Thomas Duve, Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory, has two papers on normativity as a framework for legal history. The first is Legal History as an Observation of Historical Regimes of Normativity:
In the last few years, the research at the Department “Historical Regimes of Normativity” at the Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory has increasingly been guided by two conceptual ideas: the analysis of “legal history as a history of the translation of knowledge of normativity” and the integration of these findings into an analytical framework called “Historical Regimes of Normativity”. The understanding of “legal history as a history of the translation of knowledge of normativity” is explained in a separate working paper (mpilhlt research paper series N°. 2022-16). It is recommended to read the paper on "translation of knowledge of normativity" first. The present paper introduces the concept of “Historical Regimes of Normativity”.It consists of five parts. In a first part, I sketch out in a very general way our understanding of “Historical Regimes of Normativity” (I.). In the second part, I give an example (II.). In the third part, I add some comments on the different uses of the term “regime” (III.). In the fourth section, I briefly point out some intellectual opportunities this concept offers (IV.). I close with a brief remark on the relation between this approach and other theories (V.).The second is Legal History as a History of the Translation of Knowledge of Normativity:
In the last few years, the research at the Department “Historical Regimes of Normativity” at the Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory has increasingly been guided by two conceptual ideas: the analysis of “legal history as a history of the translation of knowledge of normativity” and the integration of these findings into an analytical framework called “Historical Regimes of Normativity”. The understanding of “legal history as an observation of Historical Regimes of Normativity” is explained in a separate working paper (mpilhlt research paper series N°. 2022-17). This paper consists of five parts. In a first part, I sketch out in a very general way our understanding of legal history as a history of the translation of knowledge of normativity (I.). I then introduce the legal-theoretical foundations of this perspective (II.) and explain some advantages of speaking of “knowledge” and “normativity” and not of “law” and “legal knowledge” (III.). In the fourth part, I summarize some intellectual opportunities of using the concept of (cultural) translation (IV.). In the epilogue, I connect this paper with the paper on "Historical Regimes of Normativity" (V.).--Dan Ernst
