Monday, November 16, 2026

JACH 4:4


The Journal of American Constitutional History completes its fourth full year of quarterly publication with issue 4:4, now available online:

Constitutional Interpretation without a Constitution: Debating Union in the Early United States
Jonathan Gienapp

Debates over the American union that preceded the drafting of the U.S. Constitution of 1787 are often overlooked, but they had lasting significance. In particular, because these early debates followed an unusual path, they helped entrench a particular interpretive habit: deciphering the powers of the United States required first understanding the nature of the United States. Before American statesmen had codified articles of union outlining the formal powers of the national government, that government was exercising broad power to prosecute the war for American independence. This experience taught American statesmen how to engage in constitutional interpretation without a formal constitution at hand—by debating the unwritten constitution of union that all were capable of discerning and delineating. That habit of interpreting union first and constitution second did not disappear once formal constitutional documents were adopted but rather deeply shaped constitutional interpretation for decades to come.
A Patchwork Oligarchy: State Court Approaches to the Police Power During the Progressive Era
Joseph A. Ranney

During the Progressive Era (1890-1920), reform-minded politicians and jurists criticized court decisions cabining legislative use of the police power to meet the needs of a society and economy increasingly based on collective rather than individual forces. Many accused the courts of using doctrines (collectively labeled substantive due process) to preserve an inequitable economic and political order; others argued that the courts’ decisions were legally principled, not political. The debate continues to this day. Most scholars have concentrated on federal rather than state court decisions and have failed to test each side’s arguments through systematic analysis of court decisions. This article is an initial effort to fill both gaps.

The article examines the Supreme Court decisions of six states—New York, Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina, Colorado and California—from multiple perspectives including the proportion of police-power laws each of these courts struck down over the course of the Progressive Era, and their approaches to different categories of laws that came before them for constitutional review. The six courts listened to Progressive criticisms: as those criticisms peaked (1909-1913) the courts’ strike-down rates began to decline, and they continued to do so until the end of the Era in 1920. Judicial use of the doctrine most frequently invoked in striking down police-power laws, namely due process as a shield of property and liberty rights, also declined.

Not all categories of police-power laws met with judicial hostility. Business regulation laws, labor laws, and laws authorizing government enterprises were the most likely to be struck down, but public health and safety laws and sumptuary laws received substantial judicial deference throughout the Progressive Era. There was also variation among the six states. Five followed the pattern of strike-down rate decline during the late Progressive Era but at different paces, and North Carolina’s Supreme Court maintained a very low rate throughout the Era. It remains to be seen whether other state courts responded to Progressive criticisms in similar ways, but the consistency of patterns among six states from different regions suggests that that may be the case.

The Chief Magistrate
Daniel D. Slate

This Article recovers an overlooked historical source for the American presidency and identifies its implications for executive power. Founding-era portrayals of the “‘Hebrew Republic”’ not only had not only an exclusionary influence that forever delegitimized kings in America but also shaped the creation of the Article II executive. Cognate scholarly disciplines, including history and political theory, have recently acknowledged the decisive influence the Hebrew Republic had on early modern theories of constitutional government, including those of the American Revolution. The legal community has yet to grapple with the implications of these recently rediscovered sources for current debates about executive power. Additionally, although the broader scholarly recovery of Hebraic republicanism and its influence has focused on its antimonarchism, to date there has to date been little study of the model of executive power internal to the Hebrew Republic. This Article initiates that study and argues that model had a significant effect on Founding-era thinking about what made for an ideal republican executive and ultimately shaped the Article II presidency. Although the delegates to the 1787 Federal Convention arrived divided, differing sharply on about what an executive for a national republic ought to look like, by the end of the Convention the president they instituted shared a remarkably close resemblance to the chief magistrate of the Hebraic republicans, including: (1) being commander in chief of a federated polity’s national military efforts, yet being neither king nor dictator; (2) operating through the rule of law and being subject to legal process, including criminal penalties and removal from office; (3) sharing significant powers concurrently with a senate; (4) being constitutionally required to be a natural-born citizen; (5) being the only national figure acclaimed as the representative of the people at large; and (6) bearing the non-kingly title of President. My claim is not that the writings of the Hebraic republicans are the only pertinent source material, but rather that studying their effect on Founding-era America is necessary for any analysis of the original presidency that aspires to be comprehensive and account for all relevant historical evidence. One implication of my argument is that we should resist recent attempts to give a “royalist” interpretation to the Article II presidency. Instead, this Article argues that our law should reflect that the president shares many of the features of the Hebraic republicans’ chief magistrate, including: being always and immutably subject to the rule of law (and not in any way above it); being a decidedly republican and not a royalist executive; and, when exercising discretionary powers, doing so in ways controlled by respect for the worth of the individual person, even under the exigent pressures of emergency and crisis.

--Dan Ernst