Smith on Petitioning in 18th-Century Russia

Alison K. Smith, University of Toronto, has published “To Each Their Grievance Is Bitter and Unbearable”: Petitions, Autocracy, and the Rule of Law in Eighteenth-Century Russia in Law and History Review:

Over the course of the eighteenth century, Russian rulers released dozens of decrees about petitions. First, the decrees regulated the format of petitions, emphasizing their formulaic nature and moving them away from the personal appeals with supplication and abasement that were present in earlier centuries. These decrees recognized that petitions were essential to the administrative functioning of the imperial Russian state but saw them as akin to forms or applications. Second, the decrees stated firmly that petitioners should not approach the ruler directly. In part, these decrees reflect the rulers’ irritation at being endlessly bothered by personal requests, but Russia’s rulers also gave a more serious justification for the ban on personal appeals: they had established the rule of law, which meant that their subjects did not need to bother them personally and instead should clearly know other authorities—courts, governors—to address for aid. While efforts to change the format of petitions largely succeeded, efforts to curtail petitions directly to the ruler largely failed. That failure likely reflects several factors: inefficiencies in the judicial or administrative system, contradictory laws that still made space for petitions because they were useful, and because they held the promise of getting help quickly.

--Dan Ernst 

Balkin & Levinson, "Casebooks, Canons, and Constitutional Memory"

Jack M. Balkin (Yale Law School) and Sanford Levinson (University of Texas Law School) have posted "Casebooks, Canons, and Constitutional Memory." The abstract:

Why edit a constitutional law casebook? One might want to shape how professors teach the subject and how students learn it. But the influence of casebook editors is limited. Most students at most law schools will never practice constitutional law, and those that do probably deal with subjects not in the standard introductory course.

Editing a casebook involves the construction of a canon. The canon in literature is organized around  great works of excellence. By contrast, the canon in constitutional casebooks does not reflect the best opinions ever written; instead it reflects generations of political and legal struggles over the Constitution.

There are three kinds of canons in constitutional law, and in constitutional law casebooks: (1) the pedagogical canon of materials that students need to know to be well-trained lawyers; (2) the cultural literacy canon of materials that citizens need to know to understand their constitutional system; and (3) the constitutional theory canon of materials that are grist for the mill of serious academic discussion. Each of these canons has a politics, and different casebooks may align themselves with different political and legal visions and movements.

Casebooks are also sites of collective memory. A casebook foregrounds what teachers and students are likely to focus on and remember. What is left out of teaching materials is more likely to be forgotten. Hence constitutional law casebook authors are almost inevitably memory entrepreneurs, who seek to get people to remember certain things or remember them differently. But casebook editors are hardly all-powerful memory entrepreneurs. Authors must work with their coauthors to decide what materials to include and delete in successive editions. Casebook authors face serious constraints from publishers. Publishers demand frequent new editions to undercut sales of used casebooks; and they want casebooks to be ever shorter and simpler to understand.

Perhaps most important, casebook authors feel obliged to cover contemporary issues in constitutional law. Those issues are not in their control. They are shaped by the continuous interaction and collision between the political branches and the courts, and especially the United States Supreme Court. In this way the Supreme Court exercises vast control over the content and organization of constitutional law casebooks. This creates important problems of constitutional memory. If the Supreme Court overrules a line of cases, those cases are likely to be flushed down the memory hole unless casebook editors are willing to sacrifice other valued content.

The Supreme Court constantly destroys existing canons of constitutional law and reconstitutes them through its choice of cases to decide. Casebook authors must carefully consider how much of this constant churning and change is noise and how much is genuinely important and lasting for understanding the U.S. Constitution. This makes casebook authors' limited choices about what to remember especially important.

At most, by placing certain materials before professors and students,  casebook authors can provide opportunities to recall and absorb what is most important about our constitutional traditions. Yet what others do with those materials--and those memories--is ultimately beyond casebook authors' control. 

Read on here.

 

--Karen Tani