Friday, February 28, 2014
Who Do We Think We Are?: Teaching the History of Lawyering
Lawyering Inside and Out
A Fourteenth-Century Scamblogger?
Coming to America: Lawyers, Exploration and Colonization
Teaching [American Lawyering History] While Canadian
American Lawyer Emigrants: Loyalists and Confederates
Due South: Canadian Lawyers in the United States
Missionary Man: William Sprague and the Correspondence Law School
Lawyers: Once More, With Feeling(s)
Of Lawyers and Lifeboats
But lawyering history isn't just about people in the past. It also addresses people in the present. Today's legal profession seems lost, beset by overwhelming economic, technological and social challenges. Contemporary lawyers are unsure of where they're going and even of what's going to become of them as a collectivity over the next few decades. In this context professional amnesia doesn't help. If lawyers knew who they were - if we told them - maybe they could get their bearings and face the future with greater confidence. I think many lawyers yearn for this kind of guidance and grounding. But we need not kow-tow to some puffed-up sense of professional pride. Perhaps a better understanding of their history would encourage lawyers to take greater responsibility for their current plight. Perhaps they would learn from their failures as well as their successes. Perhaps they would recognize their weaknesses as well as their strengths. Perhaps they would gain humility in being reminded of their humanity. Perhaps, ultimately, they would reject panic in favor of perspective.
Ancient China produced the first rudimentary set of doctrines. But the cornerstone of later international law was laid by the Romans, in the form of natural law—a universal law that was superior to early laws and governments. As medieval European states came into contact with non-Christian peoples, from East Asia to the New World, practical solutions had to be devised to the many legal quandaries that arose. In the wake of these experiences, international legal doctrine began to assume its modern form in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
A few blurbs:New challenges in the nineteenth century encompassed the advance of nationalism, the rise of free trade and European imperialism, the formation of international organizations, and the arbitration of disputes. Innovative doctrines included liberalism, the nationality school, and solidarism. The twentieth century witnessed the formation of the League of Nations and a World Court, but also the rise of socialist and fascist states and the advent of the Cold War. Yet the collapse of the Soviet Union brought little respite. As Neff makes clear, further threats to the rule of law today come from environmental pressures, genocide, and terrorism.
“Justice among Nations is by far the best general survey of the history of international law to date. It will be mandatory reading for both students and scholars in the field.”—Randall Lesaffer
“Like Vattel’s 1758 Law of Nations, this sparkling and intelligent history is intended for a broad audience. Vattel reached his audience: George Washington and other Founding American Fathers are known to have possessed copies. Their vision for the new United States in the world was plainly influenced by it. Neff’s Justice among Nations refreshes Vattel for our time and our even more pressing need to understand what international law is and what it can accomplish for our common humanity.”—Mary Ellen O’Connell
Thursday, February 27, 2014
Now this is a remarkable omission at a time when the contemporary legal press (plus even mainstream media like CNN) are talking about unhappy, depressed and even suicidal lawyers. It is also unfortunate in a period when so many members of the population at large are obviously alienated from members of the legal profession, regarding them as disconnected, heartless, and even fundamentally inhuman (thus the proliferation of lawyer jokes depicting lawyers as lizards and snakes). Maybe exploring the historical reality of lawyers' feelings, and their reactions to those feelings, would help us acknowledge and better manage a critical part of our lives that we have hitherto sought to suppress. Maybe if we shared those stories with others outside our profession it would help them understand that lawyers are people too.
So where do we begin? Lawyers' emotions have inevitably left their mark on the entire sweep of lawyering history, but there are certain periods, at least in the record of American lawyering, when they come to the professional fore and leave a distinct imprint. One of these periods is (no pun intended) the Great Depression. Prior to a few years ago there was remarkably little written about the plight of many practicing lawyers during these years. Since 2008, some people seem to be taking more interest. The diary of one Depression-era lawyer, Benjamin Roth, was published in 2010. Although Roth wrote about many subjects apart from law practice in his journal, he obviously knew things were not going well in his profession, and that left him troubled: "It is very disagreeable as well as unprofitable to practice law these days. The work is of a destructive nature such as foreclosure, receivership and bankruptcies... As to fees – well, they have shrunk beyond recognition and in some cases we are offered pass books on closed banks, etc.."
Morin, "The Discovery and Assimilation of British Constitutional Law Principles in Quebec, 1764-1774," and More
"The Discovery and Assimilation of British Constitutional Law Principles in Quebec, 1764-1774" appears in Volume 36 of the Dalhousie Law Journal (2013). Here's the abstract:
This paper examines information available to Francophone persons regarding their rights as British subjects prior to the adoption of the 1774 Quebec Act, as well as the use they made of these concepts. The bilingual Quebec Gazette reported on legal developments in France, England, and the American colonies, including challenges to the traditional vision of governmental authority. It discussed the right to be taxed by elected representatives and the conflicts between the metropolis and the colonies. Debates about these issues are thought to have appeared in Quebec only after the beginning of the American Revolution, but they circulated earlier. Educated members of the Francophone elite sought more specific information about the new legal system. Many of them were eager to obtain an Assembly, if Catholics could sit in it. This was considered one of their rights as British subjects, together with the continuation of property rights guaranteed by the Capitulation of 1760 and, by extension, inheritance and matrimonial laws. In the end, requests for an assembly were shelved in order to obtain religious equality. Thus, British officials were free to declare that Canadians had no interest in such an institution, creating a lasting and misleading impression."Blackstone and the Birth of Quebec's Legal Culture 1765-1867" will appear in Re-Interpreting Blackstone's Commentaries A Seminal Text in National and International Contexts, edited by Wilfrid Prest (Hart Publishing, 2014 Forthcoming). The abstract:
Blackstone’s commentaries were soon translated in French and became, prior to the French Revolution, the principal reference on British constitutional and criminal law. In Quebec, his work was known as early as 1767 and was used to buttress arguments for the preservation of French civil law. He was quoted in court proceedings and in a draft petition. In 1773, François-Joseph Cugnet sent documents concerning these issues to Blackstone, who forwarded them to the British Government. This probably convinced the ministry that the francophone population had no objection to English Criminal Law and to testamentary freedom. Thus, the Quebec Act of 1774 expressly preserved these parts of English Law, while restoring the laws in force prior to the Conquest concerning “property and civil law”. French versions of the Commentaries were available in Quebec as early as 1784. After the creation of an Assembly, politicians who opposed the Government and wanted to assimilate the provincial Assembly to the British House of Commons regularly quoted Blackstone. His Commentaries, which had benefitted from an improved translation by Chompré in 1822, remained a model for the first legal authors in Quebec. He clearly was part of Quebec’s legal culture and facilitated the understanding of arcane rules of English Law, both because of the clarity of his writings and of various translations of his work made in Europe."Fraternité, Souveraineté Et Autonomie Des Autochtones En Nouvelle-France" (Fraternity, Sovereignty and Autonomy of Aboriginal Peoples in New France) appears in Volume 43 of Revue générale de droit (2013). The English language Abstract:
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the legal principles which formed the framework for relationships between the Algonquians peoples of the Saint-Lawrence Valley and the French were generally well understood by both parties. Founded initially on the concepts of friendship, alliance or fraternity, they assumed the existence of independent nations which had their own decisional systems and customs, as well as local or regional chiefs enjoying strong authority in practice. From 1628 to 1663, only new converts were granted the status of subject of the French king; from 1664 to 1674, only their descendents qualified. Afterward, the situation was ambiguous. However, Christian communities living close to the French cities enjoyed a wide autonomy and seldom renounced it. They were sometimes called children of the king, because they unconditionally supported him at the military level. During the second half of the 17th century, nations which had not become Christian also bestowed paternal status on the French king, but this socio-economic dependency did not call into question their independence, something the French understood very well.
Wednesday, February 26, 2014
I am writing to inform you of a Call For Papers for a conference on Irish legal history in the seventeenth century. The conference will explore the theme of law and lawyers in Ireland before, during, and after the Cromwellian Interregnum.
The 1641 rebellion, subsequent wars, and the political change that followed were to have a profound and lasting impact on the island for generations. Recent historiographical trends have seen great strides made in our understanding of the military, political, and religious aspects of this upheaval, but despite some notable work already undertaken, the role of lawyers and the law in this general crisis still warrants further attention.
How consistent with the law and the constitution of Ireland was government policy and its main actors in the decade before the rising? What role did the legal community play in the wars and political dynamics of the period? How did the law adapt to the new political realities in Ireland after 1649, and how was it used to effect a restoration of peace and stability after 1660? To what extent do these changes reflect the situation in Scotland and England at the time?
These questions and others will be considered in a conference to be convened in late November 2014. This conference is being held in the House of Lords, Bank of Ireland, College Green, Dublin in conjunction with the Irish Legal History Society Winter Discourse on 28 November, which will also address the topic.
For those wishing to present at the conference, a short description of your paper, academic affiliation (if any), along with relevant contact information, should be sent to the convenor of the conference no later than May 2014.
All correspondence should be addressed to: Dr. Coleman A. Dennehy, Department of History, NUI Maynooth
Enter William C. Sprague, a young and savvy Ohio-born lawyer with a very big idea. Before attending the Cincinnati Law School, Sprague, the son of a Congressman, had graduated from Baptist-run Denison University. At Denison one of his professors was a very young and cherubic William Rainey Harper. Fired by both academic ambition and personal missionary zeal, Harper was already experimenting with teaching Hebrew to non-resident students by mail. The surprisingly successful effort impressed Sprague, who kept in touch with Harper after they both left Denison. Sprague headed to Cincinnati and then west to practice with an older lawyer before moving back east to Detroit, Michigan, where he set up his own practice with a small legal publishing enterprise on the side. Harper meanwhile went to Yale, became a leader of the Chautauqua movement, and then of course ended up being selected by John D. Rockefeller to become the first president of the new University of Chicago in 1891 (included in Harper's original plans for Chicago was, by the way, a significant "university extension" arm that would teach by correspondence).
Sprague was doing well, but he thought he could do better. He was aware of the limitations of contemporary law office training for lawyers; having already helped a student in another state pass his bar exam, he thought his method could be generalized. In 1889, remembering Harper's example, he hit upon the notion of organizing a stand-alone correspondence-based law school that would teach law by mail. It would be, as he saw it, the first commercial correspondence school in the world. From his Midwest base in Detroit, high-speed rail links would carry his texts and lessons out, and bring student papers back. He could launch his program as a spin-off of his publishing house; after all, he was already producing legal texts, and the formulation of supplementary materials could not be that hard. If correspondence instruction could work for a subject as obtuse as Hebrew, why not for Contracts? Sprague was arguably inspired not just by the prospect of monetary gain but also by his own brand of missionary dedication. He was a favorite Detroit Sunday School instructor in an age of great Sunday School instructors, and he seems to have seen law as something of a civilizing and perhaps even unifying social gospel in the latter years of the Gilded Age. I think it was no coincidence that when the "Sprague Correspondence School of Law" launched in 1890, its defining symbol, used in virtually all its advertising through its first decade of existence, was a cherub at the shoulder of a man learning the law.
A HISTORY OF PENAL REGIMES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: 1800-2014Hat tip: @adamsigoodman
March 5-7th, 2015
The rise of the prison has been an important historical development of the modern era. Over the past two hundred years, the growth of prisons has ticked upward. Confinement has come to dominate national penal regimes, increasingly replacing bodily harm as a primary form of punishment. Prisons now span the globe. While rates of incarceration have varied widely over the past two centuries across nations and over time, the last third of the twentieth-century witnessed an upward trend from the United States to Brazil and China. In the United States, prisons have become a pressing social problem with the highest number of its citizens behind bars of any country in the world.
On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Michele Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975) the influential book that first opened a new line of inquiry into the study of the prison, the Weatherhead Initiative on Global History is planning a conference to spark a global conversation among researchers in the social sciences and humanities at work on the history of distinctive penal regimes. We are interested in exploring the diversity of regimes of punishment, and especially the prison as an institution within them, the paths along which they changed, and—most especially—the connections between these changes in different parts of the world. The conference is open to papers that address a variety of themes from the philosophical underpinnings of systems of punishment, the character and function of regimes of incarceration and penality in colonial, liberal, neo-liberal and authoritarian state systems, and the distinctive cultures of confinement that have emerged within these varied systems. We hope to balance broadly comparative papers and revealing case studies. We are seeking proposals from scholars at all stages of their academic career, including graduate students. We are particularly interested in forging a global discussion of these topics, and therefore especially welcome contributions from outside North America and Europe.
The Weatherhead Initiative on Global History is a recently created center that responds to the growing interest at Harvard in the encompassing study of global history. The Initiative is committed to the systematic scrutiny of developments that have unfolded across national, regional, and continental boundaries as well as to analysis of the interconnections—cultural, economic, ecological and demographic—among world societies. For further information about WIGH and the conference, please consult our website at http://wigh.wcfia.harvard.edu.
Proposals should include an abstract of no more than 500 words and a brief curriculum vita. Please email your submissions to Jessica Barnard (firstname.lastname@example.org) by May 15, 2014 with the heading “Penal Regimes Conference.” Travel expenses (economy) as well as accommodation will be covered.
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
The William Nelson Cromwell Foundation offers an annual prize of $2,500 for the best article in American legal history published by an early career scholar. Articles published in 2013 in the field of American legal history, broadly conceived, will be considered. There is a preference for articles in the colonial and early National periods. Articles published in the Law and History Review are eligible for the ASLH's Erwin C. Surrency Prize and will not be considered for the Cromwell Article Prize.
The Cromwell Foundation makes the final award, in consultation with a subcommittee from the American Society for Legal History. This subcommittee invites nominations for the article prize. Authors are invited to nominate themselves or others may nominate works meeting the criteria that they have read and enjoyed. Please send a brief letter of nomination, along with an electronic or hard copy of the article, by May 31, 2014, to the subcommittee chair, Alfred Brophy, University of North Carolina School of Law, Campus Box #3380, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380 or via email, email@example.com. Other members of the articles subcomittee of the Cromwell Prizes Advisory Committee are Daniel W. Hamilton of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Michelle McKinley of the University of Oregon, and Kristin A. Olbertson of Alma College.
As the Supreme Court prepares to take up yet another case on the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter, the Court will again be called on to draw the line between unpatentable fundamental principles and patentable inventions. The most significant question facing the Court is not whether software is patentable, but whether that foundational boundary requires an “inventive application,” as suggested by the Court in Mayo v. Prometheus. Both Prometheus and its intellectual forebear, Parker v. Flook, drew this notion in part from Neilson v. Harford, the famous “hot blast” case decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1841.
But an examination of Neilson reveals a different story than the one told by the Supreme Court. Neilson was indeed the starting point from which 19th-century courts, both English and American, drew the boundary between discovery and invention. But the patent in Neilson was not sustained because it represented an inventive application of the patentee’s discovery. It was in fact sustained because the patentee’s application was entirely conventional and routine. Nineteenth century English courts and commentators understood Neilson and its companion cases to teach that while discoveries in the abstract were not patentable, a practical application of a new discovery was patentable regardless of the novelty or inventiveness of the application.
The same understanding prevailed in the United States. Neilson remained the starting point for discussions of patent-eligible subject matter, patent scope, and the patentability of processes, but 19th century case law did not demand inventive application. The 19th century treatise-writers addressed the question directly, and reached the same conclusion as their English counterparts: practical application of a discovery sufficed. And until 1948, the weight of American authority agreed.
It was then that Justice Douglas, in Funk Brothers v. Kalo Inoculant, first drew boundary between discovery and invention at inventive application. Largely forgotten today, the lower courts’ implementation of Funk is a cautionary tale of the patents that could be invalidated if the Court maintains inventive application as a test of patent eligibility.
There is a growing sense today that the American political system is inadequate at addressing the major foreign and domestic challenges facing the nation. Growing partisan polarization, abetted by the rise of highly ideological interest groups and a divided mass media, is routinely cited as a primary cause of the nation's ills.
Yet, despite considerable interest in the causes and consequences of partisan polarization, we know very little about how these developments relate to previous episodes of partisan rancor in American history; how they resonate beyond the Washington Beltway; and how they are likely to affect important constituencies, such as Hispanic voters, who are likely to have a profound influence on future party alignments.
This themed colloquium series, organized by the Miller Center's Sidney Milkis, will probe these questions and shed important light on the difficult yet indispensible connection between partisanship and American democracy.
Latino Conservatives: Right Wing Aesthetics and Representative Claims
Friday, February 28 12:30-2:00 p.m.
Cristina Beltrán, associate professor of social and cultural analysis at New York University and author of The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity.
The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics: A Synopsis
Thursday, March 20 12:30-2:00 p.m.
Morris Fiorina, Wendt Family Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Polarization in Historical Perspective
Friday, April 25 12:30-2:00 p.m.
Bill Kristol, founder and editor of the Weekly Review, and William A. Galston, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
These events will take place in the Miller Center's John W. and Rosemary P. Galbraith Forum Room. All colloquia will be webcast live and archived here.
Using the life of the nineteenth-century Sierra Leonean child slave and interpreter at the trials of La Amistad James Kaweli Covey as a primary vehicle, this article explores the social and political context embedded in Atlantic child slave biography, such as claims about family, parentage, and orphanhood, in narratives of child enslavement. I examine Covey’s claims of orphanhood and the fictive kinship relations Covey marshaled during his Atlantic passages as examples of the struggle against alienation to "remake" his political and social being. Whereas we shall likely never know the fate of Covey’s biological kin, our interest should not end there. More so than adult slaves, children deployed kinship language and idioms as part of the larger struggle to forge and preserve relationships with benefactors. Although kinship claims are an experience common across slave populations, a focus on child claims draws attention to the extreme vulnerability of child slaves and their more pressing need for patron/client relationships.
Notwithstanding the fact that Covey’s passage through multiple instances of enslavement and freedom appears quite exceptional, data from the Amistad captives suggest that his familial context and path to enslavement were both relatively ordinary for a male West African child, c. 1820-40. Drawing on contemporaneous sources, I move beyond the metaphorical and fictional kinship framework within which Covey’s narrative resides, to speculate about the real biological and familial context of Covey via data he himself assisted in collecting. Covey’s statements and strategies point to a child’s view of the African family, and one that is sensitive to some of the perils of Atlantic child slave biography, such as the frequent inconsistencies and contradictions in child memories of trauma. Set against the generalized cultural context, Covey’s multiple narratives and claims suggest a deliberate struggle to resuscitate family as part of a struggle against alienation via fictional kinship.
lawyers in American history have done much more than simply practice law. Rather it is to suggest that both lawyering and war-waging have been fundamental and mutually reinforcing aspects of the American experience. In no other common law jurisdiction - perhaps in no other jurisdiction, period - has the linkage between lawyering and war-waging been so massive and so clear. Yet we have missed it.
A few blurbs:
"In this wonderful book, Karla FC Holloway illuminates legal texts with techniques and insights derived from literary criticism and offers new interpretations of fictional works by bringing to bear upon them knowledge derived from a deep immersion in legal studies. This is, in short, a remarkable example of productive interdisciplinarity from which all sorts of readers will learn a great deal."—Randall Kennedy
"Legal Fictions represents a culmination (if not the culmination) of Karla FC Holloway's rich corpus of criticism and theory. As a consideration of law and literature in the construction of race and legal fictions, it is an original intervention sure to inform understandings of, and scholarship about, both. This book is Holloway at her best: intelligent and thoughtful, fully in command of the critical vocabularies that she introduces, and thoroughly knowledgeable about the fields that she traverses."—Farah Jasmine Griffin
Monday, February 24, 2014
As human societies developed, a bedrock necessity was the identification of expectations and norms that protected individuals and families from wrongful injury, property damage, and takings. Written law, dating to the Babylonian codes and early Hebrew law emphasized congruent themes. . Such law protected groups and individuals from physical or financial insult, depredation of the just deserts of labor, interference with the means of individual livelihood, and distortion of the fair distribution of wealth.
Hellenic philosophers assessed the goals of society as being the protection of persons and property from wrongful harm, protection of the individual’s means of survival, discouragement of self-aggrandizement, and the elevation of individual knowledge that would carry forward and perfect such principles. Roman law was replete with proscriptions of forced takings and unjust enrichment, and went so far as to include rules for ex ante contract-based resolution of potential disagreement. Unwritten customary law within the Western world and beyond perpetuated these tenets, based at once in morality and aversion to wasteful behavior.
In addition to the corrective justice-morality underpinnings of the law governing civil wrongs, or torts, the common law has nurtured rules implicating economic and efficiency themes. Efficiency themes enjoy a conspicuous place in modern tort analysis: from the risk-utility analysis and implicit social cost evaluations of numerous common law courts in accident cases, to the translation of the negligence formula of Judge Learned Hand into a basic efficiency model, to the increasing number of judicial opinions that rely explicitly upon economic analysis.
Registration is open for my Rare Book School course, "Law Books: History & Connoisseurship," taking place July 28 - August 1, 2014 at the Yale Law School Library in New Haven, Connecticut. The course is one of three that the University of Virginia's Rare Book School will offer that week on the Yale University campus.
For the 2014 classes, Rare Book School is using its new online application site, myRBS. Through myRBS, you will be able to apply for a course, gain access to and edit your contact information, view your course history and Friend status, and more. More details can be found on the RBS Application & Admissions page.
The description, preliminary reading list, and student evaluations for Course C-85, "Law Books: History & Connoisseurship," can be found here. Enrollment in the course is limited to 12 students.
I am happy to answer questions about the course itself. Questions about the registration process should be directed to Rare Book School staff.
Scholars have ignored the most important question in one of the most famous constitutional law cases, obscuring the machinations that spawned the dispute. This Article sheds light on the events that precipitated Marbury v. Madison and also explains when an appointment vests. Thomas Jefferson famously refused to deliver a commission to William J. Marbury, causing the latter to seek a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court. The received wisdom supposes that Jefferson’s refusal rested on the grounds that Marbury had not been appointed a justice of the peace precisely because he never had received a commission. In fact, Jefferson’s delivery argument was a post-hoc rationalization, having nothing to do with his actions in March of 1801. John Adams’s midnight appointments incensed Jefferson, leading the new President to treat all of the justice of the peace appointments as nullities. To Jefferson, the failure to deliver commissions to some of those appointees mattered not a whit. What seems to have been far more significant is his sense that the justices of the peace served at his pleasure. Acting on this belief, he simultaneously removed them all and recess appointed most of them, save for more than a dozen, including William J. Marbury. This Article also addresses whether William J. Marbury and the other midnight appointees who never received their commissions were nonetheless appointed, considering five theories of when an appointment vests: when the Senate consents; after consent but before commissioning; when commissioning occurs; with the delivery of a commission; and with acceptance of the office. In the course of considering these theories, the Article discloses the surprising fact that Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, endorsed the second theory, namely that appointments vest before the act of commissioning. Moreover, well before Marbury v. Madison, the Adams Administration likewise concluded that appointments could vest prior to any commission being issued or delivered. Despite this convergence, the Article contends that none of the five theories is correct because each reads the Constitution as enshrining a single answer regarding when an appointment vests. There is no single answer. Rather an appointment vests whenever the President determines that it shall. The Constitution grants power to the President to appoint, never precisely specifying when or how an appointment vests. By not specifying when or how appointment is made, the Constitution leaves it to the President to decide the manner in which he appoints. This conclusion derives from a general principle of constitutional law: When the Constitution grants power to an entity but does not specify the precise means by which it will be exercised, the grantee may decide the means of exercising it.
Frankly I wasn't expecting to find many, but then I found a few, and then a few more, and then more, and more! They were from the twentieth century, the nineteenth, and even the eighteenth. They came from all regions and provinces of Canada, and they surprisingly ended up in virtually all parts of the US (not just in border states). There were men and women. There were some with pre-existing family connections to the US, and some with none. There were political refugees and ambitious careerists. There were Canadian-born individuals who were brought across the border at a young age and grew up to be lawyers, and there were trained and experienced Canadian lawyers who for various reasons pulled up stakes and moved south. There were practitioners and academics. There were those who ostensibly cut ties with Canada when they left, and then there were others who either kept up their connection or eventually went home. But all of them inevitably brought with them Canadian experiences and Canadian attitudes. After several years of investigation, I and my research assistant Megan McKee (now a graduate student in history at McGill) have put together a spreadsheet that tracks some 800 Canadian legal expatriates of one sort or another from the late 1700s through the end of World War II. Our work is ongoing.
New Release: Arias & Marrero-Fente, eds., "Coloniality, Religion, and the Law in the Early Iberian World"
From postcolonial, interdisciplinary, and transnational perspectives, this collection of original essays looks at the experience of Spain's empire in the Atlantic and the Pacific and its cultural production.
Negotiation Between Religion and the LawSanta Arias and Raul Marrero-Fente
PoliticsJose de Acosta: Colonial Regimes for a Globalized Christian WorldIvonne del Valle
Conquistador Counterpoint: Intimate Enmity in the Writings of Bernardo de Vargas MachucaKris LaneVoices of the Altepetl: Nahua Epistemologies and Resistance in the Anales de Juan BautistaEzekiel StearPerformances of Indigenous Authority in Postconquest Tlaxcalan Annals: Don Juan Buenaventura Zapata y Mendoza's Historia cronologica de la noble ciudad de TlaxcalaKelly S. McDonough
ReligionTranslating the "Doctrine of Discovery": Spain, England, and Native American ReligionsRalph Bauer
Narrating Conversion: Idolatry, the Sacred, and the Ambivalences of Christian Evangelization in Colonial PeruLaura Leon LlerenaOld Enemies, New Contexts: Early Modern Spanish (Re)-Writing of Islam in the PhilippinesAna M. Rodríguez-RodríguezArt That Pushes and Pulls: Visualizing Religion and Law in the Early Colonial Provinces of Toluca
Delia A. Cosentino
The Rhetoric of War and Justice in the Conquest of the Americas: Ethnography, Law, and Humanism in Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Bartolome de Las Casas
David M. Solodkow
Human Sacrifice, Conquest, and the Law: Cultural Interpretation and Colonial Sovereignty in New Spain
Cristian RoaLegal Pluralism and the "India Pura" in New Spain: The School of Guadalupe and the Convent of the Company of Mary
Monica DiazOur Lady of Anarchy: Iconography as Law on the Frontiers of the Spanish Empire
John D. (Jody) Blanco
Epilogue: Teleiopoesis at the Crossroads of the Colonial/Postcolonial DivideJose Rabasa
Sunday, February 23, 2014
American Society for Legal History Annual Meeting 2014: Call for Proposals
The 2014 meeting of the American Society for Legal History (ASLH) will take place in Denver, Colorado, November 6-8, 2014. The ASLH invites proposals on any facet or period of legal history, anywhere in the world. We also encourage thematic proposals that range across traditional chronological or geographical fields. The Program Committee will give preference to presenters who did not present at last year's meeting.
Travel grants will be available for presenters in need. These resources will nevertheless be limited, and special priority will be given to presenters traveling from abroad, graduate students, post-docs, and independent scholars.
The Program Committee welcomes proposals for both full panels and individual papers, though please note that individual papers are less likely to be accepted. Regarding panels, the Program Committee encourages the submission of a variety of proposals, including: traditional 3-paper panels (with a separate chair-commentator); incomplete panels lacking either one paper or a chair-commentator (whether 2-paper panels with a chair-commentator, or 3-paper panels without a chair-commentator), which the Committee will try to complete; author-meets-reader panels; and roundtable discussions.
Submission details can be found here. The deadline for submitting proposals is March 1, 2014. Proposals should be sent as email attachments to firstname.lastname@example.org. Substantive questions should be directed to Joanna Grisinger (email@example.com) or Mitra Sharafi (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Student Research Colloquium (to be held Nov. 5-6)
In 2014, the ASLH will host its inaugural Student Research Colloquium (SRC) in conjunction with its annual meeting. The SRC will offer a small group of graduate and law students an opportunity to work intensively on their in-progress dissertations and law review articles with distinguished ASLH-affiliated scholars. For details and for application information, please contact John Wertheimer (email@example.com).
Preconference on Emerging Fields (to be held Thursday, Nov. 6)
A preconference on Medieval Legal Worlds will be held before the conference. For more information, contact Michael Grossberg (firstname.lastname@example.org).
"In Clarence Darrow: Attorney for the Damned, John A. Farrell paints a brilliant portrait of the famous lawyer’s life. Going beyond the popular image of Darrow shaped by Spencer Tracy’s 1960 portrayal of a rumpled, free-thinking trial lawyer in “Inherit the Wind”—a fictionalized account of Darrow’s defense of John T. Scopes for teaching evolution—Farrell reveals a highly intelligent, compassionate, yet deeply flawed and difficult man. A preeminent litigator and a fervent defender of the underdog, Darrow was also not above stooping to unscrupulous means to win cases. He was, according to Farrell, willing to “employ any trick to save a client,” and he was twice tried for bribing jurors. Darrow’s personal life was no less complicated. Although long married to his second wife, Darrow was “a notorious rake,” according to Farrell—“a professed sensualist who took much pleasure from the chase, seduction, and act of love.”"Also in The Federal Lawyer is a review of two First Amendment books, Floyd Abrams's Friend of the Court: On the Front Lines with the First Amendment (Yale University Press) and Ronald K. L. Collins's Nuanced Absolutism: Floyd Abrams and the First Amendment (Carolina Academic Press). The review focuses "largely on the controversial decision issued by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), which ruled that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts in political campaigns. Abrams devotes considerable space to defending this decision."
There's lots on H-Net this week including a review of Saleem Badat's The Forgotten People: Political Banishment Under Apartheid (Brill Academic Publishers) about the "extra-judicial administrative process with no recourse to courts." There's also a review of Justin Buckley Dyer's Natural Law and the Antislavery Constitutional Tradition (Cambridge University Press).
"Challenging contemporary scholarship, he argues that natural law and antislavery constitutionalism are not incompatible. His thesis builds on two key principles: 1) many Americans believed that slavery violated natural law, especially its immoral imposition of one man’s arbitrary authority over another, and 2) they believed the Constitution should be interpreted as consistent with the Declaration of Independence’s commitment to those natural-law principles of equality and liberty. Dyer examines the private and public rhetoric of judges, lawyers, statesmen, and orators who challenged slavery on constitutional grounds, revealing a tradition that championed the moral right to equality against the reality that fact, custom, and law protected slavery."
Saturday, February 22, 2014
- From Slate's history blog, The Vault, "Common 19th-Century Arguments Against Women's Suffrage, Neatly Refuted."
- Via the Canadian Legal History Blog, the University of British Columbia announces the UCB Law History Project.
- Kenneth Mack, Harvard Law School, was on the Charlie Rose Show on President's Day to discuss the history of the presidency. View him here.
- Opportunities to observe the 50th Anniversary of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the Washington, DC, area (more or less) abound on Wednesday, February 26. In the morning, the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia hosts Bob Moses, who will speak on the topic Fifty Years After Freedom Summer and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from 11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m. at the Center. Then hop in your car and drive north for a program sponsored by the Historical Society of the DC Circuit that starts at 4:30. Attorney General Eric Holder will be the principal speaker, with reflections by Deputy U.S. Marshal (ret.) Richard Kirkland Bowden. The program will take place in the Ceremonial Courtroom of the E. Barrett Prettyman US Courthouse.
- Alfred Brophy’s review of Brian Z. Tamanaha’s Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging, in 92 Tex. L. Rev. 383-411, is here.
- "The founding fathers and climate change"? The Environment, Law and History blog (run by David Schorr) highlights new work by Raphael Calel.
Friday, February 21, 2014
|Credit: Carol Highsmith/LC|
This article highlights the influence of historical Anglo-American tax law developments on the formation of new political institutions and laws. In critical periods of English and U.S. history, individuals rebelled against arbitrary royal taxes. In turn, they demanded new tax laws that became embedded in documents from the Magna Carta to the English Bill of Rights to the Declaration of Independence that promoted democratic constraints on the use of state power to assess and collect taxes. Over time, the idea that individuals are entitled to equal treatment under the law, and possess inalienable human rights, emerged in part as a result of these tax law developments. The discussion in this article supports the view that pragmatic concerns over property and taxation drove important English and American political and legal reforms.
This article asks whether a historically distinct constitutional “counterrevolution” took place in 1787-88. It concludes one did, but contends that neither economic interests, nor political ideology, nor general cultural trends in the decade after Independence, fundamentally impelled this counterrevolution’s leading figures. Rather, a counterrevolutionary jurisprudence did. At the heart of this jurisprudence lay a new constellation of attitudes about the relationship between law and coercion that, notwithstanding the enormous outpouring of scholarly commentary on the framing and ratification of the Constitution in the last century, has gone unappreciated by legal scholars and constitutional historians alike. The attitudinal transformation vis-à-vis coercion among reformers proceeded in two nested intellectual shifts -- the first discursive, the second positional -- which together form the basis for what I shall call the legal counterrevolution of 1787. The article’s historical analysis of the American constitutional founding through the prism of what leading Federalists styled “the coercion of law” exposes overlooked original understandings of the Supremacy Clause, the scope of Article III jurisdiction, and judicial review under the Constitution.
Current immigration law actively undermines public health in the United States in a number of ways. Historically, federal authority to exclude immigrants on health grounds alleviated costs otherwise borne by state and local governments. Today, however, immigrant health exclusions are only minimally effective to prevent the spread of communicable disease originating outside U.S. borders. The federal and state governments confront a stark division of authority with respect to non-citizens: The federal government decides which non-citizens to admit into the country and the terms under which they may stay, while states are charged with the cost of care for foreign nationals who present a public health threat. Because the U.S. Public Health Service today has no authority or funding to accept responsibility for the health of immigrants, the cost of public health control measures falls on state and local governments, with uneven effectiveness and greatly disproportionate impact in some communities. For historical reasons, we are prone to view immigration and public health as separate interests, but they are in fact convergent. All levels of government should rethink immigration law in light of public health realities, without further delay. This article concludes with a discussion of a specific public health threat – drug-resistant tuberculosis – to provide a compelling context for the problems I identify.
Patrick Weil will be discussing the denaturalization of American citizens based on political grounds, beginning with the infamous 1909 case of Emma Goldman. Goldman was soon joined by Socialists, Communists, and Nazis, but also by Asian Americans, foreign-born Americans living abroad, and during World War II, thousands of German-Americans. Typically associated with 20th century authoritarian regimes, denaturalization affected more than 140,000 naturalized and native-born Americans since the passage of the Naturalization Act of 1906. The Naturalization Act began the transfer of naturalization authority to the Federal government, despite tense debates that divided the Supreme Court between 1942 and 1967. Professor Weil traces the historical and legal processes of denaturalization over the last century, emphasizing the key Supreme Court decision of 1967 of Afroyim v. Rusk. The decision turned the possibility of revoking citizenship into a guarantee of protection for native-born Americans, introducing in the process the theory that sovereignty belongs to citizens themselves and not the state.RSVP here
New Release: Pettigrew, "Freedom's Debt: The Royal African Company and the Politics of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1672-1752"
Unlike previous histories of the RAC, Pettigrew's study pursues the Company's story beyond the trade’s complete deregulation in 1712 to its demise in 1752. Opening the trade led to its escalation, which provided a reliable supply of enslaved Africans to the mainland American colonies, thus playing a critical part in entrenching African slavery as the colonies' preferred solution to the American problem of labor supply.A blurb of note:
"With startling precision, Pettigrew reveals the role of liberal political and market institutions in bringing about the massive eighteenth-century acceleration of the British Atlantic slave trade. All of us must ponder this deeply researched account of how 'a distinctively British conception of freedom' drove the expansion of slavery." --Christopher TomlinsMore information is available here.
Thursday, February 20, 2014
Histories of the minimum wage are usually written within national analytic frameworks. Research in the New York Public Library on the first minimum wage, legislated in Victoria, Australia, in 1896, convinced historian Marilyn Lake that a world history approach was necessary, one that located this experiment in “state socialism” in the context of both the longue duree of imperial labor relations and encounters between the subjects of the British and Chinese empires in the new world of urban Melbourne.The seminar will take place in the Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th Floor Moynihan Boardroom, in the Ronald Reagan Building, Federal Triangle Metro Stop. Reservations requested because of limited seating: email@example.com. The seminar is sponsored jointly by the National History Center of the American Historical Association and the Wilson Center.
The Yigal Arnon Legal History Workshop of Tel Aviv Law Faculty, moderated by Prof. Ron Harris, Prof. Roy Kreitner and Dr. Doreen Lustig, is happy to announce its line-up for spring 2014. The workshop meets on Wednesdays from 13:15-14:45, in room 17 of the the Zvi Meitar Center, Tel Aviv Law Faculty.
March 5 Anne Orford, Melbourne Law School
March 12 Geetanjali Srikantan, Post-Doc, TAU Law Faculty
March 19 Elizabeth Blackmar, Department of History, Columbia University
March 26 Patricia Clavin, Jesus College, University of Oxford
April 2 Arye Edrei, Tel Aviv University (TAU) Law Faculty
April 23 David Schorr, TAU Law Faculty
April 30 Rivka Brot, TAU Law Faculty (PH.D Candidate)
May 7 Ayelet Libson, Hebrew and Judaic Studies, NYU
May 14 William Forbath, The University of Texas Law School
May 21 Mark Cohen, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University
May 28 Binyamin Blum, Hebrew University Law Faculty
Here I'll deal briefly with two groups of lawyer emigrants - one known (albeit underappreciated and understudied by most contemporary American legal scholars), and another largely unknown. The first group, of course, is the Loyalists. A significant proportion of American lawyers in the 13 mainland English colonies that revolted in 1775 (two, Nova Scotia and Quebec, notably did not) remained loyal to the Crown. A good number of those worked for the Crown or had strong ties to the colonial administrations; some, however, adhered solely out of legal principle and had little sympathy with self-styled "patriots" who took up arms against the King. In a few colonies, such as Pennsylvania, some Loyalist lawyers were able to weather the storm of revolution; withdrawing to the country during hostilities, they were allowed to make their personal peace with the winning side after British and Loyalist forces were defeated. They never had to leave. In other colonies such as Massachusetts and Connecticut, most Loyalist lawyers were not so lucky. Abused, attacked and beaten, forced to take to the highway with their families, stripped of their property and sometimes even their clothes, once successful lawyers like Fyler Dibblee, a Yale graduate from Stamford, ended up boarding overcrowded British evacuation ships and sailing with their wives and children as refugees to grim and generally impecunious exile in Nova Scotia, the West Indies, and England itself.
In telling their tale to my American law students I repeatedly emphasize that at the outset of war, the Loyalist lawyers were as American as any of them, and maybe moreso. Many were from families who had been in America for generations, longer in fact than the American lineage of most of the students in my Pittsburgh classroom. Many were forced to leave the only land they had ever known for an uncertain future either in a wilderness, or in strange foreign colonies and cities. They were pointedly no citizens of the new United States, but they remained American in their background, their views, their prejudices and their social networks. In places like Nova Scotia, they infused local law and government with a new democratic energy they could not deny in themselves, maintaining cross-border family and even professional ties that subtly Americanized the legal culture of the Canadian Maritime provinces for generations. In purporting to escape the reach of American law, they ironically became vehicles of its first great exportation.
New Release: Zahler, "Ambitious Rebels: Remaking Honor, Law, and Liberalism in Venezuela, 1780-1850"
More information is available here.
In a highly engaging style, Zahler examines gender and class against the backdrop of Venezuelan institutions and culture during the late colonial period through post-independence (known as the "middle period"). His fine-grained analysis shows that liberal ideals permeated the elite and popular classes to a substantial degree while Venezuelan institutions enjoyed impressive levels of success. Showing remarkable ambition, Venezuela's leaders aspired to transform a colony that adhered to the king, the church, and tradition into a liberal republic with minimal state intervention, a capitalistic economy, freedom of expression and religion, and an elected, representative government.
Subtle but surprisingly profound changes of a liberal nature occurred, as evidenced by evolving standards of honor, appropriate gender roles, class and race relations, official conduct, courtroom evidence, press coverage, economic behavior, and church-state relations. This analysis of the philosophy of the elites and the daily lives of common men and women reveals in particular the unwritten, unofficial norms that lacked legal sanction but still greatly affected political structures.
Relying on extensive archival resources, Zahler focuses on Venezuela but provides a broader perspective on Latin American history. His examination provides a comprehensive look at intellectual exchange across the Atlantic, comparative conditions throughout the Americas, and the tension between traditional norms and new liberal standards in a postcolonial society.
Wednesday, February 19, 2014
Jews have played an integral role in the history of obscenity in America. For most of the 20th century, Jewish entrepreneurs and editors led the charge against obscenity laws. Jewish lawyers battled literary censorship even when their non-Jewish counterparts refused to do so, and they won court decisions in favor of texts including Ulysses, A Howl, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and Tropic of Cancer. Jewish literary critics have provided some of the most influential courtroom testimony on behalf of freedom of expression.More information, including the Introduction and TOC, is available here.
The anti-Semitic stereotype of the lascivious Jew has made many historians hesitant to draw a direct link between Jewishness and obscenity. In Unclean Lips, Josh Lambert addresses the Jewishness of participants in obscenity controversies in the U.S. directly, exploring the transformative roles played by a host of neglected figures in the development of modern and postmodern American culture.
The diversity of American Jewry means that there is no single explanation for Jews' interventions in this field. Rejecting generalizations, this book offers case studies that pair cultural histories with close readings of both contested texts and trial transcripts to reveal the ways in which specific engagements with obscenity mattered to particular American Jews at discrete historical moments.
Reading American culture from Theodore Dreiser and Henry Miller to Curb Your Enthusiasm and FCC v. Fox, Unclean Lips analyzes the variable historical and cultural factors that account for the central role Jews have played in the struggles over obscenity and censorship in the modern United States.
The participants will be:
Charles Barzun, University of Virginia, Law School
Susanna Blumenthal, University of Minnesota, Law School
Christine Desan, Harvard University, Law School
Laura Edwards, Duke University, Department of History
Daniel Ernst, Georgetown University, Law School
Mark Fenster, University of Florida, Law School
Robert W Gordon, Stanford University, Law School
Ajay K. Mehrotra, University of Indiana, Law School
Noga Morag-Levine, Michigan State University, Law School
Samuel Moyn, Columbia University, History Department
Cynthia Nicoletti, Mississippi College, Law School
Edward Purcell, New York Law School
Rebecca A. Rix, Princeton University, History Department
John Henry Schlegel, SUNY Buffalo, Law School
Daniel Sharfstein, Vanderbilt University, Law School
Thomas Streeter, University of Vermont, Sociology Department
Chris Tomlins, University of California/Irvine, Law School
For further information, contact firstname.lastname@example.org
[According to its website, "The Baldy Center is an endowed, internationally recognized, interdisciplinary research institute that supports research and scholarship in the broad arenas of law, legal institutions, and social policy. The Baldy Center, housed in the SUNY Buffalo Law School, collaborates with over 200 faculty members in several different departments at the University at Buffalo."]
I'm a Canadian immigrant living in the US. Some of you may have concluded this from reading Dan Ernst's introduction of me a couple of weeks ago, but it bears repeating because I think it affects what I think and what I say, especially as I begin to turn my attention in these guest posts to the history of American lawyering and lawyers. Now of course nationality is not destiny, and certainly not everything of mine that you have been or will be reading on this blog is driven or informed by my national origin and/or residency status, but ultimately I do think those things are relevant. Because of who I am, I'm unlike many of my fellow laborers (labourers?) in this particular vineyard of legal history. Not being American, I'm an outsider looking in.
From the “War on Terror” initiated during the Bush administration to the European conflict over the right to wear Islamic headscarves, the return of religion is a central challenge to inter-national law and policy in the post-Cold War. The legitimacy of international law is based on the claim that the normative foundations of modern sovereignty are agnostic to transcendental truth and political agendas. A sensibility of disenchantment, in other words, sustains the promise of international law’s emancipatory character. This article challenges the disenchantment thesis within international law through a historical and discursive analysis that draws upon diverse literature from legal theory, socio-political history, and theology. First, the article provides a revisionist history to the mainstream characterization that international law is a liberal cosmopolitan scheme of governance born through the slow divorce from a natural law and/or Christian orientation (e.g., the secularization thesis). Second, the article analyzes how the disenchantment thesis structures the options within international legal argument today, and in doing so, seeks to demonstrate that these options represent a set of false distinctions that hide the distinctly Christian core of modern international law. In conclusion, the article raises and considers the possibilities and limits of emancipation through international law in relation to its Christian orientation.Read on here.
Tuesday, February 18, 2014
The first part of the article re-frames the debate about the origins of the judicial review in Colombia, taking into account the constitutions that established notions about defending the Constitution, the contexts in which these arose, and the institutional design and implications for the exercise of judicial review of the Constitution.The full paper is available here.
The second section tells the history of the Supreme Court of Colombia since the National Constitution of 1886 to the constitutional amendment of 1910. It explores the political context in which the Court was established to be the guardian of the political-legal regime of the conservative Regeneración, and the experience of the Court in different moments of a trajectory where she started being a Court of Cassation to become a constitutional Court. This narrative shows the weakness of evolutionist approaches that assume the creation of the actio popularis (unconstitutionality) as an unavoidable continuation and development of a supposed "constitutional judicial review" established since 1886, and even of those who claim that such a judicial review had started a long time ago.
He never made it. His crew balked at the transatlantic crossing, proposed piracy at one point, and unceremoniously deposited Rastell in Ireland. Eventually returning to England, he sued the purser of one of his ships for compensation, but the lengthy litigation ultimately failed and Rastell went on to other things - among them, publishing the first English law dictionary in 1523.
The Rastell expedition is fascinating not just on its own terms, but as an early manifestation of an intense but now underplayed nexus linking English lawyers and efforts at American exploration and colonization over the next hundred years. This nexus is, I think, a much needed antidote to the conventional wisdom that lawyers were relative latecomers to America, and that prior to the mid-seventeenth century (and even for some time after that) they played but a minor role in American development. This may be technically true if we look only at lawyers in their capacity as practitioners, but if we look at them in other cultural capacities - as explorers, propagandists, investors, settlers, chroniclers and even early "framers" - it could not be more false.