Wednesday, November 18, 2026

ASLH John Phillip Reid Book Award to Lew-Williams

Continuing our notices of the prizes, awards, and fellowships given out at this year's meeting of the American Society for Legal History, we now turn to the winner of the John Phillip Reid Book Award ("awarded annually for the best monograph by a mid-career or senior scholar, published in English in any of the fields defined broadly as Anglo-American legal history"):

Beth Lew-Williams, John Doe, Chinaman: A Forgotten History of Chinese Life under American Racial Law (Belknap/Harvard University Press).

Lew-Williams offers a revelatory, kaleidoscopic, and engrossing analysis of how Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans on the West Coast endured, challenged, and maneuvered around thousands of anti-Chinese laws from the 1850s to the 1920s. Contesting the dominant historiographical frame of exclusion, she focuses on the changing legal modes of “conditional inclusion.” While their labor was in demand, and while they held basic civil rights from 1870 on, the Chinese faced discrimination in myriad ways in economic, residential, cultural, and political terrains. From the outset, they launched lawsuits, submitted petitions, and organized resistance to racialized enforcement. Their efforts rewrote the most damaging terms of their inclusion and put limits on the metastasizing form of white supremacy “tailored just for them.”
 
The book models how to do legal history that integrates all manner of court records, state and federal legislation, city ordinances, police records, business ledgers, media accounts, memoirs, and more. Much of the extensive research rests on difficult-to-access archives across three states—California, Oregon, and Washington. The book is brilliantly organized and hard-to-put-down, with each chapter anchored by vivid and often-unfamiliar stories and voices from Chinese Westerners of all ages. Perhaps most haunting are the inescapable instances of white record-keepers who disregarded individuals’ true names in favor of demeaning placeholders such as ‘John Doe Chinaman’ and ‘China Mary’.  

-- Karen Tani 

Mikhail Reviews Allen's "Radical Duke"

My Georgetown Law colleague John Mikhail has published a review in American Heritage of Danielle Allen's Radical Duke: How One Aristocrat—and the American Revolution—Transformed Britain.  The book, Professor Mikhail writes:

tells the story of a remarkable outlier. Charles Lennox, the third Duke of Richmond, third Duke of Lennox, and Duke of Aubigny in the French nobility (1735–1806), emerges from her dramatic narrative as one of the most important and underappreciated persons in late 18th-century Britain. “Richmond was a defining figure of the revolutionary age,” Allen writes, as influential, in certain respects, as Thomas Paine, Edmund Burke, and King George III himself.
Among the startling claims that propel Radical Duke is that Richmond was the mastermind behind the Junius letters (1769-1772), a famous series of anonymous attacks on the British government, for which he recruited a dream team of gifted writers, including Paine, Burke, James Burgh, Philip Francis, and John Wilkes. Allen also maintains that Richmond collaborated with Paine and Benjamin Franklin on The Juryman’s Touchstone (1771), an obscure 95-page pamphlet that blasted Lord Mansfield for his handling of the seditious libel trial of Henry Woodfall, the publisher of the Junius letters.

If these claims are true, they place Richmond at the center of a group of radical thinkers and writers who shaped revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic.

Professor Mikhail calls Radical Duke is “captivating,” but he believes that it “appears to rest on a number of questionable assumptions.” One is that a copy of the Declaration of Independence that ended up in Sussex was Tom Paine’s gift to Richmond.  Another is that Professor Allen could safely rely upon factual statements emailed to her by an editor of Paine's papers who was not professionally trained as a historian and who apparently has not submitted his findings to peer review.  A third was that the “automated computer authorship attribution methodology" that that editor employed is in fact dependable.

"Allen may turn out to be correct about her daring new theories in Radical Duke," Professor Mikhail concludes, but "significantly more evidence and explanation are needed to turn [her] speculations into persuasive historical arguments."

--Dan Ernst 

ASLH Peter Gonville Stein Book Award to Cheta

As usual around this time of year, we will be spending the next few weeks passing along news of the awards, prizes, and fellowships that were announced at this year's meeting of the American Society for Legal History. First up: the winner of this year's Peter Gonville Stein Book Award (awarded annually for the best book in non-US legal history written in English):

Omar Cheta, How Commerce Became Legal: Merchants and Market Governance in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Stanford University Press).

Omar Cheta has marked out a remarkable terrain at the intersection of law and economic life in nineteenth-century Egypt. In How Commerce Became Legal, Cheta draws on a rich set of local records—court records, mercantile correspondence, and private materials—to bring to life a mid-nineteenth-century moment in which merchants were able to enter the arena of commerce on a new scale, following the state’s relaxation of its monopolies on the sale of cotton. These merchants became increasingly invested in developing a legal infrastructure to guide their new commercial activities, and the merchant courts served that purpose admirably. Rather than focusing on the courts themselves, however, Cheta tells this story through the colorful cast of characters who moved through and around them. Readers meet the Alexandrian merchant Butrus Tawil, who was active in the cotton trade during the mid-nineteenth-century boom; the father-and-son duo Musa and Hassan Al-ʿAqqad, both merchants and landowners with close ties to the Khedival state, whose activities in Sudan generated wealth for them in Cairo; and the advocate Tito Figaro, a Damascus-born Italian who studied law in Paris on a scholarship from the Egyptian government before returning to establish a private practice at a time when few did so. Through these figures, Cheta makes new claims about the relationship between law and commerce at a decidedly global moment in Egyptian history: a moment in which Egypt’s cotton fields became deeply integrated into global markets amid the shifting tides of industrial textile production and the vicissitudes of the American Civil War. How Commerce Became Legal is about commerce, of course—but it is also about the place of law in mediating the process by which global capitalism articulated with Alexandria, Cairo, and the Egyptian countryside.

Honorable Mention:

Daniel Lord Smail, Magdelena Coline: A Life Beyond Slavery in Mediterranean Europe (Princeton University Press). 

-- Karen Tani

Brady on Story on General Law

Maureen E. Brady, Harvard Law School, has posted Story's Anxiety: The Problem of the Local in General Law, which is forthcoming in University of Chicago Law Review Online:

Joseph Story (NYPL)
A century ago, general law occupied an uneasy place in the American legal system. Back in its heyday, dusty corners of private law were the areas most affected by the general law versus local law question. Today, its comeback involves much more glamorous terrain: the federal Constitution. This Essay argues that before and after Swift v. Tyson, general law could neither answer nor escape the question of how much local variation to tolerate. “Story’s anxiety” is the gap between Justice Story’s aspiration of one law—not one at Rome, another at Athens—and the reality that certain corners of private law persistently arose out of local circumstances or depended in part on local content.

Disagreement over the permissible scale and legal force of local private law and local custom long predated Swift. At the height of the general law era, local practice entered general law in at least three ways. It could supply the content of a general standard, as with ordinary diligence. It could define how rights were acquired and recognized, as with possession or the creation and recognition of western water rights. Finally, a local practice could become the general standard, as some of the general law cases on negligence and due care illustrate. A principle framed abstractly enough to accommodate local conditions may be nominally uniform, but it could produce radically different outcomes on the ground. A rule specific enough to guarantee uniform outcomes gains determinacy, but risks illegitimacy as it grows disconnected from local practices and expectations.

This trade-off becomes especially consequential when general private law is incorporated into federal constitutional law. At Swift’s apex, state courts remained free to reject a federal court’s view of general private law as wrong in intrastate tort, contract, or property cases. When the Supreme Court canonizes a particular understanding of general private law as the only constitutionally permissible one, state courts and legislatures lose that freedom, and federal courts lose an important feedback loop they had in the Swift era: state courts rejecting or distinguishing their general law approaches. If Justice Story’s aspirations for the general law are having a revival, his anxiety deserves one too.

 --Dan Ernst

CLH 14:2

The complete issue 14:2 of Comparative Legal History is not yet available, but several articles are and are open-access.  One is When did China have law? A genealogical approach to Chinese legal history by Cho Kiu Chiang.  From the introduction:

This article starts with a question that the current literature tends not to ask: when did China have law? Scholarship usually asks instead whether China has law, and divides between those who answer yes and those who answer no.Footnote1 Both answers take for granted what most requires explanation – that ‘law’ is a settled category whose fit with Chinese normative orders can be determined by definition. This article proceeds differently. It argues that ‘Chinese law’ is itself a historical product: Chinese normative orders became intelligible as ‘law’, to foreign observers and, more importantly, to Chinese people (especially the officials, elites, intellectuals, and so on), through episodes of translation and legal encounter across the nineteenth century

A second is Between usury and legitimate profit: confessional normative frameworks and the five per cent contract in early modern Germany by Paolo Astorri:

This article examines how confessional normative frameworks shaped the regulation of financial transactions in early modern Germany through a comparison of the Jesuit theologian Gregorio de Valencia (1549–1603) and the Lutheran theologian Theodor Thumm (1586–1630). Both addressed the so-called five per cent contract, a financial arrangement designed to secure a fixed annual return while formally avoiding the prohibition of interest. Valencia developed a casuistic analysis centred on the nature of the contract, valid legal title, and the intention of the parties. Thumm, by contrast, evaluated the legitimacy of profit primarily through Scripture, Christian charity, and the authority of the political magistrate. The article argues that these distinct confessional frameworks shaped understandings of legitimate profit, risk, contractual justice, and the relationship between conscience and political authority.
A third is Jurisdiction and foreign privileges: judge conservators of nations in Portugal and Spain (fourteenth to nineteenth centuries) by Héctor Domínguez Benito.

This article compares the emergence, evolution and decline of the judge conservators of nations in Portugal and Spain. These magistrates were appointed to hear, as a first instance forum, disputes involving members of privileged foreign nations. Their authorisation was generally required for any restriction of liberty imposed by local authorities on such foreigners, and they also oversaw the administration of their property in cases of intestate succession. Their main purpose was to ensure the fair and swift handling of foreigners’ legal affairs. The article shows that, in both kingdoms, their jurisdiction and powers were not always clearly defined neither in privilege grants nor in treaties, and that the customary practices of officeholders often reinforced a degree of uncertainty. At the same time, a marked contrast emerges when comparing the circumstances and chronology of their creation and disappearance.

In addition, a forum is open access until the end of the year.  Here is the abstract for its introduction, From Slavery to Land Ownership?

The 2025 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History included a roundtable discussion of James Q Whitman’s From Masters of Slaves to Lords of Lands: The Transformation of Ownership in the Western World (Cambridge University Press 2025). Whitman’s book argues that in the Roman world the paradigmatic form of property was not ownership of land but of people, and that this paradigm continued to influence Western law through modern times, even as it slowly came to be displaced by a conception of property centred on ownership of land, one that still retains traces of the older way of thinking about property. The book’s bold thesis and remarkably longue durée approach seemed destined to spark further inquiry and debate, and so (at Ron Harris’s suggestion) we invited the participants in the roundtable to continue their discussion in these pages. 

Clifford Ando, Lauren Benton, and Whitman himself took us up on the invitation, and offer here three different takes on Whitman’s thesis, though that is perhaps too cribbed a way of describing the learned and wide-ranging essays before us. Ando and Benton each take one chronological end of Whitman’s thesis as their point of departure: Ando, a historian of ancient Rome and its law, emphasises the difficulties inhering in uncovering early Roman law and outlines some of the complexities facing students of Roman conceptions of property, in both slaves and in land. Benton, a legal historian of modern European empires, looks at varying ways in which property in persons and in land was conceived in European empires (by Europeans as well as others), with Roman conceptions interacting with norms of other origins. She illuminates, too, how Roman law on these matters at times reflected broader, global, legal practice. Finally, Whitman responds to the other discussants, passionately arguing for a distinction between the study of historical normative orders and the history of facts, an argument with implications for our discipline that go far beyond the four corners of the already broad canvas of the discussion of property law paradigms in the West.

--Dan Ernst

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Crum on "Liquidating Reconstruction"

Travis Crum, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, has posted Liquidating Reconstruction, which is forthcoming in the Michigan Law Review:

Post-ratification history has long been used as evidence of original understanding. But in recent years, post-ratification history has been invoked more expansively. Under the liquidation theory of constitutional interpretation, a course of deliberate practice can liquidate and thus settle the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional provision. As in other areas of constitutional law, the Founding and its aftermath loom large, and liquidation has been developed under the assumption that those who adopted a constitutional provision will remain in power and implement it in good faith.

But Reconstruction, Redemption, and Jim Crow problematize this newfound fascination with post-ratification history. The Reconstruction Amendments were backed almost exclusively by Republicans. After these Amendments’ adoptions, Republicans passed several enforcement acts protecting the rights of freedpeople, which are persuasive evidence of the original understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments. Reconstruction, however, was notoriously short-lived. As Democrats seized power across the South, they undermined Reconstruction’s gains and disenfranchised the overwhelming majority of Black men. This backsliding raises the question whether Redemption and Jim Crow liquidated—and thus subverted—the Reconstruction Amendments.

This Article unpacks numerous open questions about liquidation with an eye toward Reconstruction and its downfall. Using voting qualifications as a case study, this Article outlines how certain potential factors in the liquidation analysis—such as contemporaneousness, duration, motive, and democratic assent—impact the analysis of the Reconstruction Amendments. Specifically, if liquidation counts noncontemporaneous practices and does not require democratic assent, then Redemption and Jim Crow plausibly—and alarmingly—liquidated the Reconstruction Amendments. More broadly, this Article posits that liquidation may need to be tailored for the Reconstruction Amendments and that a deferential approach to Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority may be a preferable solution that sidesteps many of liquidation’s pitfalls.

This Article is particularly timely as next year marks the 150th anniversary of the end of Reconstruction. Our nation must reckon with the consequences of Reconstruction’s failure. This Article calls for constitutional law and liquidation theory to take that tragedy seriously.

--Dan Ernst 

Brinkley's "Justice Was Her Calling"

Jennifer L. Brinkley, University of Dayton Law, has published Justice Was Her Calling: The Fierce and Fascinating Life of Dorothy Kenyon (University of California Press):

Justice Was Her Calling is the first full-length biography of the New York judge, lawyer, and civil liberties champion whose litigation strategies helped transform the Equal Protection Clause into a powerful tool for women’s rights. Across decades, from the Progressive Era through the New Deal and into the rise of second-wave feminism, Dorothy Kenyon stood at the forefront of reform.

A longtime ACLU national board member, the only woman appointed by the League of Nations to study women’s legal status worldwide, and a US delegate to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, Kenyon pushed equality onto the global stage long before it was widely embraced. Her career was nearly undone when Senator Joseph McCarthy named her first on his list of alleged communists, a spurious accusation that cast a lasting shadow.

Drawing on letters, speeches, and fresh archival research, Jennifer L. Brinkley restores Kenyon to her rightful status as a legal pioneer and reminds us that civil liberties endure only when defended.

Professor Brinkley will discuss her book at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst on November 19,  4:00 pm - 5:30 pm ET 

Monday, November 16, 2026

JACH 4:4


The Journal of American Constitutional History completes its fourth full year of quarterly publication with issue 4:4, now available online:

Constitutional Interpretation without a Constitution: Debating Union in the Early United States
Jonathan Gienapp

Debates over the American union that preceded the drafting of the U.S. Constitution of 1787 are often overlooked, but they had lasting significance. In particular, because these early debates followed an unusual path, they helped entrench a particular interpretive habit: deciphering the powers of the United States required first understanding the nature of the United States. Before American statesmen had codified articles of union outlining the formal powers of the national government, that government was exercising broad power to prosecute the war for American independence. This experience taught American statesmen how to engage in constitutional interpretation without a formal constitution at hand—by debating the unwritten constitution of union that all were capable of discerning and delineating. That habit of interpreting union first and constitution second did not disappear once formal constitutional documents were adopted but rather deeply shaped constitutional interpretation for decades to come.
A Patchwork Oligarchy: State Court Approaches to the Police Power During the Progressive Era
Joseph A. Ranney

During the Progressive Era (1890-1920), reform-minded politicians and jurists criticized court decisions cabining legislative use of the police power to meet the needs of a society and economy increasingly based on collective rather than individual forces. Many accused the courts of using doctrines (collectively labeled substantive due process) to preserve an inequitable economic and political order; others argued that the courts’ decisions were legally principled, not political. The debate continues to this day. Most scholars have concentrated on federal rather than state court decisions and have failed to test each side’s arguments through systematic analysis of court decisions. This article is an initial effort to fill both gaps.

The article examines the Supreme Court decisions of six states—New York, Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina, Colorado and California—from multiple perspectives including the proportion of police-power laws each of these courts struck down over the course of the Progressive Era, and their approaches to different categories of laws that came before them for constitutional review. The six courts listened to Progressive criticisms: as those criticisms peaked (1909-1913) the courts’ strike-down rates began to decline, and they continued to do so until the end of the Era in 1920. Judicial use of the doctrine most frequently invoked in striking down police-power laws, namely due process as a shield of property and liberty rights, also declined.

Not all categories of police-power laws met with judicial hostility. Business regulation laws, labor laws, and laws authorizing government enterprises were the most likely to be struck down, but public health and safety laws and sumptuary laws received substantial judicial deference throughout the Progressive Era. There was also variation among the six states. Five followed the pattern of strike-down rate decline during the late Progressive Era but at different paces, and North Carolina’s Supreme Court maintained a very low rate throughout the Era. It remains to be seen whether other state courts responded to Progressive criticisms in similar ways, but the consistency of patterns among six states from different regions suggests that that may be the case.

The Chief Magistrate
Daniel D. Slate

This Article recovers an overlooked historical source for the American presidency and identifies its implications for executive power. Founding-era portrayals of the “‘Hebrew Republic”’ not only had not only an exclusionary influence that forever delegitimized kings in America but also shaped the creation of the Article II executive. Cognate scholarly disciplines, including history and political theory, have recently acknowledged the decisive influence the Hebrew Republic had on early modern theories of constitutional government, including those of the American Revolution. The legal community has yet to grapple with the implications of these recently rediscovered sources for current debates about executive power. Additionally, although the broader scholarly recovery of Hebraic republicanism and its influence has focused on its antimonarchism, to date there has to date been little study of the model of executive power internal to the Hebrew Republic. This Article initiates that study and argues that model had a significant effect on Founding-era thinking about what made for an ideal republican executive and ultimately shaped the Article II presidency. Although the delegates to the 1787 Federal Convention arrived divided, differing sharply on about what an executive for a national republic ought to look like, by the end of the Convention the president they instituted shared a remarkably close resemblance to the chief magistrate of the Hebraic republicans, including: (1) being commander in chief of a federated polity’s national military efforts, yet being neither king nor dictator; (2) operating through the rule of law and being subject to legal process, including criminal penalties and removal from office; (3) sharing significant powers concurrently with a senate; (4) being constitutionally required to be a natural-born citizen; (5) being the only national figure acclaimed as the representative of the people at large; and (6) bearing the non-kingly title of President. My claim is not that the writings of the Hebraic republicans are the only pertinent source material, but rather that studying their effect on Founding-era America is necessary for any analysis of the original presidency that aspires to be comprehensive and account for all relevant historical evidence. One implication of my argument is that we should resist recent attempts to give a “royalist” interpretation to the Article II presidency. Instead, this Article argues that our law should reflect that the president shares many of the features of the Hebraic republicans’ chief magistrate, including: being always and immutably subject to the rule of law (and not in any way above it); being a decidedly republican and not a royalist executive; and, when exercising discretionary powers, doing so in ways controlled by respect for the worth of the individual person, even under the exigent pressures of emergency and crisis.

--Dan Ernst 

Electing Women Judges: Moving Beyond Famous Firsts

The 2026 election blue tsunami included women judges, most prominently, the Texas Supreme Court, which is now majority women. It joins 20 other states that boast female majorities. Yet in 8 states, there is only one woman on the highest state court. Overall, women are 43 percent of state supreme courts. Which still lags behind women’s proportion of the general population (51 percent), JD graduates (55 percent), and law students (56 percent).


Ohio Supreme Court, 1932
courtesy of Bowling Green University Library,
Center for Archival Collections

A Long Time Coming

After Florence Allen was elected the nation’s first woman state supreme court judge in 1922 Ohio, it would take another 60 years until another woman was elected to that court. It was 40 years until a woman was elected to any state supreme court. A similar delay was seen on the federal court of decades after Allen’s appointment in 1934. I detail this in my new book, The First Woman Judge: The Life & Legacy of Florence Allen (UC Press 2026). 

In the long run, Allen’s legacy won out, but it was muted by the glacial pace of appointing women judges. . . .   


The next woman appointed to the Sixth Circuit, by President Jimmy Carter in 1979, twenty years after Allen’s retirement, was conservative Michigan jurist Cornelia Kennedy, initially nominated to the district court by President Richard Nixon. Judge Kennedy ruled against women in a ban on coed sports, upheld the right of voters to restrict civil rights for LGBTQ people, vacated Detroit school desegregation remedies, ruled against Black plaintiffs in most race-based cases against the police or pris­ons, and ruled against the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case, writing that “civil rights law did not protect a woman from a boss’s obnoxious or suggestive words.”

  

Beyond the Sixth Circuit, it would take decades before Allen’s famous first triggered second and third appointments of women. It would be sixty years, over half a century, before a woman was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. It was not until 1981 that Ronald Reagan, faced with a demonstrable gender gap, wooed women voters by making a campaign promise to appoint the first woman Justice, which he did in nominating Sandra Day O’Connor, an Arizona jurist and legislator. It would also take sixty years before another woman served on the Ohio Supreme Court. Blanche Krupansky was temporarily appointed by a Republican governor in 1981, and Alice Robie Resnick was elected in 1989. It would be almost forty years after Allen’s first before a woman served on the highest court of any state, with the ascension of Rhoda Lewis in Hawaii and Lorna Lockwood in Arizona. And it would be thirty years before a woman was appointed to any federal appellate court, as it was not until 1968 that President Lyndon Johnson nominated Shirley Hufstedler to the Ninth Circuit.

 Systemic Shift

What ultimately triggered the shift then, if the advent of the first woman judge was not enough to open the judicial doors to women? At a basic level, it was the increase in the number of women lawyers, bringing not just more candidates, but more familiarity with and acceptance of women in these judicial roles. But more was needed. 

As scholars have explained, although token women like Allen “in a highly visible and powerful office may provide a ‘role model’ for women, they do not automatically trigger an increase in appointments,” because tokenism can operate in the opposite way, restricting rather than expand­ing opportunities due to the “mistaken belief that inequality has been eradicated.”  It would take a systemic disruption to change this status quo and include women in meaningful numbers. That disruption came at the federal level in the form of President Carter’s 1977 executive order changing the process for nomination of federal judges and prioritizing the recruitment of women and racial minorities. The new process de-emphasized the practice of senators recommending political candidates and created mandatory nominating commissions composed of diverse lawyers and leaders, including women, to generate a merit-based list of candidates that included certain numbers of women and people of color. First Woman Judge, 205.

Why Women Matter

Focusing on the pace and number of women judges raises the question of why electing women matters. Political scientist Sally Kenney, in her book, Gender & Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (Routledge 2013), explains the research and the theory of why it is in fact democratically important to have women judges. I placed this research into the specific context of Judge Allen:

[I]t is clear that gender and the advent of the first woman judge made a “profound change in the status of women and a radical departure in the conception and work of the courts.” Allen’s gen­der made a tremendous difference in her symbolic role in shattering the glass ceiling of the judiciary, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the courts. She was a powerful, nationally visible role model of “what a judge looks and sounds like” for women, lawyers, judges, politicians, and the general public, displaying how women could effectively govern in judicial roles. As Allen explained, her breakthrough also empowered all women, for “when women sit in government, women as a whole become conscious of their individual interest and ownership in government.” Diversifying the bench to include women improved the legitimacy of the courts by ending the systemic dis­crimination the law itself created and enforced. As Allen said, since women are litigants, citizens, and persons in the courts, “they are entitled to play their parts equally with men in the administration of justice.” It is impor­tant, she said, that courts, as defenders of the rule of law, not be seen as systems of exclusion and oppression. Thus, it was justice simply to no longer exclude one-half of the human race from judicial office.

 

Women on the bench also critically enhance the representational role of the courts as impartial tribunals by expanding the diversity of arbiters to include a broader portion of the polity. This representation functions to improve people’s trust in the decisions of the courts, with judges demo­cratically reflecting the populace as a nonexclusionary body. Integrating the bench to include women makes for a “fairer legal system” beyond mere “window dressing or political correctness,” by more inclusively reflecting the norms of a wider and more representative community. Allen explained how women judges recalibrated the court’s structural impartial­ity by centering women’s experience and by negating stereotypes of women in the legal system that unfairly disadvantage litigants, witnesses, attor­neys, and jurors. First Woman Judge, 204. 

That it has taken more than a century to crawl towards this democratization of courts, shows how radically transformative was the first woman judge.

--Tracy Thomas

Saturday, November 14, 2026

Weekend Roundup

  • The Supreme Court Historical Society has posted a short video on Court's role in the presidential election of 1876 (YouTube). 
  • The View from ASLH Banff
    "The Other Roe," a 17-minute documentary on Margie Pitts Hames and Doe v. Bolton (Hollywood Times).  
  • Greetings from ASLH Banff!  Mountains make the best backdrop for legal history. 
  • "The Saatchi Gallery is hosting Sketches that Shaped History, a free exhibition of courtroom art capturing some of the most pivotal moments in legal history. Running from 14th–17th November and presented by Harvey, the AI platform for legal and professional services" (LOTI).
  • West Chester University's Department of Theatre & Dance presents "Sacco & Vanzetti: A Tragedia dell’Arte from Nov. 19-22, blending historical drama with the comedy and theatrical traditions of commedia dell’arte" (MyChesCo). 
  • A notice of that HLS panel on the rule of law, with Aziz Z. Huq, Kevin C. Newsom, Jamal Greene, and Jill Lepore (Harvard Law Today).  

Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.   

Friday, November 13, 2026

Ablavsky Replies to Nelson on Public Rights

Gregory Ablavsky, Stanford Law School, has posted Retconning the Law: A Reply to Prof. Nelson:

“The details of organization of the land system,” Henry Adams wrote in 1879, “implied much labor and minute attention, but they are not interesting.” Caleb Nelson and I evidently disagree with Adams. In my 2022 article Getting Public Rights Wrong, I argued that nineteenth-century administrative adjudication of private land claims unsettles the claim that vested property rights historically required judicial resolution. Prof. Nelson has now responded arguing that this history was, in fact, “consistent” with his framework.

I appreciate Nelson’s thorough and thoughtful engagement with my argument, and we agree on much. My core objection is that Nelson’s response is a retcon: a retroactive rewriting of the past to fit present narrative needs. Confronted with the private land claims, Nelson crafts a new exception: His framework, he now says, encompassed only “judicially cognizable” vested rights. But this new exception eliminates much of the value of Nelson’s original proposal, since it merely restates the test from Murray’s Lessee, the case his framework set out to clarify. It also turns a supposed limit on Congress into something closer to a drafting requirement. As for our other disagreements—whether imperfect titles were vested, the meaning of the California Land Act of 1851 and Botiller v. Dominguez—Nelson attempts to render the history “consistent” with his framework by positing distinctions largely unarticulated by the historical actors, plausible only by ignoring contrary evidence.

Our exchange also raises a larger question. If current doctrine turns on how nineteenth-century officials parsed perfect and imperfect titles in Sainte Genevieve and Natchitoches, Chief Justice Roberts’s mocking hypothetical about Kant and eighteenth-century Bulgaria has become serious business. That is not “ordinary lawyering,” as Baude and Sachs attempted to categorize uncovering the law of the past. It involves an ever-more sweeping, detailed, and technical inquiry into prior jurisprudence--ordinary history, you might call it. But relying on such fine-grained research to make law renders our law less transparent, less accessible, and more dependent on expert augury.

In the end, whatever the normative merits of Nelson’s framework as a solution to the problem of private rights, I don’t think he offers a faithful account of their framework—that is, of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. And if it takes over 30,000 words to try to explain away one “pocket” of law, perhaps that framework was never that coherent to begin with.

Hattem's "Declaration of Indepedence"

Michael D. Hattem has published The Declaration of Independence: A Concise History (Oxford University Press):

The Declaration of Independence is one of the world's most important historical documents. It has been lauded by generations of historians as "American scripture" and the "American version of the Magna Carta," but the Declaration began its life as a press release, intended to serve an immediate purpose, after which it was stored with no special care alongside the rest of the records of the Continental Congress. Its creators could not have anticipated that it would become one of the most iconic symbols of the Revolution they were waging and the nation they were building.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the Declaration would begin to assume its place in the mythos and civic religion of the United States. It provided Americans with a shared political language that would shape how subsequent generations understood the Revolution and the politics of their own times. Liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness became keywords in American politics, and each generation has redefined those terms and, by extension, the Declaration.

In this book, historian Michael D. Hattem offers a fresh history of the Declaration of Independence. He moves beyond how it was written and approved by Congress to tell a story that spans a quarter of a millennium and features a cast of countless individuals and groups from around the world who dared to realize the Declaration's ideals more fully than the revolutionary generation could ever have imagined. He shows how the Declaration has reflected many of the inherent contradictions at the heart of the American experiment and has been used equally by liberal and conservative political movements to achieve their different political aims. The result is a compelling story of the Declaration's origins and the creation of its legacy over the past two hundred and fifty years.

--Dan Ernst 

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Schorr on "Colonial Law" in British Legal Literature

David Schorr, Tel Aviv University Buchmann Faculty of Law, has posted The Creation of “Colonial Law” in British Legal Literature, which is forthcoming in Legal Unification Through Case Law: Supreme Courts and the Emergence of Uniform Law in the Modern Era, ed. Martin Loehnig (2027):


As an extension of ongoing research on the case law of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (hereinafter: the Privy Council), which served as a court of appeal for the empire (excluding Britain itself), this chapter examines the ways in which legal books of the time developed and reflected a consciousness of a diverse yet somehow unified corpus that could be compiled and comprehended as a new legal system-'colonial law'. More particularly, it argues that it was the existence and activity of the globe-spanning, empire-wide jurisdiction of the Privy Council, alongside various other facets of the imperial legal system administered from Westminster, that spurred the creation of this new 'colonial law'.

--Dan Ernst 

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

See You in Banff!

The American Society for Legal History starts its annual meeting in Banff, Alberta, today with preconferences on Canadian Legal History, Chinese Legal History, Radical Lawyering, and Paleography--all before a full program's worth of sessions on Friday and Saturday.  We hope to see you at the meeting!

--Dan Ernst 

Langum Prize in American Legal History or Biography

[We have the following announcement.  DRE]

David J. Langum, Sr. Prize in American Legal History or Biography

This $1,000 prize is made annually to the best book in American legal history or biography that is accessible to the educated general public, rooted in sound scholarship, and with themes that touch upon matters of general concern to the American public, past or present.

Publishers must submit books to be considered for this prize, and must submit three copies to the address indicated on the Contact page by December 1st of their first publication.  Books published in December are eligible and must be submitted for that year’s prize, but may be submitted by December 1st in advanced reading copies or proofs.

We hope that this prize will not only serve as an incentive for excellent writing, but also as a vetting process. It is intended to be a guide to the general public, bookstores, and acquisitions librarians—to all who may seek readable and sound legal history and biography, scholarship that is accessible to the educated general public.

Recent winners and finalists include:

Beth Lew-Williams  John Doe Chinaman: A Forgotten History of Chinese Life Under American Racial Law (Harvard, 2025)

Jill Lepore, We The People: A History of the U.S. Constitution (Liveright, 2025)

Stuart Banner, The Most Powerful Court in the World: A History of the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford, 2024)

Hendrik Hartog, Nobody’s Boy and His Pals: The Story of Jack Robbins and the Boys’ Brotherhood Republic (Chicago, 2024)

Dylan Penningroth, Before the Movement: The Hidden History of Black Civil Rights (Norton, 2023)

Inquiries or submissions (3 copies) for the Langum Prize in American Legal History/Biography should be sent to the chairman of its selection committee, William G. Ross, Cumberland School of Law, 800 Lakeshore Drive, Birmingham, AL 35229, wgross@samford.edu.

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Job Alert: Law, Philosophy and History at U Baltimore

[We have the following announcement.  DRE.]

The Law, Philosophy and History program at the University of Baltimore is hiring a full-time lecturer. Our preferred candidate will have a graduate degree in either History or Philosophy, in addition to having a J.D. The position is a full-time, one-year renewable contract appointment, 9.5-month faculty position, with a 4/4 teaching load, with salary range of $80,000 - $90,000.

The University of Baltimore is a federally designated Predominantly Black Institution with working adults and first-generation students making up a large proportion of our undergraduate population.  Our campus is convenient to Baltimore's public transportation and a block from Penn Station with easy access to commuter rail and Amtrak, making it an hour by train from Washington, an hour-and-fifteen minutes from Philadelphia, and two hours and forty-five minutes from New York City.

Our deadline for priority consideration is December 15.  Applications may be submitted [here].

Election Reform as Crucial to Electing the First Woman Judge in 1920

This election was a vivid reminder of how free and fair elections are—and have been—critical to electing women to office, including the judiciary. The 2026 blue tsunami electing women in unprecedent numbers to governor, Congress, and state and federal legislative office was driven by an anti-corruption philosophy—a challenge to the corporate and government overreach of overentitled leaders at the expense of individual rights and public welfare. That same motivation—women taking on corruption and unethical governance—fueled the first wave women electors and women candidates for public office at the turn of the twentieth century. That early historic movement was fueled by the Progressive Era in reaction to the excesses of the Gilded Age of millionaires and government corruption.

Judge Florence Allen, the first woman elected to a general jurisdiction court of the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) Court of Common Pleas in 1920 rode in on a similar wave of women voter’s challenge to the corrupt status quo. This result was enabled by the structural change of the newly ratified Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and progressive multi-candidate voting ballots, like ranked choice and proportional voting. The bipartisan support of the newly enfranchised women voters then implemented those systemic ideas and made all the difference to her election.

Swearing in Judge Florence Allen to the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Jan. 1921,
Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH

Nineteenth Amendment

The Nineteenth was ratified in late August 1920 when women won their federal constitutional grant of the vote without barriers based on sex. This status as electors thus was presumed to allow women to run for public office. However, many states interpreted the Nineteenth narrowly to apply only to the vote and continued to deny women the corollary elector rights of public office and jury service on grounds of originalism and coverture, all well documented in Paula Monopoli’s book, Constitutional Orphan.

Days after enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment, Florence Allen declared her candidacy for judicial office. She had missed the primaries, so she ran as an independent, thereby attracting the support of active women from both parties. Her own Democratic party did not endorse her, but behind the scenes the political bosses in Cleveland, including one of the first women shadow bosses, Bernice Pyke, buoyed her candidacy.

Voting Reform

A second critical systemic change that facilitated the election of the first woman judge was a Progressive movement for “proportional representation” voting. Allen came in first from a ballot of ten vying for four judicial positions.

These progressive voting reforms allowed a voter to select several from a group of candidates, sometimes in ranked choice, which often resulted in the election of more representative and diverse candidates like women and minorities. Cleveland and Ohio emerged as early leaders in the national movement for proportional representation reform. Ashtabula, just east of Cleveland . . . was the first city in the country to adopt proportional representation in 1915. Nationally, from 1913 to 1932, the Proportional Representation League “pursued a vigorous national campaign” for proportional voting, believing that it restored voting to ordinary people, as opposed to corruption funding single winner take-all candidates. Multiple-candidate voting also allowed voters to strategize by not voting all their possible choices, thus increasing the total number of votes for preferred candidates and decreasing the totals for other candidates.

 

Allen candidly admitted that this strategy of withholding votes, colloquially called “plunker voting,” explained her victory. She recounted a conversation she had after her election at a luncheon with Roscoe Pound, her infamous professor at Chicago and now dean of Harvard Law, who was giving a speech about his study of criminal justice administration in the Cleveland courts. She introduced herself by saying, “You will not remember me,” and he said snarkily, “I remember you perfectly: you’re Miss Allen.” Another lawyer jumped in to mediate, saying this is Judge Allen, a presiding judge in the court of common pleas. Pound said, “Oh! You’re the woman! Plunker votes, I fancy,” thus discounting her elective victory. But Florence ignored the slight. “I had to laugh at this. Unquestionably so-called plunker votes had aided me to lead the ticket. Persons who voted for me and for no one else on the list of ten candidates had deprived other candidates of possible votes.”

 

Women activists led the movement for proportional voting and city manager governance in Cleveland. The progressive women idealistically believed that women candidates would benefit from these proportional voting reforms because women were a “numerical majority but drastically underrepresented in political life.”  First Woman Judge, 66-67. 

Judge Allen ratified this form of multi-candidate form of voting in her very first published majority opinion as a state supreme court judge. She relied on expansive home rule powers of municipalities newly added to the state constitution to uphold the constitutionality of proportional voting. Reutener v.  City of Cleveland 141 N.E. 27 (Ohio 1923). 

Allen said it was the “first decision in the United States” to uphold “the radically different system of voting and counting,” which was technically true, though Michigan and California courts had reached similar results. In her opinion, she dismissed arguments that the voting system nullified votes, finding that it is “axiomatic” and “a matter of common knowledge” that minorities can determine outcomes, citing John Quincy Adams’s presidential election and the common practice of gerrymandering voting districts. In a companion case, she also upheld proportional voting against federal constitutional challenge. Cleveland’s proportional voting, however, would be repealed ten years later as wins by Italian and Irish candidates in Cleveland drew public ire, and as Democratic reformers became the majority party and lost interest in systemic reforms. First Woman Judge, 67-68.

In 2026, Ohio passed a law prohibiting any city from adopting alternative voting systems like ranked choice voting, in direct contravention of Allen’s precedent of the constitutional right to home rule. Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine Signs Bill to Crack Down on Ranked Choice Voting.  For multi-candidate forms of balloting continue to be an effective structure facilitating the election of more diverse and representative candidates. While these voting reforms continue to be unpopular, and misunderstood, across the political spectrum, they have been effective in states like Alaska and Maine and other  cities across the nation to open electoral politics democratically. Perhaps the most famous example is Mary Peltola’s prior congressional wins in Alaska, and likely 2026 win.

--Tracy Thomas

Monday, November 9, 2026

The Howlin Backlist

Niamh Howlin, University College Dublin, has posted several papers on Irish legal history from his backlist:

“Something More Than Tourists”: The American Bar Association in Ireland:
This article explores the relationship between the American Bar Association and the Irish legal professions in the twentieth century. It focuses in particular on two instances when the ABA visited Ireland; the first in 1924 and the second in 1957. Both were significant for different reasons. In 1924 the new Irish Free State had emerged from a period of violence to the formation of a new system of courts, new judicial appointments and other changes. The visit was an opportunity to demonstrate internationally that the rule of law had been reestablished. In 1957 the U.S. Supreme Court had delivered a number of significant civil rights judgments and the visit of Chief Justice Earl Warren to Ireland seems to have fed into the growing interest in American constitutional interpretation. The 1957 visit was also an example of the kind of soft diplomacy which further strengthened Irish-American relations. 

 A Wrongful Conviction: The Murder of John Donovan in Glenlara:

This is the story of a murder which took place in Glenlara, in the parish of Clonfert, in 1894, and the subsequent trial, conviction and hanging of a man from Castleisland, Co. Kerry. Initially a local story, it later attracted national attention, was discussed in the House of Commons, and generated endless columns of newspaper reporting. Stories about the murder, the trial and the hanging were told and retold in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, through books, articles, documentaries, culminating in the granting of a pardon by President Michael D. Higgins 127 years later. In this article, I explore some of the legal aspects of the investigation and the trial, to explain why it was considered necessary to grant a pardon after so many years. 

Law Reform Before the Law Reform Commission, which discusses "attempts in the 20th century to introduce systemic law reform in Ireland."

“On the Fly and on the Sly”: A District Court in Action, a study of a local court operating at the founding of the Free State and the passing of the Courts of Justice Act 1924.

–Dan Ernst

Saturday, November 7, 2026

Weekend Roundup

  • An obituary of Alan Rogers, professor emeritus of history at Boston College, who "transformed himself into a legal historian" after publishing his first book (AHA). 
  • A notice of Marco Basile, Boston College, who "explores whether the law should favor the weak when statutes leave room for interpretation" (BC Magazine).  
  • Anja Amend-Traut, Universität Würzburg, has just received a grant of 1.3 million euros for an AI-assisted project studying the protocol books of the Imperial Court Council of the Holy Roman Empire (UW). 
  • The Institute for Justice marked the centennial of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty with a symposium on zoning and a panel of experts including HLS's Molly Brady (Short Circuit).
  •  The Andalusian Studies Centre is sponsoring a seminar dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the 1876 Constitution, “the longest-lasting in contemporary Spain.”  It “aims to highlight the role of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, from Malaga, the main architect of a political system that provided institutional stability and laid the foundations for an order based on legality, coexistence and freedoms, values that remain fully valid today.” 
  • The American Political Science Association has just issued the call for its 123rd Annual Meeting & Exhibition, “The Institutions We Need: Design, Reform, and Renewal,” to be held in Washington, DC, September 2–5, 2027. 
  • The Law Library of Congress is digitizing and making available without charge its bound set of the records and briefs of the U.S. Supreme Court, which begins with the January Term 1832.  "Digitization will begin with year 2012 and work backwards.  Full-text searching will be available as well as metadata including case name, U.S. Reports citation, and file date, as available" (In Custodia Legis).
  • Update: A notice of a recent book event for Gautham Rao's White Power at Northwestern (DN)  

Weekend Roundup is a weekly feature compiled by all the Legal History bloggers.   

Friday, November 6, 2026

Hodges's "Rise of US Military Legalism"

Doyle K. Hodges, the Dean of Academic Affairs at the Naval War College, has published The Rise of US Military Legalism A New Theory of Military Professionalism (Routledge):

The book documents a change over the past 50 years in the way in which US military officers make decisions about using force, which it calls "military legalism". Rather than relying solely on professional military judgment and professional military ethics, officers are increasingly using legal norms and reasoning to justify their choices. This book explores how widespread this practice has become, explains why it has emerged, and examines some of its implications. Using historical cases from World War II through the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, this book traces changes in the way in which civilian policymakers have governed US military decisions about the use of force, and how the military has responded to these changes. While military legalism is normatively neither good nor bad, legalistic reasoning has been used to justify morally deficient policies, and a reliance on legal reasoning may have unanticipated and unexamined effects on the norms of civil-military relations.

--Dan Ernst 

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Zatelli to Lecture on Vice-Admiralty Courts of Colonial NY

[We have the following announcement.  DRE] 

On November 10, the Helsinki Legal History Series will reconvene for Gustavo Zatelli, University of Helsinki, to give the lecture “Exploring the British Empire beyond the Common Law: A Comparative Study of the Vice-Admiralty Courts during the Eighteenth Century (New York).”  Time: 3 pm – 4.30 pm.  Location: Apollon Sali K134.  Link for online participation [here]

This paper examines legal pluralism in eighteenth-century British colonial vice-admiralty courts, focusing on how legal actors drew on different legal traditions, particularly the use of civil law, to elaborate their arguments. It presents preliminary findings from an ongoing research project funded by the Research Council of Finland, which compares legal argumentation used in the Vice-Admiralty Courts of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia and Jamaica up to 1775. Within this comparative framework, the paper concentrates on records from New York, where archival research is currently most advanced.

Through an analysis of legal argumentation, the paper investigates how the interpretation and application of imperial admiralty law occurred in colonial contexts. It asks how and why different legal traditions were invoked, and what these practices reveal about the relationship between colonial interests and imperial authority. The project’s central hypothesis is that vice-admiralty jurisdiction provided an institutional environment in which participants could strategically draw on different legal traditions to advance claims, articulate expectations about rights and obligations, and negotiate competing interests. By examining these practices, the paper seeks to clarify the relationship between legal pluralism and colonial governance, while considering how the preliminary findings from New York can inform the project’s broader comparative analysis.

Gustavo Zatelli Correa is a legal historian and Academy Researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki. His research focuses on comparative colonial legal history, the circulation of legal knowledge, and the history of administrative law and police regulation. His current project, funded by the Research Council of Finland, compares vice-admiralty courts in eighteenth-century British colonies. He previously worked on the University of Helsinki’s Comparing Early Modern Colonial Laws (CoCoLaw) project and has held research appointments in Frankfurt and Vienna. He obtained his PhD by the University of Brasília, Brazil.

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Stern Receives Cromwell Article Prize

As members of the American Society of Legal History know, the William Nelson Cromwell Foundationhas long awarded a number of prizes and awards to scholars nominated by committees of the ASLH.  Since 2022, Cromwell has also awarded, on the nomination of its own committee, a $10,000 annual prize for a legal history article.  This year, the Cromwell's committee was chaired by John Fabian Witt.  Its other members were Mary Bilder, Risa Goluboff, Amalia Kessler, John Langbein, and yours truly.

The winner of this year's Cromwell article prize is Rephael G. Stern, Boston University Law School, for "The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking," 134 Yale L. J. 1955 (2025).  Here is the committee's citation:

Stern takes up one of the most consequential procedures in American government—the notice-and-comment rulemaking enshrined in Section 553 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act—and asks where it came from.  Conventional scholarly accounts locate its origins alternately in congressional petitioning, nineteenth-century agency practice, and German administrative thought.  Drawing on original archival research, Stern shows instead that notice-and-comment rulemaking arose out of a series of American transplantations of U.K. procedures for delegated rulemaking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from the Rules Publication Act 1893 through the influential 1932 report of the Donoughmore Committee.  New Deal reformers borrowed the English framework, with its requirements of publication and consultation.  But the transplant was only partial.  In light of concern that congressional involvement might obstruct administrative rulemaking, and given the resounding defeat of the nondelegation doctrine, Americans declined to import a crucial accompanying institution.  They omitted the English practice of “laying” regulations before the legislature for consideration—a form of legislative veto that was integral to rulemaking in England.

"The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking" is a model of transatlantic legal history, recovering a largely forgotten Anglo-American world of administrative law and unsettling the origin stories that have dominated the field.  It is also a timely contribution to the present.  At a moment when administrative law has returned to large-scale constitutional questions like legislative veto and nondelegation, and in an era in which administrative law often seems beset on all sides, Stern’s history illuminates lost paths not taken in the past as well as new possible futures.  Readers of this article will ask themselves new questions, including whether some version of an English-style legislative veto might still offer democratic legitimacy to administrative procedures—or instead reproduce the very problems that led the New Deal’s architects to leave it behind.
--Dan Ernst

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

How and Why I Wrote a Book About the First Woman Judge

I began writing about Florence Allen, the first woman judge, because she was literally staring me in the face, hanging in a portrait on the wall in the classroom where I taught. My dean casually asked me, “you know Florence Allen, right?” I did not.

A Biographical Lens

Judge Florence Allen,
Ohio Supreme Court c.1923

A quick web search told me the basics. The first woman federal appellate judge, appointed by FDR in 1934. The first woman in the nation elected to any state supreme court, Ohio in 1922 and re-elected in 1928. Before that the first woman judge elected to any general jurisdiction court, elected to Cleveland’s Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in 1920, immediately after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. The first woman shortlisted to the U.S. Supreme Court, considered twelve times by three presidents from both parties—and it looked like she had the nod three times between 1938 and 1949. I wrote a law review article recovering these basics, The Jurisprudence of the First Woman Judge, in the William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice. There had been women in quasi-judicial administrative positions before Allen, but she was the first elected to a general trial court and was widely known in her time “the first woman judge.”

Judge Allen’s story, however, was more than the story of one woman. It was the story of women’s integration and transformation of the law more broadly. Thus, I thought a book length treatment was needed. For Allen was among the first one percent of women in the law at every stage: as law students, lawyers, trial attorneys, prosecutors, congressional candidate, as well as judge.

And as women entered these halls of justice, they brought with them transformative ideas of public law, fair process, and ethical adjudication. As external players to partisan politics, women activists had learned how to use alternative systems of lobbying, administration, and influence to achieve policy goals and correct injustices. They brought with them reform notions to restore the rule of law, ethical decisionmaking, and a democratic legal system accountable to all, not just the corporate and private business interests. Allen was at the forefront of this transformation, and her story tracks these changes demanding more responsive courts.

On the Research Trail

The research process was longer than I had hoped. I thought I had learned with my first scholarly monograph, ECS, how to better collect, scan, organize, index, and manage the archival process. But this second book project brought similar hurdles. Changing technology uncoding the coded. A pandemic, fire, and political machinations shutting down archives. Research assistants losing and erasing documents before they were backed up. Heavy teaching loads. Restarting writing each summer, and reinventing the wheel. Yet the story continued to drive me.

The research included over five thousand documents primarily at the Western Reserve Historical Archives in Cleveland and the Library of Congress. Digitization and the LOC as well as other libraries revolutionized the process. Even in the final days of proofreading and edits, the explosion of archival access to local papers with sites like Newspapers.com and NewspaperArchive provide rich new sources from sources in real time.

Reading Allen’s 800 federal and state opinions was also a challenge. First, just finding them was a battle, as many in this historical time frame were not readily available or did not indicate the writing judge in databases like Westlaw or Lexis. Frustrated, I finally went old school, asking the wonderful librarians in the Akron Law Library to help me find the dusty volumes of the reporters in the deep storage basement of the library. Lo and behold, I discovered in these a beautiful index at the front of each book listing opinions by writing judge, easily finding all Allen’s decisions including the per curiams. I also discovered in these indices that Judge Allen was always listed at the end of all seven judges, despite the alphabet placing her first and despite rising seniority over the years. It seems the woman judge, or “Miss” rather than “Judge,” as the volumes sometimes labeled her, could not be first.

The second research challenge from the cases was placing them in legal and historical context. Allen’s key years on the bench, 1920 to 1959, were among the least familiar to me. The least taught in Con Law courses, the least used in gender analysis, and often considered mere stopping points on the way to further developments. So learning the U.S. Supreme Court cases from this period, and the labor history, and the full legal history of the 1912 progressive Ohio Constitution were all required reading. It was fascinating—among the most generative and engaging projects of my career. There were rabbit holes galore as detours took me into hours of esoteric web searching. Producing a list of ancillary interests--enough to produce a list of six more books I’d like to write next.

Writing Women’s Legal History

The process of writing The First Woman Judge reminded me of some of the catches to writing women’s history. Writing women’s history is different because the sources may be difficult to find, less evidence is preserved by family members or institutions, women change their name at marriage, and women are often found externally to legal systems. See Oxford Legal History Bibliographies. Newspapers, organizations, and private collections offer potential gold mines, but do not offer easy access or indexation. Books about women’s history are often out of print, with the burst of scholarship in the early 1980s removed from shelves.

Allen’s story did not present as many of these methodological problems because she was unmarried, and was an internal institutional actor, who went to great lengths to preserve her own papers. Yet she culled these papers to omit much of the personal or political backstory and family members got rid of the rest. Even Allen’s opinions, had to be understood in gendered context as the chief justice refused to assign her important cases and male colleagues refused to engage with her in conference or join her opinions. The historical record thus requires gendered, as well as legal and historical, contextualization.

--Tracy Thomas