The locution “law and . . . (some other discipline)” implicitly asserts the primacy of legal doctrine and institutions narrowly conceived for coming to understand phenomena in which law takes a part. The ordinary story of American legal theory – formalism then realism then contemporary legal thought – can be understood to repeat the triumphalism implicit in “law and . . .”. Of course, the story of American legal theory could possibly be read differently -- as a series of responses to the inability of law to dictate the terms of its use and so as evidence law’s subordination to other ways of understanding such phenomena. Such a possibility would dictate a different ordering of important words into “. . .and Law.” This paper attempts to examine the plausibility of the latter locution by examining some of the crucial bodies of knowledge and recurrent actions of putatively non-legal actors that led up to the no longer recent Great Recession.H/t: Legal Theory Blog, where my Georgetown Law colleague Lawrence Solum adds: “Fascinating. I especially recommend this short and readable paper for younger legal scholars from whom the developments in legal theory in the 1980s and early 1990s are ‘history.’”
Wednesday, June 22, 2016
Schlegel on the Great Recession and Recent Legal Thought
John Henry Schlegel, SUNY Buffalo Law School, has posted . . . and Law, which is forthcoming in In Search of Contemporary Legal Thought, ed. Justin Desautels-Stein and Christopher Tomlins: