Saturday, December 16, 2006

Bebchuk & Hamdani on the History of Federal Corporate Law

Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard and Assaf Hamdani, Bar Ilan University, have a new article: Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History. Here's the abstract:
This paper analyzes the history of federal intervention in corporate law and draws from it lessons for the future. We show that federal intervention has generally not alternated between tightening state law restrictions on corporate insiders and relaxing them. Rather, federal law has systematically replaced state law arrangements with ones imposing tighter constraints on insiders. Without federal intervention, state law would have produced a corporate system that provides substantially weaker investor protection than the United States enjoys today. We also show that federal interventions have systematically taken advantage of additional tools (including public enforcement, criminal sanctions, gatekeeper liability, and agency-based regulations) beyond those that state law has chosen or been able to use. Overall, unless one views existing levels of investor protection as substantially excessive, past patterns suggest that state competition on its own is unlikely to produce an adequate level of investor protection. Furthermore, the recurring need for federal officials to rectify state law failures in order to provide investors with adequate protection indicates that federal lawmaking should be proactive rather than reactive. We thus recommend that, going forward, federal policymakers examine in a systematic and comprehensive fashion which corporate law areas should be federalized either because tighter restrictions on insiders are needed or because the additional tools available to federal law would be useful.

1 comment:

Shag from Brookline said...

Consider the non-federal uniform laws adopted by many states, especially those that impact commercial activities. Nationally, the legal profession had been quite astute in the 20th century in framing and pushing for the adoption of such uniform laws. Now if the commerce clause stuck to "originalism" such as that suggested by Justice Thomas rather than the New Deal approach, what protection might investors have?