Thursday, March 26, 2026

AJLH 64:4

We're a bit late in noticing it, but the American Journal of Legal History 64:4 has been published

Mr Locke’s enclosure: the uncommon law of property in the Second Treatise
Hannah Carrese

John Locke, famously, told a property origin story. This article tells a property theory origin story, asking how Locke’s property theory, which omits common rights, emerged from a common law of property that centred them—and showing how this omission influenced the colonial American law that Locke drafted. Locke was silent on or rejected the common law of property, which recognized common rights and defences against privatization of commons through enclosure. Instead, Locke adopted law reform arguments lauding enclosure because it improved waste land. Locke’s property theory therefore attempts to improve the common law of property by orienting it around private rather than common property. He asks a question about the origin of property absent from common law: how do we create private rights to common land? He takes ‘waste’ to have purely negative connotations, avoiding the neutral meanings of that word at common law. And he stipulates that enclosure of English commons requires only tacit consent of commoners, excluding common law defences against enclosure. Locke’s is an equal opportunity enclosure. His spoilage principle and plan to reform Virginia’s land laws sought to benefit the poor by preventing vast enclosures and rural depopulation. However, he theorized a clean chain of title, absent in common law, which could prevent messy disputes over wealthy estates. This article shows the common law background from which Locke departed, thus deepening understanding of both our private property regime, often justified by Locke’s property theory, and a sometimes-overlooked alternative to it, the common law of property.
The laws of ‘an old and settled society’? The law of contract in New South Wales 1815–1850
Warren Swain

The history of contract law in New South Wales in the decades after the closure of the Court of Civil Jurisdiction in 1814 has not received much attention from legal historians. This is an important omission. At the heart of this story is a simple but critical inquiry: the way in which the law of contract in the colony mirrored or diverged from the law of contract that applied back in London. This was rarely a matter that judges addressed explicitly. Piecing together the relationship is an exercise in reconstruction. This can only be done by examining the body of case law. The creation of the Australasian Colonial Legal History Library, combined with readily searchable newspaper reports, has made this easier. The evidence in the mid-nineteenth century is still sometimes sketchy. Context is relevant. The colony moved from a quasi-military penal colony to a significant hub of commercial activity. The period also saw a shift in the legal system as the old informal systems evolved into a much more legalistic one. For the most part, New South Wales contract law was aligned with that in England. Some issues, like the desertion of sailors demanded local solutions. There are other examples in which well-established English contract doctrine did not necessarily fit very well with the conditions of the colony.
Who is a central bank for? The founding and legal design of the Bank of Canada
Dan Rohde

The Bank of Canada is an independent Crown corporation that sees its primary responsibility to be promoting Canada’s economic welfare by maintaining low and stable inflation. When it was first created in 1934, however, the Bank was a radically different institution—a privately owned corporation primarily meant to anchor Canada’s economy globally and manage foreign exchange. Not only was the Bank not tasked with managing inflation, but key policymakers behind its founding thought doing so would be a severe mistake. This article offers the first legal history of the Bank’s founding. It maps the enormous public debate that accompanied the creation of the Bank and the various, often contradictory visions expressed for it. The article labels these five visions: a Bankers’ Bank, a Government Bank, an Imperial Bank, an Economists’ Bank, and a Bank of the People. The article then looks at the original legal design of the Bank and argues that it largely fit the Imperial Bank model. Charting this history helps us better understand this vital organ of Canadian government, and has the potential to upset many of our accepted, contemporary notions of central banking.

--Dan Ernst