Lawrence J. Liu, who received his JD in 2022 from the Yale Law School and is now a doctoral candidate in the Jurisprudence and Social Thought Program at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, has posted Independence through Judicialization: The Politics Surrounding Administrative Adjudicators, 1929-1949, which is forthcoming in the Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law:
One front in today’s battle to define the scope of the administrative state concerns the authority, status, and future of its 10,000-plus administrative adjudicators. Decisions by federal courts and the executive branch to increase the dependence of administrative adjudicators on the executive have sparked strong reactions from observers, with many advocating for measures to increase adjudicator “independence.” But who should administrative adjudicators be independent of, which ought to be independent, and why?--Dan Ernst
Calls for administrative adjudicator independence are not new. This Article draws on primary documents produced by private actors, congressional decisionmakers, and federal executive agents to present a political legal history of legislative proposals between 1929 and 1949 to understand whether, how, and why different actors sought to insulate administrative adjudicators from their agencies or the President. Leading up to and following the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, politicians and interested citizens advanced proposals to increase the independence of the individuals who conducted hearings and served as factfinders in administrative agencies. Then, like now, observers debated administrative adjudicator independence in the context of discussions about the power of administrative agencies. The loudest supporters of independence were anti-New Dealers trying to halt and reverse the growth of administrative power, who were joined by a subset of legal professionals interested in using law to check its operation. These critics attempted to “judicialize” administrative adjudication by increasing the resemblance of administrative adjudicators to the federal judiciary.
What does this history teach? First, it illustrates how actors past and present deploy seemingly apolitical terms like judicial values, independence, or administrative procedure to obtain substantive political ends. Indeed, such terms can take on different meanings at different times, perhaps varying with views of the federal judiciary and active government, the policies and political strength of the President, the issues decided by administrative agencies, or the types of claimants subject to adjudication. Second, it highlights how early supporters of administrative agencies emphasized the diversity among administrative adjudicators, while opponents grouped them together to collectively limit their authority. Today, rather than pursuing one-size-fits-all reforms, I suggest that different rules should apply to different administrative adjudicators depending on the questions and claimants involved. Decisions about ratemaking or regulatory enforcement differ from individualized determinations whether citizens qualify for government benefits or licenses. Claims by business interests might be treated differently from those by more vulnerable groups, such as disability-benefits recipients or noncitizens at risk of removal. In any event, when making policy recommendations, reformers should begin by understanding who administrative adjudicators are and the functions they perform, an understanding that also underscores whether and how politics should animate arguments about adjudicator independence.
