformation in the jurisprudential meaning and legal consequence of race, color and ethnic categories in the last decades of the 20th century. Linking school desegregation, bilingual education, and affirmative action jurisprudence to the dramatic growth of the nation's Latina/o community in the second half of the 20th century, the article documents the reasons behind the inability of American law to understand conceptually the idea of a Latino race.
In particular, the article argues that three United States Supreme Court equality of education cases - Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1973), Lau v. San Francisco Unified School District (1974) and University of California v. Bakke (1978) - formed the foundation of a tri-ethnic jurisprudence. As the issues in each case came to be formulated in the lower courts as a direct result of the presence of Latino and other students of color in the litigation, the article argues that the emerging tri-ethnic jurisprudence minimized or completely obscured the importance of color privilege to the legal analysis. For Latina/os, who historically had been legally racialized as other White and other Black, such a development provided an inconsistent and loosely coherent body of jurisprudence through which to assure equal rights. Ultimately, the article details how such cases reinforces the dichotomies of U.S. law (i.e., Black/White, minority/non-minority, English/non-English, American/non-American) without confronting the distinct racialization of Latina/os in American culture and without acknowledging the emergence of a more complicated color line in a multiracial nation.

Friday, February 1, 2008

Dellapenna on Presidential Authority and the War on Terror

Joseph W. Dellapenna, Villanova University School of Law, has posted an article, Presidential Authority and the War on Terror. It appeared in the ILSA Journal of International Law and Comparative Law. Here's the abstract:
Immediately after the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush claimed, among other powers, the power to launch preemptive wars on his own authority; the power to disregard the laws of war pertaining to occupied lands; the power to define the status and treatment of persons detained as "enemy combatants" in the war on terror; and the power to authorize the National Security Agency to undertake electronic surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. With the exception of the power to launch a preemptive war on his own authority (for which he sought and obtained authorization to use military force from the Congress), he subsequently implemented these claims of power. These were the first steps of an expansive set of claims for the President to act on his own authority during the "war on terror" without regard to whether Congress or the courts would approve or support these decisions. These claims were not an accident. Vice-President Cheney stated publicly, more than once, that these steps were part of a plan to restore the Presidency to "the proper scope" of its powers even more than means to defend the nation. Lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department Justice went out of their way to claim unilateral authority for the President when the claims were unnecessary for the specific policies for which they were invoked. This pattern suggests a goal of aggrandizing Presidential authority beyond defense of the nation, ignoring that the President's duty is to enforce the law, not to break it.
Questions of Presidential authority are important. The framers of the Constitution expected the separation of powers to be the primary protection for liberty. They therefore structured each branch of government's power in ways that allow each to block the others. The framers expected the three branches to contend with each other, and in contending to prevent any single branch from dominating. The framers were prescient - the three branches have contended with each other in shifting balances throughout our history. Yet the recent Presidential claims of unilateral authority in effect would smother the other two branches. Thus far, these claims have been rejected by the Supreme Court, and arguably now by the electorate. But the struggle is not over. Governance during the next two years, and possibly the next presidential election, will turn on these issues.
This article considers whether the claims of unilateral Presidential authority can be sustained in light of constitutional text and tradition, examining the leading instances of legal and political debate regarding the exercise of the relevant powers conferred on the President by the Constitution - primarily the power to command to military, the power to conduct foreign relations, and the power to direct the executive officers of the nation.

Smith on Regulating Paid Household Work

Peggie R. Smith, University of Iowa, has just posted an article, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race and Agendas of Reform. It appeared earlier in the American University Law Review. Here's the abstract:
The Article provides a rare glimpse into the legal status of paid household workers, a segment of the American workforce that stands at the very nexus of the ideological divide between the private family and the public market but which has been consistently ignored within legal scholarship. Drawing from primary sources, the Article examines efforts to transform the relationship between maid and mistress into a modern, regulated employment relationship. The Article accords centrality to the ways in which middle-class women campaigned to improve the labor conditions in domestic service during the Progressive Era and the New Deal for purposes of satisfying their own family needs, as opposed to the economic needs of the workers. As an historical piece, the Article highlights how the dichotomy between home and work impeded the evolution of paid household workers from status to contract. As a contemporary piece, the Article argues that the themes which shaped the historical contest over whether to accord domestic workers the benefits and protections of labor legislation remain with us today. As a group that disproportionately consists of poor women of color, today's paid household workers continue to struggle, trapped between a need to provide for themselves and their families and a legal system that tends to accord them protection as "employees" only when doing so satisfies the interests of middle-class families.

Thursday, January 31, 2008

Tamanaha on The Dark Side of the Relationship between the Rule of Law and Liberalism

Brian Z. Tamanaha, St. Johns University School of Law, has posted a new essay, The Dark Side of the Relationship between the Rule of Law and Liberalism. It is forthcoming in the NYU Journal of Law and Liberty. I would read this along with David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism. Here's the abstract:
Liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law are often thought to constitute a seamless unity, reflected in contemporary Western liberal democracies. That understanding, while not incorrect, does not tell the whole story. This article traces out a long historical pattern in which liberalism and the rule of law have combined to restrict the exercise of democracy. This pattern will be exposed by elaborating on four contexts: the shift in political theory from classical liberalism to modern social welfare liberalism; the shift from the common law to legislation as the primary source of law; resort to the rule of law by liberals from the eighteenth century to the present; and the contemporary implementation of neoliberal reforms in developing countries around the world. The article will argue that liberalism has enjoyed an opportunistic relationship with the rule of law, a relationship which has taken different forms over time, though repeatedly evincing an anti-democratic tendency on behalf of property rights.
This relationship is a source of skepticism about the rule of law, and harbors the potential to discredit the rule of law in the eyes of many around the world. This article lays out this "dark side" of their relationship in an effort to separate what the rule of law requires from what liberalism wants.

Musacchio on Legal Origins, Shareholer Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950

Aldo Musacchio, Harvard Business School, has posted a new paper, Laws vs. Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950. Here's the abstract:
The early development of large multidivisional corporations in Latin America required much more than capable managers, new technologies, and large markets. Behind such corporations was a market for capital in which entrepreneurs had to attract investors to buy either debt or equity. This paper examines the investor protections included in corporate bylaws that enabled corporations in Brazil to attract investors in large numbers, thus generating a relatively low concentration of ownership and control in large firms before 1910. Archival evidence such as company statutes and shareholder lists document that in many Brazilian corporations voting rights provisions, in particular, maximum vote provisions and graduated voting scales (that provided for less than proportional votes as shareholdings increase), balanced the relative voting power of small and large investors. In companies with such provisions the concentration of ownership and control is shown to have been significantly lower than in the average company. Overall, from the sample of Brazilian companies studied it seems like the concentration of control was significantly lower before 1910 than what it is today.

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Olivas on Hernandez v. Texas, a Litigation History

Michael A. Olivas, University of Houston Law Center, has posted a new essay, Hernandez v. Texas, a Litigation History. It appeared in Colored Men and Hombres Aqui, Hernandez v. Texas and the Emergence of Mexican American Lawyering, Michael A. Olivas, ed. (2006). Here's the abstract:

An important case was decided by a unanimous United State Supreme Court in May, 1954, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren. It invoked race, which had been employed by the State in a way to marginalize a discrete racial group, and formulated Equal Protection. The term "Colored Men" figured in it. Brown v. Board of Education? No¿the case was Hernandez v. Texas, written at the same time as Brown, by the same Court, and was published in the 1954 Supreme Court Reports just before Brown. This criminal law companion to Brown involved all white juries in Mexican-Jim Crow Texas, and has been all-but-forgotten in the bright light accorded Brown. But its anti-subordination language, small town sociology, and bathroom signage (the men's room sign, invoked by Justice Warren, read "Colored Men" and "Hombres Aqui" (Men Here). The case was also the first case argued by Mexican American lawyers before the Supreme Court. This study draws upon previously-unexamined archival materials and newspaper accounts, as well as information from the lawyers who tried the 1954 case.

Quinn on the Nation's First Criminal Domestic Violence Court

Mae C. Quinn, University of Tennessee, has posted a new article, Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second Look at the Nation's First Criminal Domestic Violence Court. It is forthcoming in the Akron Law Review, in a symposium issue on The New Face of Women’s Legal History. Here's the abstract:
Many proclaim that criminal domestic violence courts -- specialized court parts that focus on intimate violence cases and utilize a particularized approach in such prosecutions to prevent further violence -- are a recent innovation within our criminal justice system. Most observers point to the Quincy District Court in Massachusetts, which opened in 1987, as the first venue in this country to offer specialized processing of criminal domestic abuse prosecutions. In the two decades since the Quincy court opened its doors, other jurisdictions have developed similar models using similar specialized approaches. For example, court planners in New York assert its first criminal domestic violence court, building on the Quincy model, was established in Brooklyn in 1996.
These contemporary accounts of judicial innovation fail to acknowledge, however, that a somewhat similar experiment in specially adjudicating domestic violence prosecutions was undertaken more than fifty years ago in New York. In 1946, Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross established New York State's first criminal domestic violence court within New York City's Magistrate's Court system. The Home Term Part, as Kross's court was called, was a groundbreaking experiment in criminal justice that sought to employ a particularized approach in domestic violence cases to address charges of assault, harassment, disorderly conduct and other abuses. Nevertheless, Kross, one of New York's first women judges, and her early attempts at judicial innovation like the Home Term Part, have been largely forgotten by legal historians and court reformers alike.
This paper seeks to inform current conversations about dedicated domestic violence courts by shedding light on Kross's remarkable early efforts to treat domestic violence prosecutions differently from other criminal matters and handle them in a designated court part. The story of Kross's Home Term Part - the first specialized criminal domestic violence court in New York and probably the United States -- is an important chapter in the history of intimate violence policies in this country. Its recognition is crucial to any complete account and understanding of our criminal justice system's renewed efforts at judicial innovation through specialized problem-solving courts. And although many features of Home Term would be viewed as objectionable by modern standards, it may also provide important insights to contemporary court reformers as they consider the future of domestic violence prosecutions.

Photo credit.

Tuesday, January 29, 2008

Super Crunchers and Antebellum Legal History

On the heels of the post on the relationship between Kyra Sedgwick and an 1830 novel featuring the auction of a landscape painting, here's something else that you wouldn't think would go together: Ian Ayers' Super Crunchers and the study of antebellum legal history.

I've been saying for years (this prediction goes back to about 1989) that full text databases of antebellum case reports will revolutionize how we think about antebellum legal history. It's been about a decade since westlaw and lexis have had the antebellum state reports on-line and so far, we're still waiting to realize their full promise. Part of this may be because legal historians have gone in so many different directions of late that we're no longer as concerned with antebellum legal history as we were in the days when Horwitz' Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 was published. I think one of the many attractions of Horwitz was that he brought the insights of law and economics to bear on antebellum jurisprudence. Horwitz and Posner did not share a political agenda, but they shared an intellectual agenda: talking about how, throughout American legal history, economic considerations were important to judges. We're now talking more about nationality, civil rights, criminal law, women, slavery and Jim Crow, all sorts of areas that were not so hot in the 1970s and 1980s. But that's a discussion for another time.

Still, I think there are important insights--low hanging fruit to use the common phrase--to be mined from the hundreds of volumes ready for full text searching. And that's where Super Crunchers comes in, with its contagious enthusiasm for looking at large datasets.

What do I want to mine from antebellum cases? Well, lots of cool stuff to be done on webs of citations (which states are citing which states and when) and other stuff, too. But right now I'm thinking about it for a different purpose. I'm in the midst of a paper on antebellum landscape art and property law. It's tentatively titled "property and progress," with apologies to Henry George and Stephen Thernstrom, of course. Not surprisingly, Asher Durand's Progress (1853) (housed in the fabulous Warner-Westervelt Musuem in Tuscaloosa, Alabama and used as an illustration here) is a centerpiece of the talk. So I've been interested in how judges talk about progress and the even more popular nineteenth century term "Civilization." All of that led me to westlaw's old cases database, where there are nearly three hundred cases that use the word "civilization" before the Civil War. Not quite super-cruncher numbers, but perhaps enough instances to see the ways judges using the term. Seems to me we could create a pretty cool map of the terrain of judges' minds by studying such phrases. There are enough uses of the word that we can begin to see how judges use it and in what kinds of cases. There are probably a lot of other words and phrases that we might use, like sentiment, utility, expediency, feudalism.... Sort of like a small version of the amazon.com algorithm that tells me what books I should read, in light of the books I've already purchased. As Ayers' says, amazon knows more about my preferences than I do--and he's right.

Gale's Making of Modern Law series, which has more than 20,000 volumes on English and American law from 1800 to 1920 is another fabulous source. book.google.com has helped out in huge ways , too. One of the many insights here: I was interested in Bill Bojangles Robinson of late, because I was involved in a conversation with my favorite librarian about him. That led to me ask about the statue put up in Richmond back when I lived there to commemorate him. And that led me to learn that some people credited him with popularizing "copasetic" and that led me to a wikipedia entry that says copasetic was first used in 1919. But, ah, through the magic of book.google, there appears to be a use in 1914!

The difficult part, now that all this information is such much more easily available, of course, is to know what to do with it. The puts an even greater premium on interpretation, now that anyone with access to the internet can get at overwhelming amounts of text on the antebellum era. ...

Smythe and Bird on The Structure of American Legal Institutions and the Diffusion of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 1978-99

Donald J. Smythe, California Western School of Law, and Robert C. Bird, University of Connecticut, have posted a new article, The Structure of American Legal Institutions and the Diffusion of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 1978-99. It is forthcoming in the Law and Society Review. Here's the abstract:
This article evaluates how the social structure of American legal institutions influenced the diffusion of wrongful-discharge laws over the period from 1978-1999 and assesses whether economic or political variables influenced the diffusion process. The results are surprising and quite striking. Precedents by other courts within the same federal circuit region were generally more influential in the diffusion process than precedents by courts in neighboring states or by courts within the same census or West legal reporting region, even though the precedents were on matters of state law rather than federal law and the decisions were usually made by state courts rather than federal courts. There is some evidence that political variables may also have been a factor, but economic variables did not appear to be particularly important, even though the new employment laws may have had important economic consequences.

Monday, January 28, 2008

Schiller on The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law

The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administration Law by Reuel E. Schiller, UC Hastings, recently appeared in the Michigan Law Review. Here's the abstract:

The first two terms of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency (1933–1941) were periods of great administrative innovation. Responding to the Great Depression, Congress created scores of new administrative agencies charged with overseeing economic policy and implementing novel social welfare programs. The story of the constitutional difficulties that some of these policy innovations encountered is a staple of both New Deal historiography and the constitutional history of twentieth-century America. There has been very little writing, however, about how courts and the New Deal–era administrative state interacted after these constitutional battles ended. Having overcome constitutional hurdles, these administrative agencies still had to interact with the judiciary in their day-to-day operations. This Article examines this interaction. In particular, it shows how Roosevelt’s appointees to the federal bench changed administrative law so as to dramatically diminish the role of the judiciary in the administrative process. The New Dealers espoused what I will call a “prescriptive” vision of policymaking in which expert administrators implemented the policy desires that emerged from the democratic process. There was little room for courts in this vision of policymaking. This era of judicial passivity was short lived, but it firmly defined the role of expertise in the administrative state and created the model of judicial deference that would be both emulated and reacted against as administrative law developed during the rest of the twentieth century.

Barron and Lederman on The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING by David J. Barron, Harvard, and Martin S. Lederman , Georgetown, recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review. Here's the abstract:
Over the past half-century, discussions of constitutional war powers have focused on the scope of the President’s “inherent” power as Commander in Chief to act in the absence of congressional authorization. In this Article, Professors Barron and Lederman argue that attention should now shift to the fundamental question of whether and when the President may exercise Article II war powers in contravention of congressional limitations, when the President’s authority as Commander in Chief is at its “lowest ebb.” Contrary to the traditional assumption that Congress has ceded the field to the President when it comes to war, the Commander in Chief often operates in a legal environment instinct with legislatively imposed limitations. In the present context, the Bush Administration has been faced with a number of statutes that clearly conflict with its preferred means of prosecuting military conflicts. The Administration’s response, based on an assertion of preclusive executive war powers, has been to claim the constitutional authority to disregard many of these congressional commands.
This Article is the first of a two-part effort to determine how the constitutional argument concerning such preclusive executive war powers is best conceived. Professors Barron and Lederman demonstrate that, notwithstanding recent attempts to yoke the defense of executive defiance in wartime to original understandings, there is surprisingly little historical evidence supporting the notion that the conduct of military campaigns is beyond legislative control. Thus stripped of its assumed roots in a supposedly longstanding tradition, and considered in light of the long pattern of executive acceptance of constraining statutes, the Administration’s recent assertion of preclusive war powers is revealed as a radical attempt to remake the constitutional law of war powers.
This Article begins by explaining why the debate about the “lowest ebb” is now emerging as the primary constitutional war powers question, and by addressing the methodological missteps that have typically infected this debate. It then explores recent attempts to identify the preclusive prerogatives of the Commander in Chief and explains why the tests often deployed to cabin the scope of the presumed preclusive power are flawed. Finally, it reviews the relevant Supreme Court precedent, along with the constitutional text, the historical context in which the text was written, and the original understandings, and sets the stage for the post-Founding historical review contained in the next Article.

Sunday, January 27, 2008

This is Not a Blog (re: NYRB)

An interesting picture of the blog world emerges from Sarah Boxer's essay "Blogs," in the February 14 issue of the New York Review of Books, now on-line and in your mailbox. What are blogs like? A characteristic feature is bloggy writing. According to Boxer, "Bloggers thrive on fragmented attention and dole it out too....And if they can't put quite the right inflection on a sentence, they'll often use an OMG (Oh my god!) or an emoticon, e.g., a smiley face :-) or a wink ;-) or a frown :-( instead of words." How do blogs operate? "The law of the blogosphere is Hobbesian: survival of the snarkiest." What are bloggers like? "Bloggers have fouler mouths, tougher hides, and cooler thesauruses than most of the people I've read in print." They are fixated on superheroes. Their writing is "grandiose, dreamy, private, free-associative, infantile, sexy, petty, dirty."

OMG! What am I doing wrong? (LOL).

There are, thankfully, many corners of the blogosphere. It doesn't paint an accurate picture to collapse us all into the sort of writing we may have enjoyed in 6th grade. To characterize the blog world this way is something like writing an essay on literature, but only taking up the romance novel. The kind of blogs Boxer writes about are an important cultural innovation (whether we like them or not), and there are common attributes across genres -- most importantly the issue of connection with sources in the rest of the web, something that has not yet effectively come to the on-line versions of traditional journalism. Even Boxer's essay lacks links to the blogs she mentions.

The blog world is also a place for writers who have things to say that won't make it into a newspaper, and sometimes things that need to be said more quickly than a print publication cycle would allow. Blogs like this really are blogs, not some second category of writers who don't have the hang of the genre yet.

Boxer's essay mentions, but does not really engage, a list of blog-related books, including Daniel Solove's important new work, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University Press). Others are: We've Got Blog: How Weblogs Are Changing Our Culture, ed. John Rodzvilla (Basic Books); Against the Machine: Being Human in the Age of the Electronic Mob by Lee Siegel (Spiegel and Grau); Republic.com 2.0 by Cass R. Sunstein (Princeton University Press); Blogwars by David D. Perlmutter (Oxford University Press); We're All Journalists Now: The Transformation of the Press and Reshaping of the Law in the Internet Age by Scott Gant (Free Press); Blog: Understanding the Information Reformation That's Changing Your World by Hugh Hewitt (Nelson Books); The Cult of the Amateur: How Today's Internet Is Killing Our Culture by Andrew Keen (Doubleday/Currency); Naked Conversations: How Blogs Are Changing the Way Businesses Talk with Customers by Robert Scoble and Shel Israel (Wiley); Blog! How the Newest Media Revolution Is Changing Politics, Business, and Culture by David Kline and Dan Burstein.
[More links to follow later -- this blogger has an off-line deadline today! ;-)]