Reva Siegel (Yale Law School) and Mary Ziegler (UC Davis) have posted "Abortion's New Criminalization—A History-And-Tradition Right to Healthcare Access After Dobbs and the 2023 Term." The abstract:
Since Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization reversed Roe v. Wade as contrary to the nation's history and traditions, efforts to ban abortion appear as calls for a return to tradition. But criminalization after Dobbs is not a return to the past; it is a new regime, in certain respects less restrictive, and in others far more so. Today, states criminalize access to urgently needed health care for pregnant patients in ways they never have before. Cases in the Court's 2023 Term, Moyle v. United States and Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, demonstrate these trends. Under Dobbs, do abortion bans that break with history and tradition in obstructing access to urgently needed health care violate liberty guarantees of state or federal constitutions?
We present evidence that the nation has long had a tradition of exempting health care from criminalization that extended to abortion law and was expressed in the many state laws cited in Dobbs’s appendices, as well as in the text and case law of the Comstock Act. This tradition demarcated quite self-conscious limits on state action that were reiterated across jurisdictions and over time. We demonstrate that under Dobbs and Washington v. Glucksberg, such a tradition can guide interpretation of the Constitution’s liberty guarantees, even if access was not historically understood as a right. We show that courts in states with abortion bans view history-and-tradition analysis of this kind as faithful to Dobbs and have begun to employ it under their own state constitutions.
Finally, we defend this account of our law against an originalist reading of Dobbs advanced by Professor Stephen Sachs asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment only protects rights historically recognized as such at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. We argue that Sachs’s reading conflicts with important aspects of Glucksberg and Dobbs, misconstrues Dobbs’s reasons for turning to history and tradition, and, in the process, imposes constitutionally offensive status inequalities on the Constitution’s liberty guarantees.
Addressing these questions, we suggest, contributes to the broader debate about how history and tradition can guide constitutional inquiry. Posing concrete questions of Dobbs illustrates how much of Dobbs has yet to be written, showing the many senses in which, as Justice Barrett writes in Vidal v. Elster, “a rule rendering tradition dispositive is itself a judge-made test.”
The full paper is available here.
-- Karen Tani
