Maureen E. Brady, Harvard Law School, has posted Story's Anxiety: The Problem of the Local in General Law, which is forthcoming in University of Chicago Law Review Online:
A century ago, general law occupied an uneasy place in the American legal system. Back in its heyday, dusty corners of private law were the areas most affected by the general law versus local law question. Today, its comeback involves much more glamorous terrain: the federal Constitution. This Essay argues that before and after Swift v. Tyson, general law could neither answer nor escape the question of how much local variation to tolerate. “Story’s anxiety” is the gap between Justice Story’s aspiration of one law—not one at Rome, another at Athens—and the reality that certain corners of private law persistently arose out of local circumstances or depended in part on local content.
Joseph Story (NYPL)
Disagreement over the permissible scale and legal force of local private law and local custom long predated Swift. At the height of the general law era, local practice entered general law in at least three ways. It could supply the content of a general standard, as with ordinary diligence. It could define how rights were acquired and recognized, as with possession or the creation and recognition of western water rights. Finally, a local practice could become the general standard, as some of the general law cases on negligence and due care illustrate. A principle framed abstractly enough to accommodate local conditions may be nominally uniform, but it could produce radically different outcomes on the ground. A rule specific enough to guarantee uniform outcomes gains determinacy, but risks illegitimacy as it grows disconnected from local practices and expectations.
This trade-off becomes especially consequential when general private law is incorporated into federal constitutional law. At Swift’s apex, state courts remained free to reject a federal court’s view of general private law as wrong in intrastate tort, contract, or property cases. When the Supreme Court canonizes a particular understanding of general private law as the only constitutionally permissible one, state courts and legislatures lose that freedom, and federal courts lose an important feedback loop they had in the Swift era: state courts rejecting or distinguishing their general law approaches. If Justice Story’s aspirations for the general law are having a revival, his anxiety deserves one too.
--Dan Ernst
